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Abstract

This thesis is about current Centrelink breach and appeal figures. It is also about
the current conservative neo-liberalising climate of Australian social policy reforms,
with which they are inextricably connected. It shows that while Centrelink breach
numbers have increased more than three fold since 1996, formal appeals against
Centrelink decisions have not increased similarly. This thesis asks: what might this
mean? It answers this question through a single case study of a Centrelink office. Data
was collected using individual focused interviews, documents collected from the site,
and direct observation (including a map of the office drawn by the researcher). Various
possible interpretations drawn from the social policy literature were evaluated in
relation to the case study findings. Interpretations included the neo-liberals, advocates,
new-contractualism, the view that surveillance is oppressive and an interpretation that
draws from the work of Michel Foucault. The thesis found that Foucault's work on
discipline and governmentality-particularly his ideas about surveillance and
individualisation-was the most relevant interpretation of Centrelink breaching and
appeals to the case study data. Much evidence was found for these governing
techniques, and their imperfection. The thesis concludes that the current conservative
neo-liberal based reforms, including the new breach regime, show undue confidence
about their ability to govern individual Centrelink clients.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Background and Some Definitions

Australian social security payments have had some form of activity requirement
or proof of eligibility since 1945, and to some extent before this (Carney & Ramia
1999). Requirements have varied from needing to provide proof of identity, to proof of
need, to proof of actively looking for work. More recently, proof of actively
participating in society is required to meet some payments.

Linked with these requirements was some form of penalty for non-compliance.
This may have involved the denial or reduction of payment. New Australian penalty
rates were introduced in July 1997. They have since been the source of great
controversy, culminating last year in a report from the Office of the Commonwealth
Ombudsman (2002) and also the Report of the Independent Review of Breaches and

Penalties in the Social Security System (Pearce, Disney & Ridout 2002). The new
penalties are summarised in Figure 1. In most of the Australian literature, such penalties
are referred to as 'being breached'. The term breach will therefore be used throughout
this thesis to refer to the action or non-action for which a penalty is imposed, and being
breached will refer to the penalty 1 •

1

It is also important to remember that a Centrelink breach means non-compliance not
fraud. Welfare fraud is a criminal offence in which dishonesty is intentional. Breaches
rarely involve criminal intent and welfare fraud rates have not increased at the same rate
as breach rates (ACOSS, 2000, p. 4). Indeed, according to the Australian Council of
Social Service (ACOSS), in 1998-99, out of the 6 million Australians receiving social
security, less than 0. 1% were found to have fraudulently obtained benefits (ACOSS,
2000, p. 4).

Administrative
breach

¢=J

�-------�

B

I

Breaches

I

Q
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Activitybreach

B

16 per cent reduction for 13

18 per cent reduction for 26

weeks. This reduces payment by $59.99

weeks for the 1st Activity Breach. This

to $3 14.91 per fortnight. This is a total

reduces payment by $67.48 to $307.41

penalty of $389.94.

per fortnight for this period. This is a
total of $877 .3 7.

ALTERNATIVELY,

a client could choose a 100 per
cent reduction for 2 weeks. This would
be a total loss of $374.90.

B

24 per cent reduction for 26
weeks for the 2nd Activity Breach. This
reduces payment by $89.98 to $284.92
per fortnight for this period. This is a
total loss of$ 1, 169.74.

B

100 per cent reduction for 8
weeks for the 3rd Activity Breach. This
reduces payment by $374.90 to $0.00
per fortnight for this period. This is a
total loss of$ 1,499.60.

Figure 1. The financial penalties of different breaches, as applicable at
28th October 2002 (FaCS, 2002, 3.2.11.20, 3.2.11.10).
Payment amounts are calculated from the Newstart
Allowance (NSA) single rate (FaCS, 2002, 5.1.8.20).
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Currently, there are two major categories of breaches; administrative breaches
and activity test breaches. An administrative breach occurs when a client refuses or
fails, without sufficient reason, to comply with a notification requirement. Notification
requirements include:
•

attending an office of Centrelink2 when asked to do so,

•

notifying Centrelink of changes to their circumstances,

•

replying to letters from Centrelink, or

•

providing a required tax file number (FaCS, 2002, 1. lB.90).

An activity test3 breach occurs when a client does one of the following:
•

refuses or fails to attend a job interview without sufficient reason,

•

fails to complete a labour market program without sufficient reason,

•

is dismissed from a labour market program for misconduct,

•

refuses to declare, or fails to correctly declare, earnings from employment,

•

becomes unemployed voluntarily without sufficient reason,

•

becomes unemployed due to misconduct,

•

fails to accept suitable job offers without sufficient reason,

•

has not applied for a particular number of job vacancies (FaCS, 2002, 1. lB.90).
The main difference between these penalties and the preceding rates4 is the

incremental reduction of payment for an activity breach according to whether it is the
first, second or third breach. Previously, an activity test breach incurred a non-payment
period according to both the length of time on payment, and whether it is a first or
second breach.
2

Centrelink is the Australian government agency currently responsible for the day-to
day administration and payment of most federal government income support payments.
3
New Start Allowance and Youth Allowance recipients, both jobseekers and students,
must satisfy an activity test to qualify for their payment. The activity test is different for
NSA and YA recipients. (Faes, 2002)
4
Here I mean the rates that the current rates have replaced, not all rates since 1945.
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The previous system was criticised for two connected reasons. The first criticism
was that it was too harsh because it left clients with no payment after a first
infringement. The second criticism of the system was that it was ineffective because
Centrelink officers were reluctant to breach clients when it meant they were
immediately denied income for a period. The current penalty rates were designed to
combat these two problems (Moses, 2000).

However, advocacy agencies have been alarmed at an apparent explosion of
breaches being administered by Centrelink (ACOSS, 2001a; 2001b; 1999; WRAS,
2000). For example, the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) report a 189%
increase in the number of penalties over the three years from June 1998 (ACOSS,
2001a). Reports with titles such as Kicking them while they 're down (Mullins, 2002)
and Stepping into the breach (The Salvation Army Australia, 2001) are critical of the
new penalty rates. They claim that the new regime makes it easier for a Centrelink
officer to administer a breach. Further, they claim, this combines with the introduction
of new complex activity requirements to effectively target the most vulnerable of
Centrelink clients-particularly the homeless and the young (Mullins, 2002). Indeed,
between 1996 and 1998 some significant additional requirements for payment were
introduced, such as:
•

Activity agreements, now called preparing for work agreements, for all unemployed
people were introduced in September 1996 (FaCS, 2002, 1.1.P.510),

•

Additional mutual obligation initiatives that certain job seekers aged between 18 and
35 must meet while receiving income support were introduced in July 1998 (FaCS,
2002, l. l .M.170),

•

The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c) in which some Youth Allowance (YA)5 and
Newstart Allowance (NSA)6 recipients must detail between 6 and 10 employers
contacted per fortnight (FaCS, 2002, 6.2.1.80),

5

A fortnightly income support payment for people generally aged between 16 and 20,
and full-time students aged between 21 and 24 (FaCS, 2002).
6
Newstart Allowance is an income support payment, payed fortnightly (FaCS, 2002).
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•

Work for the dole for some YA and NSA recipients between 18 and 34 years old
(FaCS, 2002, 3.2.8.80), and

•

Employer contact certificates which provide written verification of a client's
approach to a prospective employer (FaCS, 2002, 6.2. 1.50).

Additionally, in March 1998 the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES),
which had administered free job search assistance since the 1940s (Department of
Employment Workplace Relations and Small Business, 2000), was replaced with a
network of private and government run Job Network Agencies (JNA). Since then all
YA and NSA Centrelink clients have been required to sign with one (or more) of these
agencies to receive payment (FaCS, 2002, 6.2.1.80). Such additional requirements,
according to the advocacy agencies, have been difficult for many clients to cope with
(ACOSS, 2001a; ACOSS, 2001b; Mullins, 2002; WRAS, 2000).

Of particular concern to the Welfare Rights Advocacy Service (WRAS) in
Western Australia was the apparent low number of Centrelink clients who appealed in
1998- 1999 despite the increasing quantity of breaches. An appeal means a formal
questioning of a Centrelink decision by a client. The WRAS state that "of the 165,492
breaches imposed in 1998-99, only 2,393 ( 1.5%) were the subject of a review or appeal"
(WRAS, 2000, p. 5). They conclude that this reflects the vulnerability of those being
breached. WRAS assumes that those who are too vulnerable to avoid incurring a breach
are also too vulnerable to seek a formal appeal of this breach.

Such concerns have led to two independent reviews of current social security
penalties-one by the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman (2002) and also the

Report of the Independent Review of Breaches and Penalties in the Social Security
System (Pearce et al., 2002). Both reports were critical of the unnecessary hardship
caused to clients by Centrelink's administration of breaching penalties. For example, the
Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman was concerned that clients were not being
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notified prior to being penalised, and thus being denied the opportunity to explain their
action.7

However, since 1 996-1 997, the formal Centrelink appeals system8 in Australia
has also met with controversy. The current three tiered formal appeal system is
illustrated in Figure 2. The appeal structure is an hierarchical three tiered system of
administrative review of increasing generality. The first level of appeal is an internal
review of the decision by a Centrelink Officer called an Authorised Review Officer
(ARO). A client who is still unhappy with this decision can lodge an external appeal
with the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT). Finally, if the client is unsatisfied
with this decision-and has the stamina-an appeal may be lodged with the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which deals with all Commonwealth
administrative appeals. Appellants cannot skip a level of appeal; they must complete an
ARO review before appealing to the SSAT. Similarly, they must have an SSAT
decision before appealing to the AAT (SSAT, 1 997a). Centrelink clients are also
expected to appeal to the original decision maker before they can lodge an appeal with
an ARO. Clients may also approach the Commonwealth Ombudsman and their local
Member of Parliament to resolve grievances. The Commonwealth Ombudsman and
Member of Parliament may be approached at any time, in any order.

7

Following these reports some minor changes were made to the breaching regime.
Since July 2002, clients who failed to attend an interview with Centrelink no longer
incurred an automatic administrative breach (Ziguras, Dufty, & Considine, 2003, p. 1 1 ).
They could now have their payments suspended and reinstated if they have a reasonable
excuse.
Further changes to the breaching regime were enacted in early 2003, including
extending activity testing to parenting payment clients whose youngest child is over 1 2
years old (Ziguras et al., 2003, p. 1 1 ). Also, from September 20, the amendments
provided by the Australians Working Together and other 2001 Budget Measures Act
2003 (Cwth) will allow people who receive a first breach, but comply with the relevant
requirement within 4 weeks, would have the penalty reduced to 8 weeks.
8

The appeals system is also often referred to as merits review. An appeal or merits
review is the process whereby an administrative decision of the government is reviewed
"on the merits": that is, the facts, law and policy aspects of the original decision are all
reconsidered afresh and a new decision- affirming, varying or setting aside the original
decision- is made (Administrative Review Council, 1 995, pp. 9-1 0).
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Step three. External appeal to the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal (AAT)
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Figure 2. The three tiered review of Centrelink decisions

The current appeal system is the result of lobbying by the civil rights movement
of the 1 970s and has not changed structurally since the 1 980s (Carney, 1 998). However,
it is under pressure to reform. In 2 000-2001 the government unsuccessfully proposed
the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2000 and Administrative Review Tribunal
(Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2000 (Hansard, 2000, p. 23494-

23505). This was an attempt to merge the SSAT, AAT and other external review bodies
into a "one stop shop" that would be called the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART).
It was argued that this was required for "fair, just, economical, informal and quick"
external review of administrative matters, including social security matters (The
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives, 2000, p. 1 68).
While the SSAT and AAT provide multi-tiered review with routine representation by a
lawyer or social worker, the ART was to provide a single tiered review, where
appellants need special permission to be represented by either a lawyer or social worker
(The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives, 2000).
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Also, the matter would be heard by a single person rather than the current SSAT panel
(The Parliament of the Commonwealth ofAustralia House of Representatives, 2000).

Despite remaining structurally intact through such pressures to reform, clients'
ability to access the formal appeal system has been effectively reduced. Clients' access
to appeals has changed in two ways. First, only Centrelink decisions can be appealed
formally, not JNA agreements or their other dealings with clients (Owens, 2 001 ). Since
clients must deal with at least one JNA to receive payment, this means that some of the
requirements for payment are not subject to formal appeal. Second, Centrelink has
changed the way clients access the first level of formal appeal-the ARO. Rather than
have the AROs separate from the Centrelink offices that administer day-to-day
payments, over the last five years most AROs have been moved into Centrelink offices
(Centrelink, 2000a). Since a Centrelink client must appeal to an ARO before proceeding
to an external appeal with the SSAT, the ARO plays an important gate-keeping role in
the appeals structure.

Thus, not only are breach numbers increasing significantly, but a Centrelink
client's scope to appeal a breach has changed. It seems WRAS's (2000) observation
about the low number of appeals in 1 9 98-1 999 was pertinent. However a low appeal
rate in 1 998-1 999 partnered with an increase in breach numbers from 1 998 to 2001 is
not sufficient data to claim that high breach and low appeal numbers are related to
policy changes. The years do not correspond. More information from the period of
policy change is required to make such claims. Because the new breach regime, new
activity requirements and the changes in scope for seeking an external appeal have all
occurred since 1 996-1 997, then an analysis of breach and appeal numbers since 1 9961 997 is required.
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Breach and Formal Appeal Numbers from 1996-1997 to 2000-2001

While breach numbers have increased markedly from 1 1 3,100 in 1 996-1 997 to
346,078 in 2000-2001 , appeal numbers have not increased similarly. This will be shown
using a comparison of breach numbers, and relevant ARO, SSAT and AAT appeal
applications. Figure 3 represents breach and appeal numbers from 1 996-1 997 to 20002001 graphically, while the actual figures are shown in Table 1 .9

9

While I presented and analysed similar data in Sleep (2002), here the data is updated
and reworked.
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10

Data represents the number of breaches, not the number of people breached.
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Table 1. Centrelink breach1 1 and appeal numbers from 1996-1997 to 2000-2001
1998- 1999

1999-2000

2000-2001

1996-1997

1997- 1998

ARO
applications
received

33,462 (DSS,
1997, p. 296)

43,074 (FaCS, 47,375 (FaCS, 36,043 (FaCS, 40,920
1999, p. 134,
1999, p. 274) 2000, p. 145, (Centrelink,
274)
200 1, p. 104)
268)

SSAT
applications
received

1 1,353 (DSS,
1997, p. 296)

9214 (FaCS,
1999, p. 134,
268)

9246 (FaCS,
1999, p. 274)

7766 (FaCS,
2000, p. 145,
274)

7,651
(Centrelink,
2001, p. 104)

AAT
applications
received

1328 (DSS,
1997, p. 296)

1797 (FaCS,
1999, p. 134,
268)

1797 (FaCS,
1999, p. 274)

1592 (FaCS,
2000, p. 145,
274)

1,375
(Centrelink,
200 1, p. 104)

54,085

58,4 18

45,401

49,846

TOTAL formal 46, 143
appeal
applications

TOTAL
breaches

1 13,100
120,718 (Office 212,900 (Office
(Moses, 2000, ofthe
of the
p. 5)
Commonwealth Commonwealth
Ombudsman, Ombudsman,
2002, p. 1)
2002, p. 1)

302,078 (Office 346,078 (Office
of the
of the
Commonwealth Commonwealth
Ombudsman, Ombudsman,
2002, p. 1)
2002, p. 1)

Figure 3 and Table 1 show total breach numbers. It is important to note that the
number of breaches is represented rather than the number of people actually breached.
Also, the current incremental breach regime was not implemented until March 1997
(DSS, 1997, p. 108) and the figures are drawn from various sources so are not reliable
for accurate statistical anal"ysis. Nevertheless, the general pattern is striking-the total
number of breaches almost tripled over this period.

However, the number of appeals shows a different pattern. Figure 3 shows total
formal appeals while Table 1 shows formal appeals as ARO applications received,
11

As for Figure 3, the data here represents the number of breaches, not the number of
people breached.
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SSAT applications received, AAT applications received and total formal appeal
applications. The formal appeal rate appears flat when juxtaposed to the increase in
breach numbers since 1 997-1 998. However, the ARO, SSAT and AAT data in Table 1
reveals some subtle patterns. The greatest proportion of formal appeals are lodged at the
ARO level. This is not surprising because all appeals to the SSAT and AAT must first
pass through the ARO level. However, while the number of ARO appeals has been
generally stable from 1 996-1 997 until 2000-2001 , in 1 996-1 997 and 1 997-1 998 the
ratio of ARO appeals to breaches imposed was almost one formal appeal to three
breaches. This drops to almost one formal appeal to four imposed breaches in 1 9981 999 and then one appeal to eight breaches in 2000-2001. Even if we note that each
appeal is not necessarily about a breach, the pattern is striking. Fewer and fewer
breaches seem to be appealed formally from 1 996 to 2001.

The greatest number of SSAT appeals were lodge in 1 996-1 997. The 1 996-1 997
SSAT Annual Report observed that this was an unprecedented high (SSAT, 1 997b, p.
18), but neglected to explain it. The report described the figures as dropping back to
normal despite "expecting a further increase in appeal lodgements in 1 997-1 998"
(SSAT, 1 997b, p. 1 8 ). SSAT appeal numbers then dropped slightly from 1 998-1 999
until 2000-200 1.

The pattern of AAT application numbers is even more subtle. Here the greatest
number of appeals were in 1 997-1 998 and 1 998-1 999. However the more subtle pattern
and slight peak in 1 997-1 998 rather than the SSAT's peak in 1 9 96-1 997 and 1 997-1 998,
are not surprising when two important points are considered. First, the changes were
less obvious because all social security payments are represented, not just those subject
to activity breaches like the SSAT data12 • Consequently, the pattern is effectively

12

For the SSAT data, only appeal applications pertaining to activity tested payments
such as YA, NSA and Austudy are included. However, AAT data includes all social
security matters, not just payments which involve breach penalties. Therefore, the AAT
data also includes such payments as family support payment, single parent and old age
pensions. It is also important to note that the payments have changed name over this
period. For example, Job Search Allowance and NSA were amalgamated in September
1 996. Also, YA was introduced from 1 July 1 998. It replaced Austudy for 1 6 to 24 year
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diluted. Secondly, AAT appeals peaked a year later than SSAT appeal numbers due to
the time required for matters to reach the higher level AAT, usually 3-6 months (AAT,
1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001). It is highly likely that many people who
appealed to the SSAT in 1996- 1997 did not reach the AAT level until 1997- 1998 (AAT,
1997; 1998). Due to this time lag effect the peak in AAT appeal numbers in 1997- 1998
corresponds with the peak in SSAT appeal numbers in 1996- 1997. Also, like the SSAT
appeal numbers, the AAT rates decreased slightly from 1998- 1999.

Thus, while Centrelink breaches have increased from 1997-1998 to 2000-200 1,
formal appeal numbers have effectively stagnated. This disparity has been shown by
comparing breach and appeal numbers from 1996- 1997 to 2000-200 1. During this
period major social security policy changes have been implemented. Centrelink and the
JNAs have replaced the Department of Social Security (DSS) and CES, and the new
breach regime, new activity requirements and the changes in scope for seeking an
appeal have all been implemented. This thesis asks the apparently simple question

what might this mean?

Outline of Thesis

This thesis is about current Centrelink breach and appeal numbers. Put simply,
it is an interpretation of these figures. It attempts to interpret the breach and appeal
figures through a case study of a Centrelink office, which includes semi-structured
interviews with Centrelink clients.

However, interpreting breach and appeal numbers is more complex than it may
first seem. This is for two reasons. The first reason is that, with the exception of WRAS
(2000), a sustained analysis of the relationship between the current increase in breaches
but not appeals has not, to my knowledge, been attempted. The second reason is that
olds, Youth Training Allowance for 16 to 17 year olds, and NSA and Sickness
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neither breach nor appeal numbers occur in a political or social vacuum. Indeed,
different approaches to social policy can be used as the basis of differing interpretations
of current breach and appeal numbers. For example, one might argue that an increased
breach rate but stagnation of appeal numbers means that the current system is
working-it's catching the 'bludgers' (Howard, 1 999). In contrast, ACOSS (2001 a;
2 001 b; ACOSS & NWRN, 2000) argues that the current increase in breaches reveals an
overly harsh regime, while the stagnating number of formal appeals indicates that few
income support recipients are able to protect their rights. Consequently, different
approaches from the social policy literature will be considered.

However, an analysis should go even deeper than this. This is because it is
impossible to separate interpretations of breach and appeal numbers from ideas about
what welfare is and should be, and what humans are and should be. Indeed, is welfare a
citizenship right (Marshall, 1 949/2000) or a hindrance to entrepreneurial success
(Hayek, 1 959/2000)? If welfare is a citizenship right, then should Centrelink clients be
coerced into doing certain activities in order to receive income support (Lawrence M.
Mead, 1 991/2000)? If welfare is a hindrance to personal freedom, then should clients be
punished for not complying with Centrelink procedure? Are economic markets the best
way to distribute wealth and provide welfare (Smith, 1 974), or do people need to be
protected from the violence of these markets through state based redistribution of wealth
(Titmuss, 1 968/ 1979)? If economic markets are the best distributor of resources, then a
low number of formal appeals against Centrelink decisions is not a concern, the number
of people on welfare is. If people need to be protected from the market, then the few
formal appeals against Centrelink is a serious concern because it means people have no
state protection against the increasingly market orientated Centrelink. Therefore, an
analysis of the current breach and appeal rate should consider different possible
interpretations, with consideration of their foundational assumptions, about social
welfare and humanity. This thesis will attempt to do this.

Therefore, this thesis is essentially exp/orative. It aims to explore different
approaches' interpretations of the current breach and appeal figures. It hopes to
Allowance for 1 6 to 20 year olds. (Faes, 2002)
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contribute to the study of Centrelink: breaches and appeals by conducting an explorative
case study of a Centrelink: office, interviewing Centrelink: clients about the breach and
appeal regime, and drawing from an interdisciplinary battery of social policy and
sociological approaches. I hope this shows possible interpretations of the current
disparity of breach and appeal numbers that may not have been considered by scholars
and policy makers in the area. More modestly, I hope anyone interested in the current
breach and appeal regime will benefit from a review of some relevant literature on
breaches and appeals, and some modest original research on this topic.

This thesis is comprised of eight chapters which are organised into three parts
Part A, Part B and Part C. Chapters One to Three incorporate Part A, which sets the
ground work for the analysis of the remaining sections.

Chapter One has shown that there is a disparity of Centrelink: breach and appeal
numbers between 1996-97 and 2000-01. It also outlined the current breaching system,
and the current appeals structure.

Chapter Two demonstrates that simply showing that there is a disparity of
breach and appeal numbers is insufficient evidence with which to argue that there is any
meaningful relationship between these numbers. It thus shows the need for more
information about the social context of breaching and appealing. In other words: what it
is like to be breached and to seek (or decline to seek) a formal appeal. A case study of a
single Centrelink: office is justified as an appropriate method to explore the social
context of breaching and appealing. It explains how data was collected using various
techniques-individual focused interviews, documentation, and direct observation. The
method for analysing this evidence is then outlined. Since this is an explorative study, it
is shown that the most effective analytical method is to evaluate different theoretical
frameworks according to the case study data. In other words, the study sets out to see
which theory fits the case best. Approaches evaluated in relation to the case study
findings include the neo-liberals, advocates, new-contractualism, the view that
surveillance is oppressive and an interpretation that draws from the work of Michel
Foucault.
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However, before different theoretical perspectives are evaluated according to the
case study findings, the nature of the current Australian welfare regime must be
established. This common ground is required for the different perspectives to be
comparable. Chapter Three considers various methods of categorising welfare states.
These include levels of expenditure, residual and institutional welfare systems, levels of
citizenship (civil, political and social), the "three worlds of welfare capitalism" (Esping
Anderson, 1990/2000), and contemporary flavours of neo-liberalism (Hayek, Mead and
Murray). Through considering these different categorisations, Chapter Three establishes
that the current-Australian welfare regime is essentially neo-liberalising. The remaining
chapters work on this basic assumption to evaluate different possible explanations for
the disparity of breach and appeal numbers in the light of the case study data.

Chapter Four and Five comprise Part B of this thesis. Part B concentrates on
mainstream political views about breaches and appeals-neo-liberal-and its most
public opposition-the advocates. It moves the analysis beyond the neo-liberals and the
advocates to an emerging analysis known as new-contractualism.

Chapter Four deals with the neo-liberals and the advocates. The neo-liberals
represent the mainstream view of social policy in Australia (2000a; McClure, 2000b ).
They hold the 'hard line' that breaches are necessary to ensure Centrelink clients
comply. In contrast to the neo-liberals, the advocates include organisations who aim to
advocate on behalf of the disadvantaged. Exemplar organisations include WRAS ( 1999;
2000), ACOSS (2001a; 2000) and The Salvation Army of Australia (2001). They are
particularly concerned about the frequency and size of the financial penalty borne by
those already living in poverty under the current Centrelink breaching regime. In
Chapter Four the neo-liberals' position is outlined, their interpretation of current breach
and appeal numbers is described, and then evaluated. The advocacy view is then given
the same treatment.

Chapter Five considers new-contractualism accounts. They argue that the current
breach and appeal numbers reflect a new fetish for contractualism in Australian public
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policy, especially in welfare provision. Within this perspective, two influential accounts
seem to be emerging-an account influenced by Terry Carney's ( 1998; 1994; 1999;
2001; 200 1) analysis, and one influenced by Anna Yeatman ( 1997; 1998; 1999). This
chapter deals with these different accounts separately. Carney's account is outlined, his
interpretation of current breach and appeal numbers clarified, and then evaluated in light
of the case study evidence. Yeatman's account is then treated similarly.

The remaining three chapters make up Part C of this thesis. They focus on the
role of surveillance and individualisation in Centrelink breach and appeal numbers.
Chapte:t," Six deals with accounts that view surveillance as oppressive, including that of
William De Maria ( 1992). De Maria argues that the appeal system is one of the many
methods by which the powerful oppress. These approaches are outlined, and their
interpretation of current breaches and appeals indicated, and then evaluated.

Chapter Seven draws from Michel Foucault's ( 1977; 1991) influence and
considers his interpretation of surveillance and individualisation, which has been
developed by Mitchell Dean (1995; 1998; 1999) and others. This analysis draws from
studies on discipline and govemmentality. These terms are outlined, their interpretation
of breach and appeal numbers clarified, and finally evaluated according to the case
study findings. According to this view, surveillance and individualisation are
disciplinary techniques that create particular types of Centrelink clients. Other
disciplinary techniques include normalisation and distribution. According to this
approach, these disciplinary techniques are also inevitably incomplete. The evaluation
shows that there is much evidence for these disciplinary techniques in the case study
findings, and also much evidence of their failure.

Chapter Eight then concludes the thesis. Through exploring some different
interpretations of the current Centrelink breach and appeal numbers, and evaluating
their relative strengths and weaknesses, this thesis argues tentatively in favour of an
approach that draws from Foucault's work on discipline and govemmentality. The
increase in breach and but not appeal numbers since 1996 is shown to reflect both the
success of disciplinary techniques in creating governable Centrelink clients, and the
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failure of these techniques. It demonstrates how governable Centrelink: clients are
trained not to seek appeals. Most alarmingly, it demonstrates how the breach and appeal
system does not always create compliant active jobseekers, but also creates cynical
individuals who expect their basic rights to be violated. This results in individuals who
associate being breached with the random incompetence of Centrelink rather than any
action of their own. It concludes that the techniques for making a Centrelink: client into
an active jobseeker are imperfect and, thus, the conservative neo-liberalising Australian
social policy reforms are over confident.

Clients, Customers or Latent poor?

However, before continuing, I must justify my use of the term Centrelink clients.
This term has implied meaning, as any term used to describe this group of people does.
For example, American neo-liberal writer Charles Murray refers to this group of people
as the "latent poor" because they "would be poor if it were not for government help"
(Murray, 1982/2000, p. 100). In contrast, left leaning writer Margaret Conley prefers to
use the term "unemployable" (Conley, 1982). She explains that:

The terms "undeserving", "unworthy", and "vicious" have been applied
to paupers, vagrants, drunks, beggars and homeless, but what makes this
group so undeserving and so prone to attracting derogatory labels, is that
they do not work. Most have not chosen a life of non-work, for unlike
those born into wealth, people born into poverty usually find a life of
unemployment pays very badly. Most of the paupers, the undeserving,
belong to a group known as the unemployable, and what makes them
unemployable is that their particular skills (or lack of skills) are either no
longer, or never have been, marketable commodities. (Conley, 1982, p.
281)

I could have chosen to use one of these terms rather than Centrelink: clients. I
could also have used the term welfare recipients or beneficiaries. However, few of these
terms are used in current debates. The terms recipients and beneficiaries were common
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in the 1 9 70s and 1 980s, but they are now considered too passive. Some current writers
use the term ' underclass' to refer to people who may have never worked in their lives
and who don't expect to. They perceive an underclass of helplessness and
intergenerational dependency on welfare (compared to Dean & Taylor-Gooby, 1 992}
similar to the "jobless families" and "job poor communities" that McClure (2000a, p. 2)
finds "disturbing". However, it is the underclass analysis that misunderstands the
constitution of Centrelink clients. Research has found many Centrelink clients do
experience short bursts of casual work between periods of unemployment-a
phenomenon known as "job churning" (Le & Miller 1 999). This was a phenomenon
experienced by many of the clients interviewed. Centrelink clients could also be seen as
a 'labour pool' or ' reserve work force'. However, the terms ' underclass', 'labour pool'
and ' reserve work force' do not distinguish between those working poor who may be
breached by Centrelink and those who have no relationship with Centrelink and, as
such, cannot be breached by them.

Advocacy agencies like ACOSS and WRAS use the term 'Centrelink client' to
indicate a service based relationship. The federal government takes this service
relationship even further and uses the term ' customer' in its official documents 13
(Centrelink, September 2000) to indicate a consumer relationship between customers
and government service providers. The use of both of these terms reveals a shift in
rationality in governing the unemployed in Australia, and will form an important part of
the analysis of this thesis, particularly in Chapter Seven. For now, let it suffice to say
that by using the term Centrelink clients as the default term, we allow this shift to be
perceptible.

13

Although the terms ' bludgers' and 'people living on handouts' have been used by
politicians when addressing the nation (Howard, 1999), the term customers is more
common in official departmental documents.
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Some Notes on Language

Some of the language used by the interviewees might offend some people.
Although I could have edited this 'bad' language to make it less colourful, I decided to
leave it unaltered. As Jim, one of the interviewees explained:

If you're scraping all that [bad language] you're you're not
understanding . . .. Use it. Otherwise you're, you're not getting my
frustration, you're not getting how I feel. And I've been feeling it for a
long time.

Thus, both as an attempt to help us understand how some interviewees felt, and as a
respectful gesture to Jim, the more colourful language used by some interviewees
remains unaltered in this thesis. I mean no disrespect by including it, and I hope no one
is offended. Also, being aware of the gender dimensions of conventional grammar, I
have chosen to use the plural 'their' rather than 'his' or the clumsy 'his/her' when
referring to individuals.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHOD: EXPLORING CENTRELINK BREACH AND APPEAL
FIGURES

Chapter One showed a disparity between current Centrelink breach and appeal
figures. This chapter outlines the methods used to explore these figures. First, it justifies
the use of a case study of a single Centrelink office. It then outlines the data sources
used, which included interviews with Centrelink clients as they were leaving the office,
documentation collected from the office, and direct observation. Third, it outlines the
techniques used to analyse the data to explore the significance of the current Centrelink
breach and appeal numbers. Finally, it outlines some ethical considerations, explains
some ways the validity and reliability of the study were facilitated, and some limitations
of the study methods.

A Case Study of a Centrelink Office: Justification

There is currently a disparity of Centrelink breach and appeal numbers.
However, simply describing the contrast between breach and appeal figures is not
sufficient evidence to claim there is a relationship between them. To claim a
relationship with this data alone commits the same logical fallacy as claiming there is a
relationship between an increase in media interest in crime and an increase in the actual
crime rate (Jupp, 1989). The two figures do not necessarily correlate. More data is
needed. To my knowledge, the only research that has attempted to investigate a possible
relationship between the current breach and appeal numbers has been done by WRAS
(2000). However, they point out that their data is limited by its reliance on anecdotal
evidence rather than a systematic inquiry into the relationship. Consequently, to
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understand if there is a relationship between breach and appeal numbers, more evidence
is required.

Furthermore, the Centrelink breach and appeal figures described in Chapter One
are not just abstract numbers-they happen to people. It is Centrelink clients who are
breached, and who officially have access to the formal appeals structure. Despite this,
no systematic research has attempted to explore a possible relationship between clients
being breached and possible reasons for seeking a formal appeal. While some important
research has investigated the experience of being breached (ACOSS, 200 1 a; ACOSS,
2001b; Lackner, 2001 ; Moses, 2000; Mullins, 2002; Office of the Commonwealth
Ombudsman, 2002; Pearce et al., 2002; The Salvation Army Australia, 200 1 ; WRAS,
2000; Ziguras et al., 2003), this research does not link the breaches to appeals. While
this research is useful and valuable, it offers insufficient evidence for any relationship
between current breach and appeal numbers.

The Wallis Consulting Group (2001), funded by FaCS, does link concerns about
the breach rate with appeals. Their concern, however, is perfunctory. Their analysis
consists of a six line paragraph (Wallis Consulting Group, 200 1 , p. 62), and research on
appeals consisted of two closed-ended survey questions. Their concern, however, does
not extend to the appeal numbers over the period that the breach figures increased so
markedly. It also is not particularly interested in the experience of being breached or
seeking an appeal: the Wallis Consulting Group (200 1 , p. 5) surveyed 3003 NSA and
YA (unemployed) Centrelink clients over the phone using primarily closed-ended, short
answer questions. This research alone does not provide sufficient evidence for any
relationship between breach and appeal numbers.

It is from the social context that evidence of any relationship between these two
figures can be obtained. In other words, more data about the phenomenon of the
disparity of breach and appeal numbers in its social context is needed. According to Yin
(1 993, p. 3 1) this constitutes a case study. An exploratory case study method was used
in this research.
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So, what case did I study, why was this case chosen and how did this proceed?
The case used in a case study can be a person, a town or even a country. In this research
the case was a particular Centrelink office-this included the clients that visited the
office and the layout of the office. It also included the forms and fliers used by that
office to communicate with clients (although these were produced in Canberra, they
were collected from the site). A Centrelink office is one of the few places where
Centrelink clients congregate in one place, and where they all experience Centrelink
decisions (including breaching) and can collect information about seeking a review and
also lodge an appeal. Although a Centrelink office is by no means the only place where
Centrelink clients experience Centrelink decisions or can seek a formal appeal, it is a
place where these processes are linked.

Another possible case might have been the SSAT or AAT. This would have
allowed collection of contextual data about seeking a formal appeal, however a
Centrelink office was preferred. This is because it allowed the social context of all
Centrelink decisions and appeals to be studied at a single site. For a similar breadth of
data both the SSAT and AAT would need to be studied-leading to many cases rather
than one. Also, the AAT and SSAT would not allow the context of actual Centrelink
decisions to be analysed, just appeals. To study a Centrelink office was a more resource
efficient and effective approach.

Another possible case might have been a JNA office. Indeed, this is where much
of the management and surveillance of Centrelink clients occurs, for example, through
negotiated agreements. However, JNAs do not administer breaches nor allow Centrelink
clients to appeal their decisions (Owens, 2001). To study a Job Network office to
explore Centrelink breaches and appeals would miss the phenomenon entirely. A
Centrelink office is a more appropriate site to study the social context of Centrelink
breaches, Centrelink decisions and formal appeals.

Also, although a number of offices throughout Perth could have been sampled,
this would not have significantly increased the representativeness of the sample
especially nationally. Perhaps if offices could be randomly selected from each state and
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territory a nationally representative sample could be obtained. However, this type of
generalisation is not the aim of this project. As Stake ( 1995, p. 7-8) wrote, "the real
business of case study is particularisation, not generalisation. We take a particular case
and come to know it well". It is through a deeper contextual understanding of a
Centrelink office that a deeper understanding of the significance of the current breach
and appeal figures can be obtained. To concentrate on a single Centrelink office does
not detrimentally limit an exploratory project such as this. To study any more offices, at
this stage, would be an inefficient use of limited resources.

The particular Centrelink office was selected according to the pragmatic criteria
explicated by Stake: "time and access for fieldwork are almost always limited. If we
can, we need to pick cases which are easy to get to and hospitable to our inquiry"
(Stake, 1995, p. 7-8). The particular office chosen was close to the researcher's base.
Further, its layout was suitable for conducting interviews with Centrelink clients
without needing permission from Centrelink. It had an appropriate area on the footpath
outside the office to conduct interviews. There was a metal bench that was obscured
from the Centrelink officers working inside. The bench was also close enough to the
exits to approach potential participants and obscured from the road so participants
didn't need to be embarrassed to be seen outside the Centrelink office. It was also
sheltered from the sun and rain. These factors were shown to be important when I
attempted to conduct interviews outside another Centrelink office. Although one
interview, with Jed, was completed, a Centrelink officer who could see the interviewee
and myself from inside the office interrupted it. I was concerned about the interviewee's
privacy. It was also physically uncomfortable for potential interviewees and myself
outside the other Centrelink office, as there was nowhere to sit down, no shelter and too
much traffic noise.

Data was collected from the selected office usmg a variety of sources
interviews with Centrelink clients after they visited the office, documents such as forms
and fliers found in the office, and direct observation inside the office which included
drawing a map of the office layout. According to Yin ( 1989, p. 84-95) these are
common sources of evidence for case studies. Each source is elaborated below.
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Individual Focused Interviews

Individual focused interviews of Centrelink clients were conducted. Although a
particular set of theoretical frameworks were being evaluated, including neo-liberal,
advocacy, new-contractualism, one that views surveillance as oppressive and one
derived from the work of Michel Foucault, I still needed to provide room for
unexpected responses. This is because the study was essentially explorative. According
to Minichiello et al. ( 1995) individual focused interviews permit this exploration and
flexibility, within a broad framework. This is because in individual focused interviews
"the topic area guides the questions being asked, but the mode of asking follows the
unstructured interview process" (Minichiello et al. 1995, p. 65). Clients' accounts of
Centrelink decisions, payment postponements, breaches, appealing, and their account of
the appeal system itself were sought. Please see Appendix A for the interview schedule.

Information about Centrelink clients' accounts of the appeal system was
obtained through a series of open-ended and closed-ended questions. An example of a
closed-ended question is:

"To what extent are you aware that you have a right to have decisions of
Centrelink subject to a review by an Authorised Review Officer?"

I-------I
Very aware

Somewhat Aware

I-------I
Not Sure

Not Aware

An example of an open-ended question about appeal system knowledge is:
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"What rights do you think you have when you disagree with a decision
taken by Centrelink?"

Demographic information was also collected. 14 Also, room for unforseen information
was allowed through broad questions such as "would you like to add anything else to
this conversation?" The interviews were taped and interviewees were encouraged to
speak freely if they wished-all did to some extent. Interview duration ranged from 1 0
minutes to almost an hour.

As Minichiello suggests (Minichiello et al. 1 995, p. 80), the interviews consisted
of three main sections-an opening, topical sections and a closing. A "funnelling"
process of questioning was used (Minichiello et al. 1 995, p. 84). This means "as the
participants engage in conversation, the interviewer guides the informant's view
towards more specific" and personal issues (Minichiello et al.1 995, p. 84). This gently
built rapport with participants and encouraged them to discuss their experiences with
Centrelink. This is especially important for research with income support recipients.
Brewer found in his interviews with Australian unemployed people that some were
initially "wary and defensive" when discussing feelings about their situation (Brewer,
1 980, p. 47).

Sampling

Interviewees were sampled from the population of Centrelink clients who visited
the Centrelink office, and might incur an activity or administrative breach. Although the
topic of the thesis is Centrelink breach and appeal numbers, clients were interviewed
regardless of whether they had been breached. This is for two main reasons. First, this
research aimed to explore interpretations of the breach and appeal figures. An answer to
this question required information about all Centrelink clients' knowledge of the
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appeals system, not just those who have been breached. Second, it was difficult to
discern who was breached before the commencement of an interview. I believe it would
have discouraged people from participating if they were approached with a question
about their breach record (following the experience of Brewer, 1980, p. 47). This would
also preclude the funnelling questioning technique outlined above. Also, to find out that
someone had not been breached while conducting the interview, and then discard his or
her contribution, would be inappropriate. Further, as will be shown later, some clients
seemed confused about whether they had indeed been breached.

Three techniques were used to try to obtain a random sample of potentially
breached Centrelink clients leaving the Centrelink office. First, following a technique
described by Neuman ( 1991), every seventh person exiting the Centrelink office was
invited to participate in the research. Second, I aimed for a balance of different
demographic groups, such as age and gender, following Lowenstein's ( 1997) study.
Lowenstein obtained this balance through a somewhat organic process; simply
continuing interviewing until a loose balance emerged. The male/female ratio of
participants in this project was 13/9. Please see Table 2 for the age groups sampled. At
least one member of each age group indicated participated in the study; unfortunately no
one over 5 5 participated. Aged pensioners and disability support recipients used another
entrance and were thus not sampled. Since people receiving these payments cannot
incur either an activity or administrative breach, they are not relevant to the study.
While most of the interviewees were under 35 years old, this may reflect the general
population of clients who used the Centrelink office and might incur a breach rather
than sample bias. There are more Centrelink clients who are under 35 years old
receiving payments that are subject to the breach regime than older clients (FaCS, 2003,
p. 28, 30, 32, 36). Third, time stratified sampling-Monday morning first week,
Monday afternoon second week, Tuesday morning third week, and so on (similar to
Carrington, 1993 )-was used.

14

This was a requirement of the Western Australian WRAS, who I worked with in the
early stages of this project. The Western Australian WRAS also helped develop the
interview schedule.

40

Table 2. Age group of participants

Age group

Number of participants

1 5-2 1

3

2 1 -24

7

25-34

8

35-44

3

45-54

1

Total

22

A total of at least thirty Centrelink clients was originally anticipated, continuing
until I reached a point of theoretical saturation, end of research time, or no more willing
participants. Twenty-two interviews were sufficient for this exploratory project. A brief
description of each interviewee is listed along side their pseudonym in appendix C.

Recruiting interviewees

Recruiting Centrelink clients has proved problematic for many researchers since
they are a geographically decentred group. However, researchers who have conducted
immediate, in-situ interviews outside government offices (Fitzpatrick, 1 987; Turner,
1983), or job clubs (Brewer, 1980; Fitzpatrick, 1 987) have experienced the most
success. Indeed, no person approached by Turner (1 983) outside DSS offices declined
to be interviewed. In contrast, advertising in local newspapers seems the least successful
technique employed, with Fitzpatrick ( 1987) receiving only one response, and that
being abusive. In the light of past successes and challenges, I recruited people from
directly outside the Centrelink office, and avoided advertising in newspapers.
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I was concerned that Centrelink clients may be reluctant to talk with me if they
thought I worked for Centrelink. Therefore, I needed to distinguish myself from
Centrelink. I wore smart-casual clothing Geans and a t-shirt, not a business suit),
introduced myself as a Masters student from Edith Cowan University doing research on
Centrelink breaches and appeals, reassured them of my independence from Centrelink
and gave them a declaration and consent form to read (see Appendix B).

It is important to consider that not all people who enter or exit a Centrelink
building are Centrelink clients (they may be staff for example). However, a sufficient
percentage of the human traffic were Centrelink clients and this approach to recruitment
was successful. Most people approached participated, which reflects past research that
recruited unemployed people directly from the office (Fitzpatrick, 1 987; Lowenstein,
1 997; Turner, 1 983, p. 2-3).

Ethical considerations

The Edith Cowan University ethics committee for research on humans approved
the interview research methods. Interviews were only conducted after the interviewee
gave informed consent. Informed consent meant that, after I informed the participant of
the nature of the research, their anonymity, and freedom to decline at any time without
giving reasons, the interviewee signed the informed consent form (see declaration and
consent form in Appendix B). It was essential that the participants understood that the
research was independent from Centrelink. This means that participation involved no
financial benefit or punishment, nor could it be used for mutual obligation.

Since some YA recipients are minors, special consideration of their rights was
required. Before the potential participant signed a consent form, I established whether
they were a minor. I asked them ifin doubt. No one I approached was a minor.
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Each participant's confidentiality was maintained by using pseudonyms on the
cassette tapes and transcripts of interviews, and in the research report. No participant's
real name or actual contact details were recorded on the tapes, transcripts, interview
schedules or in the final research report.

If any interviewee stated they wished to seek an appeal of their breach, or asked
for information about appealing breaches, then I referred them to relevant services. I
carried brochures produced by local community legal centres, and phone numbers for
the SSAT and Ombudsman. This documentation was not available from the Centrelink
office. However, other documents that were available from the office were important
sources of evidence for this thesis.

Documentation

The documents collected from the Centrelink office for this research are
described below. All documents, except for the customer charter (Centrelink, September
2000), were obtained through a Centrelink officer because they were not available
without this contact. According to Yin ( 1 989, p. 86) documents should not be seen as
unbiased accounts of the working of, for example, a Centrelink office or action of a
Centrelink client. Rather, they should be understood to be a particular view point. Also,
"for case studies, the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment
evidence from different sources" (Yin, 1 989, p. 86). The documents used in this thesis
included:

Application for payment of Newstart Allowance (Centre/ink, 2 May 2000)
(also known as the 'fortnightly ' form). This is a double sided A4 sheet which must be

completed personally by NSA clients every fortnight and returned to a Centrelink office
to ensure payment continues. Mitchell Dean ( 1 998, p. 95) used the 'fortnightly' form to
demonstrate how the ethical lives of the unemployed are governed.
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The jobseeker guide (Centre/ink, 2000d) and jobseeker diary (also known as
the 'dole ' diary). Together they comprise a small stapled aqua and purple printed
booklet, in which The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c) is a removable insert. The

jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c) (37 pages) is where the client records job search
activity in detail. It is removable so it can be lodged at a Centrelink office after twelve
weeks of diary keeping. A new diary is then collected by the client for completion over
the next twelve weeks. The jobseeker guide (Centrelink, 2000d) ( 1 8 pages) is for the
Centrelink client to keep private job search notes and contains job search tips, similar to
the "Job Search Kit" referred to in Mitchell Dean's research ( 1 998, p. 95).

What we can do to help each other: customer charter (Centre/ink, September
2000). This is an information pamphlet. It is glossy and printed in green and orange
ink. They are very common-laminated copies of this pamphlet were on the counters of
the Centrelink office. The pamphlet outlines appropriate behaviour for both Centrelink
and its clients.

Claim for Newstart Allowance (Centre/ink, 2000b) and Notes for Newstart
Allowance (Centre/ink, 2000e). An A4 sized booklet, matt printed in purple and green
ink. The Claim for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000b) is a 23 page form that must
be completed by a client, often in an interview with a Centrelink officer, in order to
apply for NSA. The 8 page Notes for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000e) is a
smaller booklet insert of instructions for completing the NSA application form.

Direct Observation

As Yin ( 1 989, p. 9 1 ) suggests, direct observation ranges "from formal to casual
data collection activities". The formal observation in this study included a map of the
office layout drawn by the researcher during a visit to the office in early 2002. Casual
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observations were also noted throughout the research, particularly when interviewing
Centrelink clients.

Analysing Evidence

Data was analysed according to different possible explanations of current breach
and appeal figures in the Australian social policy literature-from neo-liberalism, to
advocacy, to new contractualism, to surveillance as oppressive, to an approach drawn
from the work of Michel Foucault. This process was similar to Yin's "explanation
building" where "the case study evidence is examined, theoretical positions are revised,
and the evidence is examined once again from another perspective" (Yin, 1989, p. 1 13115). Different evidence was used to evaluate different possible explanations. For
example, interviews with Centrelink clients were invaluable for evaluating the neo
liberal, advocacy, and new-contractualism approaches, while the documents and map
derived from direct observation were most useful for evaluating the approach drawn
from the work of Michel Foucault. Like most existing case studies, this analysis will
proceed in narrative form (Yin, 1989, p. 113)-through critically applying and
evaluating each approach according to the evidence. The neo-liberal and advocacy
approaches will be the first to be evaluated, then the new-contractualism approach, then
the oppressive surveillance approach, and finally an approach that draws from Michel
Foucault's ideas.

Validity and Reliability

According to Yin ( 1994, p. 92), case studies that use multiple sources of
evidence curbed potential validity (or accuracy) problems. Using different data sources
also allowed me to triangulate these different sources to corroborate findings. Further
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validity was enhanced by analysing the data according to different possible
explanations, and evaluating these different possibilities (Yin, 1 993).

I reduced the chance of a biased sample of interviewees, and thus improved the
validity of the research, in four ways. I attempted to obtain a balance of different
demographic groups, used time-stratified sampling methods, interviewed as many
people as possible, and consulted with industry professionals such as WRAS.

The reliability (or reproducible nature) of the research was facilitated by keeping
a research diary, and describing my research and analytic method. Also, using the same
interviewer (myself) and following the same research schedule at each interview
enhanced the reliability of the interview findings.

Methodological Limitations

However, any conclusions made through this research should be tempered with
an understanding of some methodological limitations of the study. We must remember
that a single case study was used. A single Centrelink office was studied in detail. While
this allowed detailed information about a particular office to be collected-such as the
indiscriminate nature of breaching and many clients' attitudes to appealing-this was
only one case. This means that any attempt to extrapolate these findings to the entire
population must be cautious. I have no reason to assume the particular office studied
was representative of all Centrelink offices. However, I have no reason to assume it was
significantly different either. As Stake (1995) explains, inferences can be made from a
small number of cases; however they must be made with caution and with consideration
of other possibilities. I hope I have done this through considering different
interpretations of the breach and appeal numbers.
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The data collection techniques also had potential limitations that should be
recalled here-particularly the interviews. Some of these limitations are listed below.

•

Despite all my efforts, interviewees (also people who declined to be interviewed)
may still not have believed I was independent from Centrelink and may have altered
their responses accordingly.

•

My age and gender may have influenced people's responses to my questions. Since
I was the only interviewer, I was very sensitive to this while conducting the
interviews and also during the analysis of their transcripts.

•

I was only able to interview unemployed people who could access the Centrelink
office; my sampling excluded people from regional Australia, and people who were
too ill to attend Centrelink.

• Since I conducted the interviews in English, I am aware that non-English speakers
were excluded from the sample.

Conclusion

Numerical figures alone provide insufficient evidence for a relationship between
breach and appeal figures. More data on the social context, which links Centrelink
decisions such as being breached to the formal appeals structure, is required. An
exploratory case study of a single Centrelink office, incorporating documentary
evidence, individual focused interviews, and direct observation, was used. The case was
analysed according to an evaluation of different social policy interpretations of the
current breach and appeal figures. Chapter Four explores and evaluates the neo-liberal
and advocacy interpretations of current Centrelink breaches and appeals. Chapter Five
explores and evaluates the new-contractualism writers' interpretations. Chapter Six .
explores and evaluates some oppressive surveillance accounts. Finally, Chapter Seven
evaluates the discipline and govemmentality analyses of current Centrelink breach and
appeal figures.
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However, as Esping-Anderson ( 1990/2000, p. 155) postulated in his seminal
taxonomy of welfare regimes, "we cannot test contending arguments unless we have a
commonly shared conception of the phenomenon to be explained". In the context of
exploring possible explanations of the current breach and appeal numbers through a
case study of a Centrelink office, the specific phenomena are breaches and appeals.
These breaches and appeals exist within the context of the Australian welfare regime.
Therefore, we must establish an understanding of the Australian welfare regime before
different interpretations of the breach and appeal figures can be tested against the case
study findings. The Australian welfare regime is the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE AUSTRALIAN WELFARE REGIME

This chapter will establish a conception of the current Australian welfare regime.
This will be used as a basis for the pending evaluation of different explanations of
current breach and appeal numbers. As explained in the previous chapter, without this
the pending evaluation will be less convincing. However, establishing a conception of
the Australian welfare state is a complex task.

A very general definition of a welfare state is a state that accepts "responsibility
for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens" (Esping-Anderson,
1990/2000, p. 154). According to this definition, Australia could be considered to be a
welfare state. However, this definition is too general for three reasons.

First, this definition is too general because it does not address questions about
the level of state responsibility, how this responsibility is administered and whether this
is a desirable method. In short, it ignores the diverse ways that different governments
have attempted to guarantee welfare. For example, social democratic governments like
the Scandinavian countries have a different approach to welfare than Australia, America
and Britain which are often referred to as liberal welfare regimes (Esping-Anderson,
1990/2000).

Second, the above definition is too general because even within a particular
welfare state there are different forms of service provision. For example, Richard
Titmuss (1968/1979) famously extended the common sense definition of welfare as
income relief to include all social benefits from governmental redistribution of wealth.
He perceived direct income relief to be the equivalent of the tip of an iceberg of the
entire social spending by government. The submerged bulk of the iceberg of social
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spending, according to Titmuss, is enjoyed by the middle and upper classes through tax
breaks, industry subsidies and general infrastructure like roads.

Similarly, more recent Australian writers (such as Bryson, 1 992; McMahon,
Thomson, & Williams, 2000; Williams, 1 989) distinguish different types of welfare
within the Australian welfare state. They distinguish social welfare from occupational
and fiscal welfare. Social welfare, according to McMahon (2000, p. 1 0) includes
"government-individual benefits redistributed from taxation to those who are eligible in
relation to defined and strictly evaluated need". It is applied mostly to the poorer
sections of the population. In contrast occupational welfare is defined as welfare that
includes benefits paid "to wage and salary earners over and above their pay, including
those referred to as fringe benefits" (Bryson, 1 992, p. 1 3 1 ), such as company cars and
travel expenses. And fiscal welfare "is the use of the taxation system to reduce the
amount of taxes paid on certain approved goods and services" (McMahon et al. 2000, p.
1 0) such as investments. Both occupational and fiscal welfare benefit the middle and
higher income earners more than the poor. They continue to explain that:

In addition, the welfare state also delivers education, health, policing,
cultural and recreational services. Like occupational and fiscal welfare,
these services also favour those who are already better off. (McMahon et
al. 2000, p. 1 0)

Third, the above definition of the welfare state is too general because it ignores
that the Australian welfare regime has changed over time. For example, in the
nineteenth century social welfare provision was handled by voluntary organisations,
such as the Benevolent Society of New South Wales (Conley, 1 982), while in the post
war period social provision was administered primarily by the Federal Government of
Australia.

Consequently, the general definition of a welfare state offered above is over
simplistic. It does not consider differences among welfare states, different welfare
provisions within welfare states, or historical changes. Another definition is required. A
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taxonomic system helps to establish the best way to conceptualise the current Australian
welfare regime. Different writers, however, offer different categorisations of welfare
states. For example, some writers distinguish among welfare states according to the
level of expenditure, others according to the type of welfare provision-residual or
institutional, and others according to citizenship rights. Therefore, an understanding of
the current Australian welfare regime should consider different categorisations of
welfare states. Consequently, this chapter will consider the distinctions made by the
level of expenditure writers, then Richard Titmuss, then TH Marshall, then Esping
Anderson, then some neo-liberal writers. These different categorisations will form the
organisational structure of this chapter.

Categorising Welfare States

Levels of expenditure

One taxonomy of welfare states focuses on the level of social expenditure,
assuming that more expenditure indicates a greater commitment to welfare (Esping
Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 55). However, relating this to Australia is problematic. On
the one hand, Peter Saunders (then Director of the Australian Institute of Family
Studies) paraphrases the then Senator Jocelyn Newman, Minister for Family and
Community Services, "that rising rates of welfare dependency were . . . placing an
increasing burden on government expenditure" (Saunders, 2000, p. 1 ). Saunders and
Newman might argue, according to the levels of expenditure taxonomy, that Australia
currently has an exorbitantly high commitment to welfare. On the other hand, many
writers observe that as poverty and unemployment are increasing, the scope for people
to actually obtain services from the state is decreasing (McMahon et al. 2000). Hence,
while total expenditure may seem to be increasing, the actual level of support is not. It
seems that Esping-Anderson (1 990/2000, p. 1 55) was correct to criticise the
categorisation of welfare states according to their level of expenditure because they
ignore important structural and political issues. For example, he states that the "focus on
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spending may be misleading" because "some nations spend enormous sums on fiscal
welfare in the form of tax privileges to private insurance plans that mainly benefit the
middle classes" (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 55).

Residual and institutional welfare

Another approach derives from Richard Titmuss's (1 968/2000) classical
distinction between institutional and residual welfare states (Esping-Anderson,
1 990/2000, p. 1 56). In an institutional welfare state, the state universally addresses the
entire population, and embodies an institutionalised commitment to welfare. Also, "it
will, in principle, extend welfare commitments to all areas of distribution vital for
societal welfare" (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 56). In contrast, residual welfare
"assumes responsibility only when the family or the market fails; it seeks to limit its
commitments to marginal and deserving social groups" (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000,
p. 1 56). According to this distinction, the Australian welfare state has been residual
throughout its history, but to different degrees. Before federation welfare in Australia
was administered by voluntary community agencies, like the Benevolent Society of
New South Wales (Dickey, 1 987). These societies provided basic relief to marginal,
deserving groups (Conley, 1 982). Under the Whitlam Labor Government in the 1 970s,
welfare in Australia was the closest to universal it has ever been. McMahon et al. (2000)
refers to this period as a "high water mark" of democratic socialism in Australia.
Education (including tertiary education) became free and Medibank (universal public
health insurance) (van Krieken et al. 2000, p. 1 59, 1 90) was introduced. Both of these
services were available without means testing. However, since a fiscal crisis was
declared in the late 1 970s the Australian welfare regime has become increasingly
residual. A student loan scheme for university fees has been introduced (the Higher
Education Contribution Scheme) (Australian Taxation Office, Department of
Employment Education and Training, & Department of Employment Education
Training and Youth Affairs, 1 989) and more recently high-income earners have been
financially penalised through tax for using the public health system rather than private
health insurance (see A New Tax System (Medicare Levy Surcharge - Fringe Benefits
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Amendment) Bill 2000 (Cwth)). This might surprise Titmuss because he writes about
residual welfare in the 1950s in the past tense. For example, according to Titmuss:

In the past, poor quality selective services for poor people were the
product of a society which saw 'welfare' as residual; as a public burden.
The primary purpose of the system and the method of discrimination
was, therefore, deterrence (it was also an effective rationing device).
(Italics not in original R. Titmuss 1968/2000, p. 47)

While this "universal versus residual" distinction is useful, it is not a simple
dichotomy. Titmuss ( 1968/2000, p. 46) believes "those students of welfare who are
seeing the main problem today in terms of "universal versus selective" services are
presenting a naive and oversimplified picture of policy choices". Indeed, such
oversimplifications do not account for other diverse characteristics of welfare states
such as citizenship rights or social structure (Esping-Anderson, 1990/2000, p. 157).

Three levels of citizenship: civil, political and social

Another approach derives from TH Marshall's classical division of citizenship
into three parts-"civil, political and social" (Marshall, 1949/2000, p. 32). TH Marshall
( 1949/2000, p. 32) explains that the "civil element" of citizenship:

is composed of rights necessary for individual freedom-liberty of the
person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property
and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice . . . The
institutions most directly associated with civil rights are the courts of
justice.

The "political element" of citizenship to TH Marshall ( 1949/2000, p. 32) is:
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the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of
a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members
of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and
councils of local government.

To TH Marshall (1 949/2000, p. 32) the "social element" of citizenship is:

the whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and
security to the right to share the full social heritage and to live the life of
a civilised being according to the standards of the prevailing society. The
institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and
the social services.

According to Marshall social rights are both the newest part of citizenship to be
extended, and have been separated from citizenship in certain periods. For example, the
Poor Law 1 5 in England from 1 834 to 1 91 8 :

treated the claims of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of the
citizen, but as an alternative to them-as claims which could be met only
if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word. For
paupers forfeited in practice the civil right of personal liberty, by
internment in the workhouses, and they forfeited by law any political
rights they might possess ... The stigma which clung to poor relief
expressed the deep feelings of a people who understood that those who
accepted relief must cross the road that separated the community of
citizens from the outcast company of the destitute. (Marshall, 1 949/2000,
p. 34-35)

Many writers have used this separation of citizenship into civil, political and
social to map changes in the Australian welfare state. In particular, some writers point to
a current divorce of social citizenship, in the form of rights to welfare, from general
citizenship rights (Bessant, 2000a; Camey & Ramia, 1 999; Camey & Ramia, 2001 ;
Harris, 1 999; Shaver, 2001 ). They point to the increasing requirements that claimants
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must meet to receive payment, including voluntary work under mutual obligation and
work for the dole, as evidence for this change. Further, some writers even argue that
large segments of the population have been effectively denied citizenship due to the
biases of the Australian welfare state. For example, Carol Pateman (1 989/2000) argues
that women have never been considered full citizens under the Australian welfare
system because they have never been considered independent (see also, Bryson, 1 992;
Bussemaker & Voet, 1 998; Shaver, 2001 ). However, while focusing on different types
of citizenship may offer a useful basis of critique for current trends in Australian social
welfare policy16, it does not account for all variations among different types of welfare
states. For example, it does not accommodate different types of social stratification to
consider inequalities among those with similar citizenship rights such as tax breaks (that
is, occupational welfare) for a white collar working man compared to a blue collar
employed gent's occupational welfare.

The three worlds of welfare capitalism

Another approach to categorising welfare states is the well-known taxonomy
developed by Esping-Anderson (1 990/2000) in The three worlds of welfare capitalism.
He attempted to account for "qualitatively different arrangements between state, market
and the family" (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 61 ). He identified three clusters of
regime types-liberal, corporatist and social democratic (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000,
p. 1 62).

Corporatist welfare regimes, Germany for example, focus on contributory social
insurance. As Robert E. Goodin (2000, p. 1 72-1 73 ) summarises, in a corporatist regime
"you get what you pay for and you pay for what you get. Furthermore, what insurance
pays you when you are unable to work is a direct function, and a large fraction, of what
you used to earn when you were in work." Here "what predominated was the
15

Poor Laws were laws designed to regulate the poor in England. See Chapter Six for
more information about the English Poor Laws.
16
As will be shown in Capter Five.
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preservation of status differentials; rights, therefore, were attached to class and status"
(Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 62).

Social democratic welfare regimes include the Scandinavian countries. They
pursue:

a welfare state that would promote an equality of the highest standards,
not an equality of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere ... manual
workers come to enjoy rights identical with those of salaried white-collar
employees or civil servants; all strata are incorporated under one
universal insurance system, yet benefits are graduated according to
accustomed earnings. This model crowds out the market. (Esping
Anderson, 1 990/2000, p. 1 63)

Finally, in liberal welfare regimes:

means tested assistance, modest universal transfers or modest social
insurance plans predominate. Benefits cater mainly to clientele of low
income, usually working class, state dependants. In this model, the
progress of social reform has been severely circumscribed by traditional,
liberal work-ethic norms: it is one where the limits of welfare equal the
marginal propensity to opt for welfare instead of work. Entitlement rules
are therefore strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are
typically modest. In tum, the state encourages the market, either
passively-by guaranteeing only a mm1mum--or actively-by
subsidising private welfare schemes. (Esping-Anderson, 1 990/2000, p.
1 62)

Esping-Anderson locates Australia, along with the United States of America and the
United Kingdom, in the liberal cluster (1 990/2000, p. 1 62).

This taxonomy accounts for many variations among different types of welfare
state. However, Esping-Anderson (1 990/2000, p. 1 63) qualifies this taxonomy with a
caution that "welfare states cluster, but we must recognise that there is no single pure
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case ... Neither are the liberal regimes pure types". Indeed, there are variations among
liberal states which are not accommodated by the large category "liberal welfare
regimes". The next section extends Esping-Anderson's taxonomy to include some
contemporary interpretations of liberalism apparent in western welfare states.

Contemporary flavours of neo-liberalism-Hayek, Mead and Murray

There are many contemporary flavours of liberalism that are becoming
increasingly influential in western liberal welfare states. These ideas are often
collectively called neo-liberal or new-right ideas. For convenience, this thesis will refer
to such ideas as neo-liberal. Traces of the neo-liberal ideas of Friedrich von Hayek, who
wrote 40-50 years ago, and Lawrence M Mead and Charles Murray, who are more
current writers, can all be found in the Australian welfare regime.

Hayek's ideas about welfare and freedom, for example, have been very
influential in Australia. He interprets the ideal liberal welfare state as one that does not
impinge on individual liberty. Although Hayek does not argue against all state based
welfare provision, he does believe that certain "methods of government action" (Hayek,
1 959/2000, p. 91 ) deny individuals their freedom. He claims that:

The reason why many of the new welfare activities of government are a
threat to freedom, then, is that, though they are presented as mere service
activities, they really constitute an exercise of the coercive powers of
government and rest on its claiming exclusive rights in certain fields.
(Hayek, 1 959/2000, p. 91 )

Hayek (1 959/2000, p. 92) does not consider redistribution of wealth to be the primary
aim of welfare because "it is bound to lead back to socialism and its coercive and
essentially arbitrary methods". He continues to warn against giving government
"exclusive and monopolistic powers" because "the chief danger today is that, once an
aim of government is accepted as legitimate, it is then assumed that even means
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contrary to the principles of freedom may be legitimately employed" (Hayek,
1959/2000, p. 92-93).

Hayek's ideas have become increasingly influential in Australian social policy.
For example, the Liberal-National coalition government's replacement of the state
based CES with many competing JNAs fits well with Hayek's concern about the
monopoly and coercion of government. Similarly, Newman, when she was Minister for
Family and Community Services, expressed Hayek type concerns about how the erosion
of individual enterprise means the national market economy is compromised:

Long-term worklessness and welfare dependency tends to reduce
people's opportunities to participate fully in society. This means the
productive capacity of the nation is not as great as it could be. (Newman,
1999, p. 6)

Even Hayek's argument that government services are socialist and threaten individual
freedom is mirrored by Vanstone when she was Minister for Family and Community
Services:

Liberal social policies, which are based on a recognition of the primacy
of the individual, which see choice as a better motivator than
compulsion, and which see the community rather than government as the
natural builder and owner of social capital were the victors of the
twentieth century ideological war. (Vanstone, 2001)

She continues later in the same address:

The victory has been the triumph of liberal democracy with its focus on
the individual over communism, socialism and any other system which
does not acknowledge the primacy of the individual. (Vanstone, 200 1)
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Mendes (1 998) maps the influence of Hayek's ideas (along with Adam Smith's
and Milton Friedman's) on the Liberal Party of Australia from 1 983 to 1 9 97. He shows
that concerns "to reduce government interference with free market outcomes by
restricting access to social security payments" have gained influence from the early
1 980s on (Mendes, 1 998, p. 74). Mendes calls this a "neo-liberal takeover of the Liberal
Party" (Mendes, 1 998, p. 68). This was in response to the defeat of the Fraser Liberal
government. However, in response to further election defeats the Liberal Party made a
pragmatic compromise by adding to concerns about market interference some social
conservative concerns "to reinforce traditional institutions such as the family" (Mendes,
1 998, p. 74). Mendes claims that this compromise of the small government, freedom
focused agenda of Hayek is the platform that led the Liberal and National Parties to
form a coalition government in 1 996. This demonstrates a small departure from the
freedom focused agenda of Hayek's, who expresses disdain for governments that decide
what people need and should be like (Hayek, 1 959/2000; 1 976; 1 979).

Since the Liberal and National Parties' coalition government has extended its
term in office, the influence of Lawrence Mead's ideas has become clear (Mendes,
2000). This is to the extent that, during the debate about welfare reform that led to the
McClure report (2000a; 2000b ):

[t]he government brought Lawrence Mead to Australia to extol the
virtues of US-style reform. Mead was the keynote speaker at the annual
conference of the quasi-independent research body the Australian
Institute of Family Studies (AIFS) ... The AIFS, then under the research
direction of British neo-liberal academic Peter Saunders, lauded the
views of Mead and their relevance to the Australian situation. (Mendes,
2000, p. 3)

In contrast to Hayek's focus on freedom, Mead (1 997a; 1 997b) supports a mutual
responsibility in which welfare recipients must be forced to be free, or, coerced into
being competent citizens. This is because, according to Mead, despite fewer structural
barriers to good paid employment since the 1 960s and early 1 970s, poverty has become
entrenched amongst those who work little because they do not have the competence,
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confidence or motivation to sustain full time employment. He (Mead, 1 991/2000, p.
1 07) believes that this has formed an underclass whose "poverty stems less from the
absence of opportunity than from the inability or reluctance to take advantage of
opportunity".

Newman, when she was Minister for Family and Community Services, reflected
Mead's ideas about the need to force people to be selfreliant. For example, she said:

We do welfare recipients no favours by simply paying their benefits and
being content to leave them on welfare indefinitely. They have both the
right and the obligation to share in the benefits of economic and
employment growth and to participate in th�ir communities to the full
extent of their capacity (Newman, 1 999, p. 6).

Further, the influential McClure report (2000a; McClure, 2000b) reflects Mead's
position with its dire warnings about welfare dependence and "entrenched economic
and social disadvantage" which led to "an intergenerational cycle of significant
joblessness" (McClure, 2000a, p. 3). McClure recommends we "re-think and re
configure our approach to social support". He claims that a "social support system
should seek to optimise their [clients'] capacity for [social and economic] participation"
(McClure, 2000a, p. 3-4). McClure thus recommends a focus on "participation support"
rather than income support.

Further, Mead (1 991/2000, p. 1 1 1 ) argues that, in the United States, and
increasingly in the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe, "the drift is towards policies
that address [the lack of] motivation by seeking to direct the lives of those dependent on
government" so they can eventually help themselves. Newer paternalistic programs,
such as workfare in the United States, have this aim (Mead, 1 991/2000). So too do the
post-1 997 Australian Liberal/National coalition government's policies of mutual
obligation, work for the dole, and increased surveillance though the jobseeker diary
(Mendes, 2000, p. 26). Indeed, in The challenge of welfare dependency in the 21 51
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century (1 999) released by the then Senator Newman, welfare dependency is seen as

best combated by mutual obligation (see O'Connor, 2001 ). Indeed, according to
Newman (1 999, p. 9, 1 0), one of "a number of key principles that will underpin the
reform of the welfare system" is:

expecting people on income support to help themselves and make a
contribution to society, through increased social and economic
participation reflecting mutual obligation. (Original is in bold type)

Similarly, Tony Abbott, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, justifies
work for the dole along Mead like lines:

Work for the Dole is starting to change· the culture of welfare and work.
Work for the Dole demonstrates to unemployed people that they have not
been abandoned to quiet despair in front of the television set. It reassures
wider society that they are pulling their weight in a largely shirker proof
system. Most significantly, it helps to overcome the impact of a
regressive tax transfer system by creating a strong non-monetary
incentive to find work. If the alternative to working for a wage is
working for the dole, even part-time work at modest rates of pay
becomes considerably more attractive. There's nothing ' punishing' about
Work for the Dole proj ects but participation invariably involves turning
up on time, attention to detail, taking responsibility and working in a
team (like a normal job) and failure to perform can involve a failure to be
paid (like a normal job). (Abbott, 2003)

Mead's agenda has thus been deeply influential in Australian social policy since the
Liberal/National coalition government has been in power. However, as Mendes (2000,
p. 24) points out, Mead's big state approach has not been complemented by the
increased welfare spending required to force Centrelink clients to be free. Rather, much
government talk suggests the need to reduce government spending. For example Prime
Minister John Howard's 1 999 Federation Address titled The Australian way criticised
the then welfare system for passivity and over-generosity as follows:
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The dole system we inherited sent the worst possible message to young
Australians. It told them that dropping out of school, out of their
communities, escaping personal responsibility, was acceptable and that
the taxpayer would foot the bill. (Howard, 1 999)

Hayek's concern about the problems of budget and big government have been
shown to be shared by the current Liberal/National coalition government; so too was
Mead's concern about making welfare dependents behave more independently. Charles
Murray shares these two concerns and has, along side Hayek and Mead, influenced
current directions in Australian welfare reform. Charles Murray is both concerned with
budget issues, and making ' welfare dependents' behave more independently. Indeed,
Murray agrees with Hayek that the government should be as small as freedom allows
and not redistribute wealth. In fact, he claims that increased ·government spending has
led to an increase in the "latent poor" (his term for social security recipients)1 7, while
periods of less spending have decreased it (Murray, 1 982/2000). Tony Abbott recently
expressed similar concerns about government spending increasing welfare dependence
in his address to the Young Liberals:

Comprehensive social security is part and parcel of modem civil society
but has had a range of harmful side-effects. Failure to acknowledge the
way universal, more-or-less unconditional welfare changes people' s
behaviour has seriously compromised Australian government' s effort to
deal with unemployment. The Hawke Government cut basic award
earnings by 7 per cent in real terms between 1 983 and 1 990 (while
increasing unemployment benefit by nearly 20 per cent). Unemployment
averaged more than 7 per cent over the period and at its end the Minister
for Social Security told cabinet that his department had just identified the
first Australian family with three generations simultaneously on welfare.
(Abbott, 2003)

However, Murray also agrees with Mead that welfare recipients must be made to be
good, independent citizens. Indeed, like Mead, Murray seems to have the support of the
17

According to Murray ( 1 982/2000, p. 96-1 06) social security recipients should be regarded
as the "latent poor" because if they were not receiving assistance they would be living
in poverty.
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quasi-independent AIFS. O'Connor (200 1 , p. 230) observes that a recent edition of their
journal Family Matters (1 999), "promotes Murray as a welfare expert whose ideas have
considerable merit". Murray's ideas are also reflected in the social conservative strain of
the contemporary Liberal Party's focus on family and community (see O'Connor, 200 1 ).
He (Murray, 1 982/2000, p. 1 03 ) links increases in latent poverty to "the decline in the
intact husband-wife family unit, especially among blacks". Murray (1 982/2000) claims
the Great Society reforms in America under Kennedy and Johnson during the 1 960s link
poverty to the decline of the family. Newman reflects similar neo-conservative concerns
in her view of the impact of long term welfare dependency on families:

New evidence is also emerging about the impact of long term welfare
dependency on the next generation. Research by the Department of
Family and Community Services has shown that young people from
income support recipient families are much more likely than other young
people to leave school early, to become unemployed and' to become
teenage parents. About one in six young people from income support
recipient families are themselves highly dependent on income support
between the ages of 1 6 and 1 8. (Newman, 1 999, p. 6)

Neo-liberal based reforms in context

However, to simply say the current Australian welfare regime is essentially neo
liberal is over simplistic.

This is because it does not account for the various

manifestations of these ideas in different contexts. Indeed, as Mark Considine observes:

While these [neo-liberal type] common themes and justifications suggest
the workings of a single ' enterprising' imagination driving the definition
of public service, in practice, the organisational reforms produced
according to these various imperatives are fashioned from local
institutional material and born of political compromise. The same
enterprising urge can beget different offspring, even if the gene pool is
much the same. (Considine, 200 1 , p. 1 4)
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In Enterprising states: the public management of welfare-to-work Considine shows that
similar contemporary neo-liberal ideas like the need for citizen responsibility for their
own welfare provision have been implemented differently in the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia. For example, according to Considine, (2001,
p. 16) while Australia and the Netherlands brought private organisations into the centre
of the service delivery role, New Zealand and the United Kingdom attempted to make
their existing public service organisations more neo-liberal.

Further, to simply say the Australian welfare regime is neo-liberal oversimplifies
the process of current policy change. In Mark Considine' s idea of the enterprising state,
he really means the "enterprising of the state" [italics in original] because "this
transformation is something less than a final accomplishment. Process is often more
revealing than structure" (Considine, 2001, p. 1). Indeed, whether the contemporary
Australian welfare state is neo-liberal/neo-conservative or not is not the point here, but
the influence of such ideas on current policy change cannot be denied. The Australian
welfare state is currently neo-liberalising.

This section concludes that the current Australian welfare reforms reflect
elements of general-liberal influence. However, these ideas manifest themselves
differently in different contexts, and indicate a process rather than a finished product.
Hence, this thesis will thus accept that the current Australian welfare regime is neo
liberalising. The possible explanations for the current Centrelink breach and appeal
numbers will thus "have a commonly shared conception of the" current Australian
welfare regime to allow "contending arguments" to be tested (Esping-Anderson,
1990/2000, p. 154).

64

Conclusion

This chapter has established that the current Australian welfare regime can be
understood as essentially neo-liberalising. This will provide a basis for the pending
evaluation of different understandings of Centrelink breach and appeal numbers.

This was established through accommodating various complexities in
categorising welfare states including the different ways welfare states are administered,
different types of welfare provision within welfare s.tates, historical variation, and
different categorisations of welfare regimes. Categorisations of welfare regimes that
were considered include one based on levels of expenditure, another based on residual
or institutional welfare, another based on TH Marshall' s three level of citizenship,
another based on Esping-Anderson's three worlds of welfare capitalism, and a final
categorisation based on contemporary flavours of neo-liberalism.

The next chapter will begin evaluating different explanations of the current
disparity of Centrelink breach and appeal numbers with the help of the case study
findings. It seems fitting that the neo-liberal approach should be considered first, since it
is the most influential in current policy formation. It also seems fitting that the neo
liberals be followed by their most public opposition, the advocates.
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PART B
BEYOND THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NEO-LIBERALS,
THE ADVOCATES, AND THE NEW-CONTRACTUALISM
WRITERS

66

CHAPTER FOUR
BEYOND THE NEO-LIBERALS AND THE ADVOCATES

The previous chapter established that the current Australian welfare system is
essentially neo-liberalising. However, it does not automatically follow that a neo-liberal
framework offers a convincing understanding of the current disparity of Centrelink
breach and appeal figures. While awareness of the ideas behind current policies is
important, such ideas may not offer a convincing understanding of what actually
happens to Centrelink clients when these ideas are applied through specific social
policies. Hence, this chapter will evaluate the neo-liberals' interpretation of current
Centrelink breach and appeal figures in the light of the social context of neo-liberalising
policies-particularly the case study of a Centrelink office. This chapter will first
outline the dominant neo-liberal approach to social policy in Australia, describe its
interpretation of the relationship between the current breach and appeal figures, and
evaluate this interpretation according to some of its strengths and weaknesses.

The most vocal opposition to the neo-liberal view in Australia is provided by
various organisations which aim to advocate for the disadvantaged. ACOSS (ACOSS,
1997a; ACOSS, 1997b; ACOSS, 2000a; ACOSS, 2000b; ACOSS, 2001a; ACOSS,
2001b; ACOSS & NWRN, 2000) and the welfare rights movement (WRAS, 1999;
WRAS, 2000) have been particularly active. The writers whom I will collectively call
the advocates (following Moses, 2000), will also be considered in this chapter. Their
view will be evaluated after the neo-liberals', and in a similar manner.
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Beyond the Neo-Liberals

Outline

As shown in the previous chapter, neo-liberal ideas permeate current Australian
social policy. Hayek's (1959/2000; 1976; 1979; 1984/1948; 1994/1944) trust in market
forces and individual self-reliance, Mead's ( 1991/2000; 1997a; 1997b) wish to help
people be more self-reliant, and Murray's ( 1982/2000) neo-conservatism have all been
shown to flavour current reforms. Mutual obligation, work for the dole, increased
surveillance and the replacement of the CBS with the JNAs are examples of neo
liberalising policies.

Interpretation of current breach and appeal numbers

An important element of this dominant neo-liberal approach in Australian social
policy is the use of compliance measures to ensure that Centrelink clients 'participate'.
For example, John Howard, in his The Australian way address, stressed the importance
of "improving compliance" (Howard, 1999). Improving compliance was also the
justification given by Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Philip
Ruddock in the second reading speech for the Social Security Legislation Amendment
(Activity Test Penalty Periods) Bill 1997. Ruddock cited the Organisation for Economic
and Cultural Development Job Study's conclusion that "a priori reasoning and historical
evidence both suggest that if benefit administration can be kept tight, the potential
disincentive effects [for self reliance] of benefit entitlement will be largely contained"
(Hansard, 1997, p. 3 19 1-3 192). McClure reinforces this dominant neo-liberal approach.
The report states that:
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The stark reality is that those who most need assistance are often those
who have few opportunities to participate and are often the least
motivated to pursue them. For this reason, the new system must engage
people more actively, and to be successful that engagement must be
reciprocal. Consequently, the Reference Group believes that some form
of requirement is necessary. (McClure, 2000a, p. 5)

It follows from this perspective that some regime, like the breach regime, is
needed to ensure compliance. Indeed, the breach regime ensures taxpayers' generosity
is reciprocated by Centrelink clients' participation in social and economic activities
through financially punishing those who do not (McClure, 2000a, p. 40). Thus,
according to this view, the increase in breaches since 1997-1998 is good and necessary.
It is a process for weeding out the 'deadwood' and minimising abuses to ensure only
those who 'participate' are assisted.

Further, according to the neo-liberals, the stagnating number of appeals despite
the increase in breaches is not necessarily a problem. Rather, it is used as evidence that
the new breaching regime is working (Moses, 2000, p. 15)-that is, it is catching those
with no grounds for appeal. Indeed, the Department of Family and Community Services
(FaCS) has reasoned that "on a very conservative estimate, 27% of people who are
breached do not reclaim within 6 weeks" (Moses, 2000, p. 16). They conclude that "a
significant proportion must have an alternative source of income" (Moses, 2000, p. 16)
and, therefore, were not legitimate recipients of payments.

Further, FaCS (200 1)

positively views changes to the AROs because they have decreased appeal numbers.
Since around 1997 AROs were placed in Centrelink offices rather than grouped together
in area support offices. According to FaCS (2001, p. 106) "this puts them closer to both
the customers they are making decisions about, and the decision making process itself'.
They explain that:

The new approach helps customers to understand why Centrelink acted
as it did, and also ensures that original decisions are made properly. In
the long run, this will help cut down the number of appeals and
dissatisfied customers. Feedback from the CSCs where AROs are now
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based suggests the new arrangement is working well. (FaCS, 2001, p.
106)

Evaluation

The dominant neo-liberal derived perception of the relationship between breach
and appeal figures has some attraction. Indeed, it does provide a strong link between
current breach and appeal numbers and a policy framework for future developments
(McClure, 2000a). However, this strength is overshadowed by some serious limitations.

First, the neo-liberals tend to incorrectly assume all breaches are accurately
administered. However, as both WRAS (2000, p. 5) and ACOSS (2000) have observed,
43.8 per cent of Activity Test breach cases that were appealed at the SSAT in 1998-99
were over-ruled. This means that Centrelink does err. It is not administratively
infallible.

Second, this approach incorrectly assumes that only those Centrelink clients
with no grounds for appeal will be caught because all clients who are unhappy with a
decision will appeal. However, WRAS (2000) provides anecdotal evidence that
Centrelink clients with grounds to appeal do not always push for an appeal of a
Centrelink decision. Interviews with Centrelink clients that were conducted for this
thesis support WRAS's finding. While 19 out of 22 participants were unhappy with a
decision taken by Centrelink about their case, only 1 1 were happy with the eventual
outcome. This means that 8 Centrelink clients who participated in the study remained
unhappy with both the Centrelink decision and the eventual outcome. Of those who
were unhappy with both the Centrelink decision and eventual outcome, 4 said that they
did not seek any appeal. Of the others who said they did seek an appeal but were still
unhappy with the outcome, none had exhausted all avenues for appeal, although one
was awaiting the outcome of his SSAT appeal and may continue if still unsatisfied.
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Third, this approach underestimates the hardships breaches can cause. Indeed, it
assumes many people who are 100 per cent breached and do not reapply have some
other source of income. This is contradicted by WRAS ( 1999; 2000) and The Salvation
Army of Australia's research (2001). For example, a census of Salvation Army clients
found that every second person requesting emergency relief who had been breached by
Centrelink said that this breach had caused their need to ask for assistance (The
Salvation Army Australia, 2001, p. 10). This finding is supported by the case study
findings. At the time of interview Jonathan was waiting for his SSAT hearing, which
was in a few weeks. Jonathon said he had suffered a 100 per cent breach, and had
already spent 8 weeks without pay while he was seeking an appeal. According to
Jonathon he was surviving on "food hand outs from Saint Pats, one of them, I've only
had one of them. And mainly off parents, borrowed money".

Jaques' experience provides another example of the hardship being breached can
cause an individual. He spent six weeks with reduced pay, during which he was evicted
and was homeless for 50 days. Although he was unhappy with the outcome, Jaques did
not appeal beyond the original decision maker or Ombudsman, nor was he aware that he
could. Below is his description of his experience:

when I expected this years payments, they weren't there, and um, I was
relying on, I needed them, um, to cover [renting?] costs, and it took them
six whole weeks to sort it out. During that time 'cause I couldn't even
afford rent I just lived on the street for fifty days. Fifty nights on the
street 'cause I couldn't afford rent.
Jaques continued:
I was on their case. I was, um, I was, um, basically in here every single
day telling them to hurry up and sort it out. They just kept saying yeah
they would, and I'd ring back in a couple of days and say what's
happening and nothing ever got done, and it took them, four to six weeks
to, um, get it sorted out, and to get my payments back on schedule.

In summary, the neo-liberals dominate Australian social policy. They draw from
a belief in market forces and individual enterprise to criticise the post World War Two
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welfare state for creating welfare dependence. They argue that compliance measures
like breaching are needed to ensure a more participatory system. They perceive the
current breach and appeal figures as a positive indicator that this approach is working.
While the neo-liberal view does provide a strong link between current breach and
appeal figures and a policy framework for future developments, it has serious limits. It
ignores the possibility of administrative error, down plays the personal and social cost
of depriving a client of an income, and wrongly assumes that Centrelink clients appeal
whenever possible. Consequently, its interpretation of the current breach and appeal
numbers is wanting.

The Advocacy View

Outline

The advocacy approach to social welfare policy and breaches and appeals draws
from the optimism of the classic post war welfare approach of TH Marshall
( 1949/2000), and Richard Titmuss ( 1968/1979) who consider access to welfare to be a
basic right of social citizenship. Examples include ACOSS's ( 1997a; 1997b; 2000a;
2000b; 2001a; 2001b; 2000), WRAS's ( 1999; 2000), and The Salvation Army of
Australia's (2001) responses to the breach regime. The advocates argue that welfare
recipients are some of the most vulnerable people in our society. They aim to protect
people's basic right to welfare by advocating in their defence.

Interpretation of current breach and appeal numbers

Rather than view the current increase in breaches as necessary, like the neo
liberals, the advocates argue that the current increase in breach numbers reflects an
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overly harsh breaching regime. They point out that since NSA and YA payments are
already under the Henderson poverty line 1 8 , breaching financially penalises those who
are already living in poverty (ACOSS, 2000b; 2001a; 2001b; 2000; 1999; WRAS,
2000). Furthermore, they suggest the current breach regime targets the most vulnerable
of those living in poverty, such as youth. For example, Susan Lackner (2001, p. 3)
observed that "young people aged under 18 to 24 are the group most affected by
Centrelink breaches, with 53% of all breaches occurring in this age range". Further,
these writers observe that the most vulnerable recipients are more likely to become
homeless or tum to emergency relief when state funds become unavailable (ACOSS,
200 1a; The Salvation Army Australia, 200 1; WRAS, 2000).

Parallel to concerns about breaches, the advocacy approach regards the current
low appeal numbers as a serious problem. This is because, according to the advocates,
under-utilisation of the SSAT and AAT reflects that fewer people may be protected
from government error or abuse of power (WRAS, 2000).

Further, the advocates argue that the current increasing breach rate combined
with the consistently low appeal rate reflects two factors. First, unlike the neo-liberals
who view these figures as an indication that the breach and appeal systems are working,
they argue that these figures reflect the vulnerability of the people being breached.
Vulnerable people do not tend to seek an appeal of Centrelink decisions (WRAS, 2000).

Second, according to this approach, the relationship between steady appeal
numbers and the increased number of breaches relates to recent policy developments.
The increase in breaches since 1997- 1998 reflects new, confusing policy requirements
that recipients find it difficult to meet. Since 1997 there has been a steady increase in
mandated activities for the unemployed especially the jobseeker diary, work for the
dole, increased fortnightly employer contacts (from 2 to 8), negotiating between job
18

The Henderson poverty line is a measure of relative poverty that has been particularly
influential in Australia. It was first used by the 1975 Commission of Inquiry into
Poverty (Henderson, 1975) -also known as the Henderson Report and has been indexed
since to be relevant to the current cost of living.
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network providers and Centrelink and mutual obligation (ACOSS, 2000c). All these
require the ability to perform complex negotiation between agencies, mobility and a
good standard of oral and written communication skills which Centrelink clients often
lack (AAT, 1995; ACOSS, 1997b; ACOSS, 2001a).

Evaluation

The advocacy approach highlights some important relationships between breach
and appeal figures. It points out that the breach and appeal regime has caused great
hardship for Centrelink clients, especially those who do not seek an appeal when
breached. As indicated earlier, this is a more convincing account of the case study data
than the neo-liberal account that plays down this hardship. Further, unlike the neo
liberals, the advocates understand that Centrelink clients do not always seek an appeal
when they disagree with a breach. As discussed earlier, this fits well with the case study
findings.

The advocacy approach also points out that the breach rate increased after new,
confusing activity requirements were introduced. This view is supported by the case
study findings. For example, some Centrelink clients that were interviewed even
seemed confused about whether they had been breached. Some clients believed they had
not been breached, when, in fact, it seems they have been. For example, Jasmine said
her pay had been delayed a few days because Centrelink misplaced her form. She
resubmitted the form, but incorrectly did not consider it a breach. Another example is
Jeff who also said his pay was delayed until he returned a form. This is despite him not
receiving the letter requesting the form. This would normally incur a breach. However,
when asked whether Centrelink had ever penalised or breached him for any reason, he
replied "No".
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In contrast, other participants seemed to think they had been breached when, in
fact, they had not. For example, Jenny thought a delay when applying for her allowance
might be a breach:

Lyndal: And has Centrelink ever penalised or breached you or cut your
allowance at all?
Jenny: Um, Yeah, kind of.
Lyndal: What happened?
Jenny: Um, they (unclear) had to come back a few times to because they
didn't think the um identification that I has was correct or something
they made me get all the signed signatures and stuff from school.
Lyndal: Okay. So were they paying you at all when that happened?
Jenny: No, to get the payment that I wanted I had to go back and get.
Lyndal: Okay, so were you receiving payment and then they stopped it
until you.
Jenny: No, I wanted to go get Austudy or something like that and the
identification I had wasn't sufficient, what's that word, yeah it wasn't
enough and so I had to go back and get signatures and stuff from school
to say that I was going to school, yeah.

There are a number of possible explanations for this confusion. One possibility
is that participants did not say they were breached when they actually were because they
were embarrassed to admit this to me. However, if this was a general pattern, other
participants would not say they were breached when they were not. Another possibility
is that my questions were unclear or confusing. However, I explained the meaning of
breach, and also asked separate questions about whether their payment had been
postponed, reduced or cut. So I do not believe this is the case. I think the most likely
explanation is that participants were actually confused about whether they were actually
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breached, and that this evidences the advocates' view that the new policies are too
complex and confusing.

The advocates also point out that the low appeal numbers reflect the
government's targeting of the most vulnerable people, because they are the least likely
to have the skills and knowledge necessary to navigate the appeals process (WRAS,
2000). This is more convincing than the neo-liberals who incorrectly assume that all
those who have grounds to appeal do so. However, the case study found the clients
interviewed were articulate, intelligent and had a reasonable knowledge of the appeals
structure. Of the 22 participants, 1 8 were aware of some appeal body. This means only
4 of the 22 participants did not know of any avenue of appeal. Of the 1 8 participants
that were aware of some appeal body, 7 were aware of one appeal body, 7 were aware
of two, 5 were aware of three and 3 were aware of four appeal bodies. Also, 1 8
participants were aware of the possibility of appealing to the original decision maker, 14
were at least somewhat aware of the ARO, 8 were at least somewhat aware of the
SSAT, 5 were at least somewhat aware of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, and 2 were
aware of the possibility of approaching their local MP with grievances.

Thus most of the Centrelink clients that were interviewed had at least some
awareness of the possibility of appeal and the appeals structure itself. The Wallis
Consulting Group (200 1 , p. 62) found similar results after surveying 3003 NSA and YA
(unemployed) Centrelink clients. They found that two thirds of their respondents who
had been breached were aware of their right to appeal their breach. In contrast to the
advocates' assumption, ignorance of the formal appeal structure does not seem to be the
reason for the relatively low number of formal appeals.

Rather than being ignorant, many interviewees perceived their relationship with
Centrelink to be paternalistic. For example, Joan was perplexed and amused when asked
what rights she thought she had when she disagreed with a Centrelink decision:
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Lyndal: OK. Um, what rights do you think you have when you disagree
with a Centrelink decision?
Joan: (5 second silence, then shrugs, pulls face and laughs)
Lyndal: (laughs) Is that because you don't want to say or you don't know
what to say?
Joan: Huh? (3 second pause) Rights?

Joan was cynical despite being aware of the Ombudsman, original decision maker, and
somewhat aware of the ARO and SSAT. Some Centrelink clients were concerned about
what Centrelink might do to them if they sought an appeal. For example, Josh, who was
aware the possibility of seeking an appeal with both the original decision maker and the
ARO, explained that:

I think the more you try to push your rights the harder they'll be on you,
and the more they'll try and penalise you and breach you and they'll do
things to you. Make it tough for you. So you're best off, I think they
make you just want to go in there and keep your mouth shut, and not
argue.

Another interviewee, Jeff, who was aware of the possibility of appealing with the
original decision maker and somewhat aware of the ARO and Commonwealth
Ombudsman, replied when I asked whether Centrelink had ever made any decisions that
he disagreed with: "No use arguing---don't get paid".

Furthermore, the advocates' emphasis on the vulnerability of Centrelink clients,
who are assumed to be unskilled and unintelligent individuals, suggests paternalism.
This is a problem because, as Carol Pateman (1 989/2000) observed in 1 979, paternalism
comes at a price. Protection is offered in return for loss of autonomy. Sheila Shaver, in
2001 , agrees with Pateman. Shaver states that "most troubling about Australian welfare
reform is the separation it presumes between political and social policy citizenship . . .
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Hidden in the shift from rights to conditional support, and from sovereignty to
supervision, is a withdrawal of the freedom of selthood as the price of welfare
assistance" (Shaver, 2001, p. 290).

The advocate's approach has further important limitations. Assuming that clients
do not seek an appeal because they lack the knowledge or skills, rather than because
they are aware of their paternalistic relationship with Centrelink, reflects a general
problem with this approach-that their pragmatic approach to social policy leads them
to ignore deeper political dimensions. It does not reflect about why these harsh
breaching penalties were implemented in the first place. Their policy recommendations
tend to react to current government policy by advocating incremental rather than more
substantial social change. For example, rather than questioning the existence of a breach
regime, they accept the new incremental regime and only criticise the hefty financial
penalties and complex new activity requirements (ACOSS, 2000b).

In summary, the advocacy view provides many valuable insights into how the
current breach and appeal numbers reflect the vulnerability of Centrelink clients to
administrative error or misuse of power in an unnecessarily harsh breaching regime.
However, it has two serious limitations. It incorrectly assumes that the relatively low
formal appeal rate is due to Centrelink clients lacking the necessary knowledge and
skills to seek an appeal and ignores deeper political questions such as why such a harsh
breaching regime exits.

Conclusion

Both the neo-liberal and advocacy approaches represent contemporary pragmatic
responses to welfare in Australia and have significant strengths, but serious weaknesses,
for explaining breach and appeal numbers. The neo-liberal account of current breach
and appeal figures was shown to be limited because it did not account for the vulnerable
position of Centrelink clients to the market. Their assumption that clients who do not
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reapply after being cut have other sources of income, otherwise they appeal-was
shown to be false.

On the other hand, the advocates' interpretation of breach and appeal figures
was found to be limited because it dealt with the vulnerability of Centrelink clients in a
paternalistic manner. It thus did not account for the vulnerability of Centrelink clients to
the state, or advocacy agencies themselves. It ignores deeper political questions such as
why such a harsh breaching regime exits. It also incorrectly assumes that the relatively
low formal appeal rate is due to Centrelink clients lacking the necessary knowledge and
skills to seek an appeal. This assumption contrasts with the case study finding that
Centrelink clients may not seek an appeal for an unsatisfactory decision even if they are
aware of the possibility to do so

However, other approaches go beyond the pragmatism of the neo-liberal and
advocacy approaches to offer deeper and more detailed analysis of current breach and
appeal figures, and the research findings. The new-contractualism writers focus on the
detail of administrative changes in current Australian welfare reform. In particular, they
explicate a new or quasi-contractualism in current policy changes-although different
writers have different views about the utility and appropriateness of the new
contractualism. These writers are dealt with in the next chapter.

In all, three further approaches will be considered in this thesis-the new
contractualism approach, some oppressive surveillance approaches, and an approach
which draws from Foucault's ideas of discipline and govemmentality. Each of these
approaches will be outlined, applied and evaluated over Chapters Five, Six and Seven.
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CHAPTER FIVE
BEYOND NEW-CONTRACTUALISM ACCOUNTS

This chapter will consider the new-contractualism writers' contributions to
understanding current Centrelink breach and appeal figures. Much recent scholarship
has been concerned with explicating a new-contractualism in Australian welfare policy.
According to this scholarship contemporary contractualism in social policy uses the
language of classical legal contract theory, but reinterprets it. However, the nature of
contemporary new-contractualism is interpreted differently by different writers,
resulting in different interpretations of breach and appeal numbers. Terry Carney ( 1998;
1986; 1994; 1999) writes particularly about the Australian social security appeal
structure, so will be considered here. Anna Yeatman has debated directly with Carney
(Carney, Ramia & Yeatman, 2001, p. 1) and so will provide a contrasting approach.
Carney's approach will be considered first, followed by Yeatman's. Each approach will
be outlined, and its interpretation of the current disparity of breach and appeal numbers
explicated. It will then be evaluated in the light of the case study findings.

Terry Carney's New-Contractualism

Outline

Carney's analysis concentrates on the growing use of individual behavioural
contracts in Australian welfare provision. He links this development to the emergence
of neo-liberalism in English speaking countries (Carney, 1998; 1999; see also Kerr &
Savelsberg, 1999; Owens, 2001). He is particularly concerned about this development's
impact on the citizenship status of welfare recipients. In particular, according to Carney,
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neo-liberal based new-contractualism retracts TH Marshall type social citizenship to a
citizenship based on individual agreements, such as individual activity agreements. He
argues that the dominant discourse of Australian welfare policy has shifted from
focusing on a citizen's right to an economic safety net with administrative safeguards of
this right through the SSAT and AAT, and towards attaching payment to an individual
behavioural contract. Camey is critical of this change because it is not a classical legal
contract as the parties are neither equal nor particularly free. Indeed, clients are
effectively coerced into maintaining certain behaviour, under threat of financial
retribution, using the language and ceremony of a classical liberal legal contract.

Interpretation of current breach and appeal numbers

According to Camey's view, increased breaching by Centrelink since 1997- 1998
correlates with an increased fervour for monitoring clients' behaviour through an
individual contract. Indeed, although monitored social security payments are not new in
Australia 19 , 1997- 1998 marks both a new level of monitoring and the introduction of
new welfare architecture to facilitate it (Camey, 1998, p. 26-35). In 1997- 1998 three
connected major reforms occurred-the public CES was replaced with privately
contracted JNAs, the DSS was absorbed into the new Centrelink, and the current
incremental breach regime was launched. The JNAs were particularly important in this
final change from entitlement to contract. This is because clients must now negotiate an
activity agreement with a JNA case manager to qualify for income support. Previously,
such contracts were not individually negotiated. Furthermore, if the client does not
comply with this contract, the case manager is required to recommend that Centrelink
breach them.

Following Camey's interpretation of new-contractualism, the introduction of the
JNAs is also important for understanding the current consistently low appeal numbers.
While the JNAs personalise client treatment, they deny clients' administrative
For example, Camey ( 1 999) observes that the work test in 1933 was a behavioural
requirement for payment
19
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safeguards. Indeed, while recipients could previously appeal CES and DSS decisions to
the SSAT, AAT or the Commonwealth Ombudsman (Owens, 2001 ), they can now only
appeal Centrelink decisions. This is because while Centrelink is a government body
subject to statutory review to the SSAT, AAT, and Ombudsman, the JNAs include
private organisations that are outside the appeal structure. This means that while a
Centrelink decision to breach a client is appealable, the JNAs negotiation and
monitoring of the activity agreement and reporting about a client is not. Thus, the space
in which recipients can appeal decisions has effectively been constricted (Owens, 2001 ).
Therefore, the corresponding stagnating number of formal appeals indicates a decline in
administrative safeguards for Centrelink clients as private agencies administer
individual clients' contracts and monitor their behaviour.

Consequently, according to Camey's approach to new-contractualism, the
relationship between increasing breach numbers and low appeal figures is connected to
the increasing use of quasi-contractual agreements in Australian social security
provision. In particular, the increase in breaches after 1 997-1 998 corresponds with the
introduction of Centrelink and the JNAs and their more individualised quasi-contract
approach, while the decreasing scope for administrative appeal of welfare matters has
prevented a corresponding increase in formal appeals.

Evaluation

Camey's approach to new-contractualism offers a compelling interpretation of
current breach and appeal figures. Indeed, it allows the increase in breaches and
stagnation of appeals to be clearly linked with changing fundamentals of social policy.
In particular, he allows the increasing breach rate since 1 997-1 998 and the continuing
low appeal rate despite the rise in breaches to be linked with new welfare architecture in
Australia-especially the introduction of the JNAs and constriction of Centrelink
clients' opportunities to appeal decisions that affect them.
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However, Camey's new-contractualism approach has some serious limitations.
While the retraction of the scope to appeal since the introduction of the JNAs might
partially explain the relatively low external appeal rate, it does not accommodate the
case study finding that Centrelink clients may not seek an appeal even if they are aware
of the possibility to do so. It may explain why more Centrelink clients seem to appeal to
the ARO than the external SSAT and AAT20 -because appeals are lodged with the
ARO but rejected because they are JNA matters rather than Centrelink matters.
However, this is only a partial account because it focuses on the general limits of the
policy framework rather than its contextual embodiment. While it can show how
seeking an appeal for a Centrelink decision might be more difficult for a client, it does
not account for the actual effect of that difficulty on the client's behaviour. No
participant said that they declined to seek an appeal because the matter they disagreed
with was a JNA action rather than a Centrelink decision. Further, only 21 per cent of
breaches imposed in 1 998-1 999 and 24 per cent in 1 999-2000 were attributable to
JNAs; in both years fewer than 50 per cent of all breaches recommended by the JNAs
were administered by Centrelink (Moses, 2000, p. 8). Camey's account is, at best, a
partial one.

Another limitation of Camey's new-contractualism approach is that while
Camey (1 999) does qualify that the Australian welfare system has always been
oppressive, he ignores two ways in which this oppression is administered to welfare
recipients. First, he seems to glorify a golden age when TH Marshall's idea of social
citizenship was taken seriously. For example, he says that:

The overriding effect of the transition toward contractualism has been to
partially de-legalise the system, to de-legitimate the rights of its
beneficiaries, and thereby to add to the socio-economic marginalisation
of the unemployed. (Camey & Ramia 1 999, p. 1 1 8)

This statement implies that before current policy changes the system was legalised and
legitimate. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, Fox Piven and Cloward (1 971 )
20

See Figure 3 and Table 1 in Chapter One.
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question the existence of such golden periods of social welfare2 1 • Further, as we shall
also see in the next chapter, Carol Pateman (1 989/2000) and Sheila Shaver (2001 )
remind us that the paternalism reflected in Marshall's ideas offers protection in return
for loss of individual autonomy, especially for women.

Second, the formal appeals process, including the AAT and SSAT, is perceived
by Camey as one of the last precious remnants of this golden period. In his lament at the
threatened nature of the AAT and SSAT, he implicitly accepts that they safeguard
welfare recipients' right to income support. While the overt aim of the appeal system is
to safeguard this right, it is in fact limited in this capacity. Indeed, the SSAT and AAT
can only overturn a Centrelink decision on the individual merits of the matter
(Administrative Review Council, 1 995). Neither the SSAT nor the AAT can overturn a
Centrelink decision because the legislative framework on which the decision is based is
unfair or unnecessarily harsh. Therefore, while the SSAT and AAT can interpret both
the relevant legislation and the individual merits of the matter, they are ultimately
required to apply social security law-even if it might be unjust.

The appeal system itself can even be perceived as oppressive to Centrelink
clients (see H. Dean, 1 991 ). Indeed, De Maria reminds us that the social security appeal
regime in Australian is not concerned about Centrelink clients, rather it is a tool of the
powerful. He puts it "bluntly" as follows:

The Australian community which has fully supported the AAT since its
birth could not rely on it to cut across, contradict, or question
government policies which hurt the ordinary Australian . . . Rather, as
many would argue, Australia's history is a history of oppression
perpetuated through iron-structured partnerships between government
and the judiciary. (De Maria, 1 992, p. 1 1 8)
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Although Fox Piven and Cloward ( 1 971) focus their analysis on the US, where the
rights of social welfare recipients were less formally recognised than in Australia, the
general argument that the social welfare apparatus is controlling for the poor is still
relevant to an Australian context (see, for example, Bessant, 2000a).
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This view is reflected in the case study findings. Centrelink clients that were
interviewed by the author were mostly cynical about the appeals system's ability to
protect their rights. Despite most participants being at least somewhat aware of avenues
of appeal, they were generally negative when asked about their rights. When asked
"what rights do you think you have when you disagree with a Centrelink decision?", 1
participant answered that she had many rights, 7 that they felt they had some rights, 6
that they had few rights, 4 that they had no rights, and 3 felt that they had variable
rights. One participant's response was unclear. The only participant, Jillian, who
answered positively that she had many rights, however, did not know what they were.
Jillian answered that "there's plenty [of rights], but I've just never read all the garbage
they send ya . .. I'll read it one day if l need to". In contrast, Jonathon had appealed to
every level except his local MP, which was the only appeal avenue he was unaware of.
Despite being the participant with the most knowledge and experience of the appeal
system, he still felt he had few rights. When I asked him what rights he thought he had
when he disagreed with a Centrelink decision, he answered "Oh it's a government
department so you think whoop/what? you can't go really any further than that because
everything's government really".

Jasmine's response provides another example of feeling powerless despite
having knowledge about the appeals system. Although Jasmine was aware of 3 avenues
of appeal-the original decision maker, the ARO and the SSAT-she was unclear of
her rights. When asked what rights she thought she had when she disagreed with a
Centrelink decision, she said:

Well I think that, um, you should have at least fifty per cent of the rights,
as a human, birthright, to be able to, um, have something reassessed that
you disagree with. Um, you know, it's not saying that the department is
one hundred per cent wrong, but, you should certainly be heard, you
should certainly be satisfied with your meeting with them about the
issue.

Thus, some Centrelink clients were, despite knowledge about the appeal system, cynical
about the appeal system's ability and intention to protect their rights.
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Conclusion

In summary, Camey's critique of new-contractualism offers a compelling and
detailed analysis of the relationship between the increase in breaches and consistently
low appeal numbers. However, like the approaches in Chapter Four, it is limited. The
neo-liberals problematically assumed that all breaches were legitimate, and
underestimated the hardship a breach can inflict on a person. The advocacy view
ignored deeper political issues and did not account for why some clients did not seek an
appeal even if they disagreed with a Centrelink decision and were aware of the
possibility of appeal. Camey's new-contractualism critique also failed to account for
this case study finding. Also it problematically assumed that there was a golden age of
TH Marshall type citizenship in Australia where social security provided a safety net for
all, and that the appeals structure in Australia, as a final precious remnant of this period,
successfully protects the rights of social security recipients. Yeatman offers a different
interpretation of new-contractualism in Australian welfare.

Anna Yeatman's New-Contractualism

Outline

While Camey is critical of the increasing use of quasi-contracts in Australian
social welfare provision, Yeatman (2001 , p. 2-3) is a little more supportive of a general
culture of broad ideas of contract in social welfare as negotiated social agreement.
Yeatman (2001 , p. 5) says that:
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If there is to be a genuine alternative to neo-liberalism, it will have to be
one that is post-patrimonial [not paternalistic] in nature, one that
genuinely invites all those who cannot achieve self-reliance to be
individualised participants in the relationships that govern their lives.

Like Camey, Yeatman (2001, p. 3) sources the current contractualism in social welfare
in neo-liberal pressure to provide choice for Centrelink clients so they can develop their
capabilities to be effective citizens. However, unlike Camey, Yeatman explicates a
second source of pressure for a new-contractualism in Australian welfare: social
movements on behalf of the clients who are vulnerable to abuses of state power, such as
the welfare rights movement. Indeed, according to Yeatman (2001, p. 3):

Unlike neo-liberalism, these movements do not think in terms of market
models of freedom . . . They argue for a democratisation of the
relationship between the state and service users and, in particular, for
policy development and design that involves users as a major stakeholder
of the service relationship.

Here, Yeatman goes beyond Camey's lament about the retreat of TH Marshall's social
citizenship. She attempts to accommodate Pateman's critique of Marshal as paternalistic
to reach a more favourable evaluation of neo-liberalism-although Yeatman falls short
of full support of neo-liberalism. According to Yeatman (2001, p. 5) "neo-liberalism,
after all, works with these standards in setting up the liberal structures of self-reliance to
women and to people with disability".

Interpretation of current breach and appeal numbers

Yeatman's account of the increase in Centrelink breaching since 1997 would be
similar to Camey's in some instances. She would analyse it in terms of the neo-liberal
based changes in Australian welfare provision-such as the replacement of the DSS and
CES with Centrelink and the Job Network-and the corresponding increase of
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individual work agreements. She might even agree that the stagnating number of
external appeals is due to a demise of the old 'welfare as right' ideas. However, here the
similarities cease.

While Camey might perceive the increasing breach numbers since 1 996-1 997 as
an inherently negative phenomenon, Yeatman would be less pessimistic. This is because
she links breaching to the "deeper preferences" (Yeatman, 1 999, p. 267) of clients.
While the TH Marshall type paternalism often ignored clients' vulnerability to the state,
the aim of the new-contractualism agreements between the case worker and the client is
to further the client's individual needs. While Yeatman does concede that this is a new
form of paternalism-she argues that it is defensible if:

The agent of government is both actually working with the deeper
preferences of the client ... and actively engaging the client in the design
and delivery of his/her program of activity. It is morally defensible
policy only as long as both this premise holds and government commits
sufficient policy effort and resources to enable the programs concerned
to be effective. (Italics in original Yeatman, 1 999, p. 267)

She continues to explain how "the deeper preferences of the client" can involve
some coercion. This is because:
most welfare recipients want to work, this is their deeper preference, but
their lack of positive work experience together with the non-work
orientated structuring of their everyday existence mean that they find it
hard to act on their deeper preference. (Yeatman, 1 999, p. 266)

She quotes the following extract from Mead to elaborate:

Why do requirements cause recipients to participate and work when
simply offering them the chance usually does not? Most staff of welfare
employment programs I have interviewed say that participation in a work
program must be mandated to get recipients' attention. Most adults on
welfare would in principle like to work, but they are preoccupied with
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day-to-day survival. Few will make the effort to organise themselves for
regular activity outside the home unless it is required. Starting to work or
look for a job must also be enforced, many staff members say, because
recipients are often reluctant to seek work on their own. They may want
to work, but they have usually failed to find or keep a job before,
especially good jobs, and they fear to try again. Many prefer education
and training because it is less threatening. It postpones the day when they
must reckon with the labour market. Meanwhile, remaining on welfare is
secure. (Mead in Yeatman, 1999, p. 266)

It follows that an increase in Centrelink breaching is not inherently bad, but
might reflect the "deeper preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267) of Centrelink clients. In
other words, the post-1997 increase in Centrelink breaches might be due to the
identification of clients' "deeper preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267) to be encouraged
to work and discouraged from behaviour which does not increase their chances of
obtaining paid employment. Further, the absence of a corresponding increase in external
appeals might be used as evidence that clients' "deeper preferences" (Yeatman, 1999, p.
267) are being recognised. Indeed, if they disagreed with the breach, wouldn't they
appeal in greater numbers? Further, even if clients do disagree with a Centrelink
decision due to its day-to-day inconvenience, perhaps they do not seek a formal appeal
because they believe that it meets their 'deeper preferences' to be forced to actively seek
work-while the 'welfare as right' basis of formal appeals does not.

Evaluation

An interpretation of current breach and appeal figures based on Yeatman' s
explication of new-contractualism is compelling in many instances. First, it does not
suffer for lamenting the decline of TH Marshall's paternalism like Camey's approach.
A second compelling factor in Yeatman's interpretation is that, unlike Camey, she does
offer a contextual account for why Centrelink clients do not seek a formal appeal
despite disagreeing with a Centrelink decision and being somewhat aware of the appeal
structure. She might argue that this occurs because they know it is not in their "deeper
preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267) to fight their activity agreement. Some clients that
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were interviewed expressed similar sentiments-while they often found Centrelink
requirements inconvenient, they also saw their necessity. For example, Jackie
complained about the large amount of paperwork when dealing with Centrelink, but saw
it as necessary:

All the paper work, it's ridiculous. I understand that they have to do it
because, um, there's a lot of people who probably are on the dole that
shouldn't be on the dole. But, um, the amount of paperwork is j ust
ridiculous that you've got to fill in all the time.

Some research has shown that many Centrelink clients support the new breaching
regime, with 78 per cent of respondents supporting a reduction in payment for those
who fail to meet their activity test requirements (Tann & Sawyers 2001 , p. 9).

However, these strengths also indicate some serious limitations. While Yeatman
criticises old bureaucratic approaches to welfare for their paternalism, she claims
agencies that advocate on behalf of the vulnerable such as welfare rights groups are
somehow exempt from similar paternalism. The previous chapter shows otherwise.

Further, although this approach does offer an explanation for a client not seeking
an external appeal even when they know this is possible and disagree with a Centrelink
decision-it is a flawed explanation. If Centrelink clients must be coerced to follow
their own "deeper preferences" (Yeatman, 1 999, p. 267) in one area-active job
seeking-how can we be sure they are acting in their own higher interests by not
appealing when breached. To claim any action which causes immediate harm to be a
higher good is risky and potentially arbitrary. For example, the McClure report suggests
that single parents with children over "the stipulated ages" should be coerced to seek
work (McClure, 2000a, p. 38-41 ). To draw such arbitrary lines reflects a paternalism
that Carol Pateman (1 989/2000) would be alarmed at.
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Although many clients that were interviewed did agree with the need for
enforcing compliance, this agreement should not be considered in isolation from their
other comments. They also felt that they had few or no rights when dealing with
Centrelink.

Conclusion

Therefore, neither Carney's or Yeatman's account of a new-contractualism in
current Australian social welfare provision provide an adequate analysis of the case
study findings or current breach and appeal figures. Camey is critical of the increasing
use of quasi-contracts in social welfare administration which he views as neo-liberalism
writ-large. Yeatman is more optimistic about new-contractualism-although she stops
short of full support. Yeatman explicates new-contractualism as not just neo-liberal
but also derived from Centrelink client advocacy groups and thus focused on clients'
interests. However, she neglects that advocacy groups are often organised by social
service professionals rather than the clients themselves. This reflects the paternalism
that Yeatman criticised in TH Marshal type welfare. Further, Yeatman's claim that
coercion (such as breaching) is needed, provided it furthers clients' deeper interests, is
dangerously arbitrary. She considers the clients to be more concerned with short term
issues than their long term greater good-so sometimes clients must be coerced to do
something such as search for work. Even this 'tough love' style of new-contractualism
does not seem to protect clients' interests-unless the short term concerns of clients are
ignored as against their "deeper preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267).

Perhaps the issue is not exactly what type of contract we have, as Carney and
Yeatman assume, but why people seemed to have accepted this contract in the first
place. This point is made by Michel Foucault about the idea of a classical social
contract:
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The question is often posed as to how, before and after the [French]
Revolution, a new foundation was given to the right to punish. And no
doubt the answer is to be found in the theory of the contract. But it is
perhaps more important to ask the reverse question: how were people
made to accept the power to punish, or quite simply, when punished,
tolerate being so. The theory of the contract can only answer this
question by the fiction of a juridical subject giving to others the power to
exercise over him the right that he himself possesses over them. It is
highly probable that the great carceral continuum, which provides a
communication between the power of discipline and the power of the
law, and extends without interruption from the smallest coercions to the
longest penal detention, constituted the technical and the real,
immediately material counterpart of that chimerical granting of the right
to punish. (Foucault, 1977, p. 303)

The power of discipline that Foucault is referring to includes surveillance and
individualisation. Both Camey and Yeatman (2001) observe surveillance and
individualisation in the new-contractualism of Australian welfare. Surveillance is the
continual observation of Centrelink clients. Individualisation is the process where
clients are treated as individuals and expect to be treated as such. According to Yeatman
(2001) these can be positive-supervision can ensure a client's needs are being met and
individualisation can ensure their unique circumstances are considered. Camey (200 1)
is more sceptical. He considers surveillance to be a violation of Centrelink clients' basic
rights, and individualisation to be a means by which neo-liberalism reinforces not just
individual responsibility but individual fault. Individualisation, according to Camey,
effectively blames the Centrelink client for their predicament and suggests it is their
ultimate responsibility to change it.

Increased surveillance of Centrelink clients could lead to an increase in
breaches. Further, the combination of surveillance and individualisation might lead to
clients being reluctant to formally seek an appeal of a Centrelink decision for fear of
blighting their record. They may fear future retribution for their challenge. Indeed, as
shown in Chapter Four, many interviewees expressed this concern. Although both
Camey and Yeatman mention surveillance and individualisation, they do not provide a
detailed account of these concepts. This is the topic of Part C, the remainder of the
thesis.
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PART C
SURVEILLANCE AND INDIVIDUALISATION
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CHAPTER SIX
BEYOND SURVEILLANCE AS OPPRESSION

Surveillance generally means continual monitoring (Delbridge & Bernard 1994,
p. 1013), while individualisation means, generally, giving individual character to
someone or something (Delbridge & Bernard, 1994, p. 489). It is possible that
Centrelink clients do not appeal because they are afraid it will be recorded on their
individual record and have future negative repercussions. If this is so, then it would
make little difference whether the client was aware of the possibility of appeal. Here it
is the fear of future reprisal that discourages the client from appealing rather than lack
of knowledge of the appeal system.

As yet, no interpretation of current Centrelink breach and appeal figures
considered in this thesis has been flawless. A particular challenge for them has been to
explain the following finding of the case study interviews: Why don't some Centrelink
clients appeal a Centrelink decision when they are both unhappy with the decision and
aware of the possibility of appeal? Neither the neo-liberal nor the advocates in Chapter
Four could explain this. Further, although both new-contractualism approaches in
Chapter Five offered explanations-they were either incomplete or flawed. The
surveillance and individualisation of Centrelink clients might hold a key to explaining
why some clients don't seek an appeal, despite being both unhappy with a Centrelink
decision and aware of the possibility of appeal. Part C will explore these terms'
relevance to understanding the case study data.

Two general approaches to understanding surveillance and individualisation will
be considered in Part C. Chapter Six will consider some accounts of surveillance as
oppressive. Chapter Seven will evaluate an approach that is derived from Michel
Foucault's understanding of discipline and governmentality.
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Chapter Four's evaluation of the neo-liberal and advocacy explanations of
current Centrelink breach and appeal numbers showed that Centrelink clients are
vulnerable to both market forces and state agencies. This would be no surprise to writers
who focus on the link between social welfare provision and oppression. This chapter
will explore and evaluate some possible explanations for the current disparity of breach
and appeal numbers, which view surveillance as oppressive.

Outline

These writers generally understand surveillance in social welfare provision to be
controlling (Beilharz, Considine & Watts 1 992; Berreen & Wearing 1 989; Conley,
1 982; Considine, 1 999; McMahon et al. 2000). Unlike Yeatman, these writers view this
negatively as oppressive. They do not see it as oppressive in the sense that social
welfare violates peoples freedom to thrive in a market economy, as neo-liberals
following Hayek might argue, but oppressive in a way that serves and perpetuates
structural social and economic inequalities. Hence, rather than argue that social welfare
harms the ability of the market to allow its invisible hand (Smith, 1 974) to distribute
wealth to all levels of society, some of these writers generally argue that the particular
way social welfare manifests actually helps the market keep certain people oppressed
and that this is to other people's advantage. However, these writers interpret oppressive
surveillance in varying ways.

For example, Carol Pateman (1 989/2000) offers an understanding of the
relationship .between welfare provision and patriarchal oppression. She argues that
women, as the primary care givers in society as mothers, wives and daughters,
effectively subsidise the welfare state through providing caring for free. Further,
Pateman argues that the welfare state is so focused on the male bread winner, paid work
and financial independence, that women are effectively denied social citizenship in the
classical TH Marshall sense. In other words, women were effectively denied
independent access to social security. In particular, personal relationship details are
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often recorded because a woman is assumed to be economically dependent on a man if
she is living with him in a sexual relationship. Indeed, the surveillance of personal
relationships has even extended to home visits by welfare officer "sex snoopers"
(McIntosh, 1981/2000, p. 1 1 9).

Other writers interpret social welfare as an oppressive function of capitalism,
where the poor are oppressed by the wealthy in the interests of the market. In a seminal
work in 1 971, Fox Piven and Cloward (1 971 ) demonstrated the link between social
welfare provision and capitalism. Their study focused on the welfare provisions of the
great depression and New Deal period in the United States of America. They argued
that welfare provisions regulated labour by preventing revolution in periods of market
down-tum, and depressing wages in more comfortable periods. Surveillance, through
gathering information about people while they were receiving welfare provision, was
one way of insuring they either accepted any work available-including very low paid
work which depressed wages-during more comfortable periods, or would not revolt
when unemployed during periods of market down-tum.

Many writers have argued that social welfare in Australia also favours market
interests. For example, some writers show how neo-liberal values of hard work and
independence but disapproval of laziness and dependence are reinforced through the
social welfare system (McMahon et al. Conley, 1982; 2000, p. 1 66). Social welfare,
according to these writers, manifests so as to distinguish between the 'deserving' and
the 'undeserving'. Those considered 'deserving' receive support while the
'undeserving' do not, and may even be punished. There are many examples of such
social welfare policy. Many writers point to the English Poor Laws as the starting point
for these policies in Australia. The Poor Laws were nineteenth century (and earlier)
English statutes that regulated the poor 22 • Although Australia has never had an explicit
The first Poor Law was in 1 534 after the black death and was designed to quarantine
unemployed labourers and encourage them to take any locally available work (McMahon
et al., 2000, p. 1 65- 1 67). Further amendments in 153 1 , 1536, 1572, 1 597 and 1 598
"combined repressive punishments for the idle and the beggar (the undeserving) with
alms for the aged and the needy and work for those who were able (the deserving)"
(McMahon et al., 2000, p. 1 65-167). These measures were formally codified in the
Elizabethan Poor Law of 1 601 (Trattner, 1984). From 1795, beginning in Speenhamland in

22
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Poor Law, these writers argue that these laws have provided a legacy that is still
perceivable in Australian welfare policy. Of particular significance is the distinction
between the deserving nature of hard work compared to the undeserving nature of
idleness, and offering social welfare in relation to whether a person is considered
'deserving' or 'undeserving' (McMahon et al. Conley, 1982; 2000, p. 166).

A very early example, from before Australia's federation, is the Benevolent
Society of New South Wales, founded in 1818. Their benevolence was carefully
monitored in the following manner:

For an outlay of one guinea per year, respectable persons could be
subscribers, and this entitled them to recommend an applicant for relief.
The Society sent its members to visit applicants in their homes, to
interview them, determine whether or not their homes were respectable
and well-kept, and to discover whether or not they were deserving of
the south of England, parishes supplemented low wages from parish taxes. These
supplements were known as outdoor relief (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 1 66). However, "it was
argued that the allowance system forced down wages, undermined self-help, made
people dependent and drove them to pauperism" (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 166). So, a new
much tougher Poor Law act was introduced in 1834. "The New Poor Law assumed that
poverty and destitution were the individual's fault. Underlying this act were two
important elements-the principle of less eligibility and the workhouse test" (McMahon et
al., 2000, p. 1 66). The principle of less eligibility:
required that welfare benefits should only be offered on terms designed
to make the condition of the unemployed less desirable than the
condition of the lowest paid self-supporting worker in the labour market
. . . This principle was reinforced by a stringent workhouse test designed
to force recipients to re-enter the labour market in preference to
depending on charity or on the workhouse. (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 1 66)
The aim, according to McMahon was, to be "cruel to be kind". McMahon continues to
explain that:

The allowance system, it was said, had offered the social cripple a pair of
crutches and so permanently disabled him; the new Poor Law offered
him nothing and so he walked again. (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 1 66)
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relief ... The Society ... actively discouraged persons providing welfare
relief without the proper scientific investigation, for it was argued that
indiscriminate almsgiving encouraged pauperism by removing the
incentive to work. (Conley, 1 982, p. 282-283)

The stated aims of the society were:
The following ... : "That the Object of this Society be to relieve the Poor,
the Diseased, the Aged and Infirm; and thereby to discountenance as
much as possible, Mendicity and Vagrancy, and to encourage industrious
habits amongst the indigent Poor, as well as to afford them Religious
Instruction and Consolation in their Distress". (Conley, 1 982, p. 282283)

Windschuttle (1 980, p. x) points out another example of a Poor Law based
policy in Australia. The social benefit provided in Australia during the great
depression-known as the "susso"-was given in return for willing labour-"road
works, forestry projects, or simply digging holes and filling them up again"
(Windschuttle, 1 980, p. x). Here the ' deserving' were distinguished from the
' undeserving' by whether they were willing to labour, and the ' deserving' thus received
support which those who did not work were denied.

Similarly, McMahon (2000) suggests that The Harvester Judgement in 1 907, the
White Paper on Full employment in 1 945, The Accord and state child care in 1 9 72 also
reflect the Poor Law work ethic. He states:
Just as in the British Poor Law, those who are deemed to be deserving
within the welfare state are essentially those who are in work or those
whose capital creates wealth. (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 1 67)

More recent Australian social policy changes have also been criticised for their
oppressive surveillance and for distinguishing the ' deserving' from the ' undeserving'
poor. For example, Robert E. Goodin (2001 ) criticises welfare-to-work reforms like
Australia's work for the dole for claiming to apply a type of strong paternalism where
people are forced to behave deservingly. Inherent in these policies claim for legitimacy
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is "a view that work is intrinsically good, and welfare is second best" (Goodin, 2001, p.
197). This view reflects the values of the Poor Laws. However, according to Goodin
(2001, p. 189-190, p. 198), such a claim is like a "fig leaf' which conceals a more
oppressive intention. This is because the stated moralistic intention is "clearly not"
sincere:

If we seriously believed that work was good for you and that it is the
state's legitimate role to force you to do it, then we would have no
grounds for confining our paternalism to the poor. Patemalistically
speaking, it would be equally important to make the rich work too.

Goodin goes on to suggest that more oppressive aims like reducing public expenditure
might be the real intention of contemporary work for the dole schemes, rather than
justice (Goodin, 2001, p. 199-200). Or in other words, that saving taxpayers money is
the real aim, at the expense of emancipative justice for welfare recipients.

Judith Bessant (2000a; 2000b) also criticises the current Australian work for the
dole program. Bessant (2000a, p. 29) says it is "destructive of the unemployed person's
sense of autonomy and agency", particularly for youth. Bessant (2000a, p. 28) argues
that increased youth unemployment relates to structural economic factors like a
decrease in industrial jobs, rather than young people's lack of any work ethic. Further,
she suggests that policy makers are aware of this, but admitting this means they cannot
control youth through such programs as work for the dole. Bessant writes that:
If policy-makers and politicians recognise that unemployment results
from structural changes in the labour market and so on, why then insist
that job seekers be forced to work for unemployment benefits? (Bessant,
2000a, p. 28)
Bessant then answers this question:
Acknowledging that jobless people are disadvantaged by 'structural'
changes in labour market (changes over which they have no personal
control) weakens government claims about there being a need to 'police'
young unemployed people on moral grounds (ie: to teach the lessons of
reciprocation). (Bessant, 2000a, p. 28)
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Interpretation of Current Breach and Appeal Numbers

According to this approach, the current disparity of Centrelink breach and appeal
figures relates to welfare's relationship with oppressive forces like patriarchy and
capitalism. In particular, the disparity might be due to the oppressive surveillance of
Centrelink clients which distinguishes the 'deserving' from the ' undeserving' poor. It
could be argued that more Centrelink clients are being punished for being 'undeserving'
to ensure they accept even the poorest working conditions during a period of relatively
comfortable market conditions (following Fox Piven & Cloward 197 1). New
requirements such as mutual obligation, work for the dole, and The jobseeker diary
(Centrelink, 2000c) mean there is more intense surveillance of Centrelink clients'
activities (McMahon et al., 2000, p. 170). These new requirements have been
introduced gradually since 1996. This recent increase in oppressive surveillance of
Centrelink clients' daily activities could be reflected in the increased number of
breaches since then. According to Goodin (2001, p. 199):

The more cumbersome the process, the more people will fail to satisfy
some requirement or other and be 'breached off the program. The more
times they are supposed to tum up for interviews, the better the chances
they will miss one or more of them . . . The more letters they have or
forms they have to fill in, the more opportunities they have for failing to
comply.

The view of surveillance as oppressive can also be applied to formal appeal
numbers. The stagnating formal external appeal numbers, according to this approach,
reflect the increased surveillance and oppressive nature of the system. In other words,
Centrelink clients do not tend to seek formal appeals because they are too oppressed.
Goodin (2001, p. 199-200) reflects on how oppressive surveillance applies to all
Centrelink clients, not just the 'undeserving' but also the 'deserving' :
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Of course, there is no reason to think that only the 'right' people (the
undeserving, and only the undeserving) will necessarily be the ones
breached off Quite the contrary . . . Campaigns against welfare cheats
reduce the errors of giving people benefits they don't really deserve, but
only at the cost of increasing the number of cases in which people don't
get the benefits they do deserve.

Further, the scope for Centrelink clients to appeal has effectively retracted as the JNA
(many of which are community organisations) have taken over the role of the state
based CES. This is because, as explained earlier, a client cannot formally appeal
against a JNA decision, as only Centrelink decisions are appealable.

The formal social security appeals system in Australia can also be understood
according to its relationship with the powerful (De Maria, 1992, p. 1 18). As explained
earlier, the formal appeal system can only attempt to ensure that Centrelink officers
have not made an error in the assessments of whether recipients are ' deserving' or
'undeserving' of payment. Formal appeal rulings do not question the bases of these
Poor Law type judgements.

Evaluation

This approach's interpretation of current Centrelink breach and appeal figures is
compelling for many reasons. First, its interpretation of surveillance as oppressive might
explain why some Centrelink clients do not seek a formal appeal when they disagree
with a Centrelink decision, even if they are aware of the appeals process. According to
this approach, they do not seek a formal appeal because they are too oppressed. This
explanation does seem to fit with the powerlessness clients expressed in interviews. For
example, Jim felt so surveyed and marginalised that he said being a Centrelink client is
"like being in gaol". Second, unlike the approaches in Chapter Four, this approach
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draws on broader power inequalities. Indeed, this is the very basis of their analysis of
the relationship between welfare and oppressive forces like capitalism and patriarchy.

Despite these strengths, however, this approach is limited. It does not explain
why people let themselves be so oppressed. Conley, however, does offer a partial
explanation:

After 1 50 years of daily practice under the Australian economic system,
the unemployable have thoroughly internalised their labels, so they now
believe they are hopeless cases and that the reason for their situation is
quite possibly their own fault. Our first unemployables were much more
likely to have blamed the economic system and its attendant class system
for their plight. (Conley, 1 982, p. 281 )

However, this explanation is insufficient because it does not explain how the
"unemployable have thoroughly internalised their labels" or how "daily practice under
the Australian economic system" does this. She suggests that it might have something to
do with "1 50 years of daily practice". However, since few "unemployables" are 1 50
years old this does not explain how individuals have internalised these labels! Although
many writers who consider surveillance as oppressive prefer to focus on collectivity to
show the class (Fox Piven & Cloward 1 971 ), gender (Pateman, 1 989/2000), or race
based nature of individuals' experiences (Williams, 1 989), this does neglect questions
about how these processes work on the level of the individual. The case study found
much evidence of processes working at the level of the individual. For example, in the
Notes for Newstart Allowance booklet (Centrelink, 2000e) words referring to individual
obligations, such as "you", "your", "you'll", "you're" and "yourself', occur 1 86 times
over the 7 pages (excluding the cover). The greatest number on one page is 51 times, the
smallest 1 5. Over the 7 pages of type the average number per page that "you" or "your"
occur is 26.5 times per page. These words are also used thickly in The jobseeker guide
(Centrelink, 2000d) and The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c)-an average of 1 1
times per page (excluding the blank jobseeker diary forms from pp. 6-3 7). Common
phrases in the documents are "your jobsearch", "your plan", "your interview", "your
performance", "your efforts to find work", "your payment", "your Diary", and "your
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obligations". It seems being a Centrelink client is very individually focused. Indeed,
when interviewed the Centrelink clients commonly used similar phrases. They often
used phrases like "my interview", "my first interview", "my pay", "my work diary",
"my application", "my payments", and "I'm on the dole". Hence, this approach's
account is, at best, a partial one. An approach, which engages with both surveillance and
individualisation, is required.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered some explanations for the current disparity of
Centrelink breach and appeal figures that focus on surveillance as oppressive. These
approaches to social policy have been concerned with the surveillance and control of the
poor through social security provision. Particularly important to approaches that focus
on surveillance as oppressive are various manners of distinguishing between the
'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor that are the historical legacy of the English Poor
Laws. While this approach has many strengths, it has one serious weakness-it neglects
to address individualisation in its analysis. It thus cannot explain how oppressive
surveillance works at the level of the individual.

Erving Goffman studied the effects of oppressive organisations on individuals.
He focused on what he called "total institutions" such as mental asylums and prisons to
show how individuals were stripped of their identities through degradation ceremonies
when they entered the institution, and then reprogrammed. He explains the oppressive
effect, or mortification, of this type of individualisation below:

In total institutions these territories of the self [such as body, immediate
actions, thoughts] are violated; the boundary that the individual places
between his being and the environment is invaded and the embodiments
of self profaned. (Goffman, 1 961 , p. 3 1-32)
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And:

There is, first, a violation of one's informational preserve regarding self.
During admission, facts about the inmate' s social statuses and past
behaviour-especially discreditable facts-are collected and recorded in
a dossier available to all staff. Later, in so regulating inner tendencies of
the inmate, there may be group or individual confession-psychiatric,
political, military, or religious, according to the type of institution.
(Goffman, 1 961 , p. 32)

He goes on:

New audiences not only learn discreditable facts about oneself that are
ordinarily concealed but are also in a position to perceive some of these
facts directly. Prisoners and mental patients cannot prevent their visitors
from seeing them in humiliating circumstances. Another example is the
shoulder patch of ethnic identification worn by concentration-camp
inmates. Medical and security examinations often expose the inmate
physically, sometimes to persons of both sexes; a similar exposure
follows from collective sleeping arrangements and doorless toilets. An
extreme here, perhaps, is the situation of a self-destructive mental patient
who is stripped naked for what is felt to be his own protection and placed
in a constantly lit seclusion room, into whose Judas window any person
passing on the ward can peer. (Goffman, 1 961 , p. 32)

Although I have found no evidence of Goffman's more extreme examples of
mortification in my case study, there is evidence of violating people's personal
information. Indeed, Centrelink clients are required to provide evidence of failed job
applications, employment history, and past and current personal relationships. However,
Goffman argues that it is the lack of individualisation that causes the problem. The
processes he describes are a form of de-individualisation. However, the reverse seems to
be occurring in current social welfare policy in Australia. Yeatman argues that
increasing surveillance allows individuals' special cases to be considered. Carney
argues that increased individualisation has led to more marginalisation of Centrelink
clients. Although Yeatman and Carney differ in their approval, they agree that the
current Australian welfare system is experiencing increased individualisation rather than

1 04

Goffman-like de-individualisation. As already discussed, there was evidence for
increased individualisation in the case study. For example, the documents studied gave
individual character to Centrelink clients. They did this by heavily using words like
"you", "your", "you' 11", "you' re" and "yourself'. Hence, if the concepts of surveillance
and individualisation are to be useful for understanding the current disparity of
Centrelink breach and appeal figures, they need to account for the increased
individualisation of Centrelink practice. They also need to account for both surveillance
and individualisation-unlike the oppressive surveillance writers discussed above. That
is, it needs to account for how Centrelink clients accept such oppressive individual
surveillance. This is the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCIPLINE AND GOVERNMENTALITY

Much current work on surveillance and individualisation in social welfare draws
from the work of Michel Foucault. Although some do consider him to be essentially a
writer who deals with oppression23 , his approach is very different to those generally
considered to be critical, like Marxist writers (Ransom, 1 997). Foucault's criticism is
not grounded in relationships to capitalism, or social collectivity in the orthodox critical
manner (Ransom, 1 997). Rather, through focusing on the level of the individual and
individual subjectivity, he concentrates on the how rather than the who for or who
against of the orthodox critical writer who tends to view surveillance as oppressive.
This is illustrated by Foucault' s particular view of power. While Foucault does argue
that power may be oppressive, he says that it is also creative. According to Foucault,
power, through such techniques as surveillance and individualisation, creates individual
subjectivity. Perhaps Foucault's understanding of surveillance and individualisation will
provide that which was lacking in the orthodox surveillance as oppressive approach of
the previous chapter-an account of how Centrelink clients allow themselves to be
breached. Consequently, we might finally be offered the previously elusive explanation
for why (or how) some Centrelink clients do not appeal a Centrelink decision when they
disagree with it, even if they are aware of the possibility of a formal appeal.

There are two general areas of scholarship that claim Foucault's influence and
consider surveillance and individualisation-those who focus on Foucault's disciplines
and those who focus on govemmentality. Although these two areas could be considered

23

Interestingly, other writers consider Foucault to be essentially conservative (see Harris,

1999, p. 27)
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separately24, they do overlap and interconnect and, for clarity, will be considered
together in this chapter.

Outline of Discipline and Governmentality

Studies that concentrate on Foucault's understanding of discipline view
surveillance and individualisation as forms of disciplinary power. Disciplinary power,
according to these writers, is a small, intricate, micro-power which " 'makes'
individuals" (Foucault, 1977, p. 170). As Foucault explains, disciplinary power "is not a
triumphant power ... it is a modest, suspicious power" ( 1977, p. 170). Individuals are
made through "a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application,
[and] targets" (Foucault, 1977, p. 2 15). These techniques include surveillance and
individualisation.

Foucault is most famous for his account of surveillance, in particular "panoptic
surveillance" (Foucault, 1977, p. 195-230). This term is derived from Jeremy
Bentham's ideal prison-the Panopticon. It focuses on the continual surveillance and
"correct training" of prisoners. Prisoners are housed in isolated cells surrounding a
central surveillance tower and continually modify their behaviour because they know
they may be watched at any time. Eventually, prisoners internalise this new behaviour.
Or, in other words, the disciplinary power of surveillance recreates the prisoner.

24

The approach taken in this thesis may not be considered properly Foucaultian by
some. However, it is not the aim of this chapter, nor this thesis, to be so. Nor is it
desirable to attempt to follow Foucault doctrinally. Here, please keep in mind Hunt and
Wickham's (1994, p. 3) position that there "is no single starting point or grounding of
Foucault's thought; it can be approached from a number of different perspectives. One
particularly important consequence is that there is no 'real Foucault' who can be
summoned. Rather, we argue that it is a useful strategy to insist that there are many
'Foucaults' who coexist and interact with one another. No amount of synthesis can yield
a unitary body of knowledge let alone a single theory".
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Individualisation creates individuals in a similar manner, according to Foucault
(1 977, p. 1 92-1 94). To use the example of the Panopticon, prisoners are continually
surveyed m isolated cells. Each prisoner is individually watched. They are thus
individually judged and are, individually, changed into reformed law abiding
individuals. By focusing the gaze of surveillance on the individual, the disciplinary
power of surveillance can recreate an individual prisoner.

Other disciplinary powers also create and recreate individuals, according to this
approach. These include normalisation and distribution. Normalisation provides the
means by which individual prisoners are trained to know how they are expected to
behave in the Panopticon and change themselves accordingly (Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 781 80). Distribution refers to how the position of bodies and objects in space makes
individuals (Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 41 -1 45). To use the Panopticon example again, the
distribution of the cells around the central surveillance tower, and the distribution of
prisoners' bodies in these cells so they can view the tower but no other prisoner, allows
the other disciplinary powers to work. These walls isolate bodies and thus allow
individualisation. Similarly, the distribution of the central surveillance tower and
corresponding transparent front wall allows surveillance.

However, Foucault's concept of disciplinary power goes beyond the prison wall.
For example, to Foucault, the disciplinary instrument called panoptic surveillance
pervades all society. Indeed, to Foucault "wherever one is dealing with a multiplicity of
individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must be imposed, the
panoptic schema may be used" (Foucault, 1 977, p. 205). Further, disciplinary
techniques of power are very relevant in the context of current Centrelink breach and
appeal figures in Australia. Judith Bessant observed that Centrelink clients are treated as
needing correction:

Jobless people allegedly failed to become employed due to their ' bad'
attitudes towards work, because they lacked discipline, could not
successfully present themselves at interviews, or because they lacked the
necessary skills in literacy and numeracy. (Bessant, 2000a, p. 26)
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However, Foucault was criticised by his contemporaries for ignoring broader
political processes such as the power of the nation state. Indeed, these critics ask: what
about power inequalities, legal coercion, and economic inequalities? Foucault rebutted
these criticisms with an account of politics, often called govemmentality, which
accounted for both intricate micro-power and wider politics (Burchell, Gordon & Miller
1 99 1 ). Most political analysts only saw part of the wider picture, according to Foucault.
This is because they continue to understand modem politics in terms of a sovereign or
crown-despite this being outdated. Most political theory, according to Foucault (1 980,
p. 1 21 ), had yet to "cut off the King's head". While most accounts of political power are
concerned with laws, coercion and who is sovereign, Foucault is also concerned with
methods of counting and managing the population. Foucault envisages a triangle of
contemporary govemmentality which has in each comer-sovereign, discipline and
government (management) (Foucault, 1 991 ). Hence, the analysis offered by studies of
govemmentality differs from the type of analysis used in earlier chapters of this thesis.
The approach developed by Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller (1 992) has been very useful
here.

In very general terms, govemmentality studies analyse the "conduct of conduct"
(M. Dean, 1 999, p. 2). Govemmentality is concerned with the "problematic of
government" (Foucault, 1 991, p. 87)-the how of governing (M. Dean, 1 999, p. 2,1 01 1 ; Foucault, 1 982, p. 220-1 ). The problematic of government may be analysed in terms
of political rationalities and governmental technologies (Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 1 751 76).

Political rationalities are "the changing discursive fields within which the
exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of
exercising power by diverse authorities, of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of
politics, and conceptions of proper distribution of such tasks" (Rose & Miller 1 992, p.
1 75). Or, in other words, political rationalities are the changing understandings of
acceptable management practice. For example, Rose and Miller call the political
rationality of the Keynesian welfare state "welfarism" and describe it as championing
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mutual social responsibility as the preferred conduct of conduct (Rose & Miller 1992, p.
19 1-198). In contrast, currently, according to Rose and Miller, neo-liberal political
rationality perceives markets to be the best regulators of economic activity, including
welfare (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 198). It is an attempt to address a perceived
problematic 'crisis' of the Keynesian welfare state.

Governmental technologies are "the complex of mundane programmes,
calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which
authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions" (Rose & Miller
1992, p. 175). Or, in simpler words, governmental technologies are the tools for
managing populations. Some examples are statistics (Procacci, 1978, p. 68-69; 1991)
and the government of the self through surveillance (M. Dean, 1995; 1998; 1999). For
example unemployment statistics such as the number of people who are unemployed
were not always recorded-this is a relatively recent practice. William Walters refers to
the discovery and invention of unemployment in Unemployment and government:

geneologies of the social (Walters, 2000, p. 12-52). He argues that the categories of
employed and unemployed were created, and were not a naturally occurring
phenomenon.

However, Foucault can be criticised for perce1vmg society as a perpetual
autonomous machine. It is argued that if the techniques of power explicated above
continually create human subjectivity-then there is no escape from them. If we can't
yearn for or even conceptualise an escape from them, then how are we ever to break
free from them? This, however, misunderstands Foucault's intention. Foucault does not
claim these techniques always work-rather, he says they inevitably fail (see Malpas &
Wickham, 1995). They are so fallible that they are more like an imagined ideal world
than concrete reality. Indeed, no prison works exactly like the Panopticon. It is an ideal
schema that perpetuates certain ideas-like neo-liberalism or welfarism in Australian
social welfare provision.
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Interpretation of Current Breach and Appeal Numbers

Through an analysis of the intricate inter-dependencies between political
rationalities and governmental technologies, we can begin to understand the multiple
and delicate networks that connect the individuals, groups and organisations to the
aspirations of authorities in the advanced liberal democracies of the present. Patricia
Harris (1 999; 2000), Barry Hindess (1 987; 1 993; 1 997a; 1 997b; 1 997c; 1 998a; 1 998b)
and Mitchell Dean (1 995; 1 998; 1 999), for example, have applied this analytic to an
Australian welfare context.

Within neo-liberal political rationality "the language of the entrepreneurial
individual, endowed with freedom and autonomy, has come to predominate over almost
any other in evaluations of the ethical claims of political power and programmes of
government" (Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 200). But "through this loose assemblage of
agents, calculations, techniques, images and commodities, individuals can be governed
through their freedom to choose" (Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 201 ). They aim to create
"enterprising individuals" (Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 1 96). In another example, in the
political rationality of welfarism, "payment would qualify an individual to receive
benefits, and teach the lessons of contractual obligations, thrift and responsibility"
(Rose & Miller 1 992, p. 1 96). The aim here is to create "responsible individuals" (Rose
& Miller 1 992, p. 1 96).

According to this approach, neo-liberal political rationality25 , with its
championing of market forces and envisaged population of ' enterprising individuals',
expresses its mentality in some changes to the Australian welfare apparatus (Harris,
1 999, p. 44). The privatisation of the CES to become the Job Network was championed
for allowing YA and NSA recipients a choice of service provider. The neo-liberal
language of choice permeates the governance of the Job Network; furthermore, how
Centrelink clients can be "governed through their freedom to choose" (Rose & Miller
1 992, p. 201 ) is clearly enunciated. Indeed, recipients must apply for YA or NSA in
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order to choose a Job Network provider. Also, NSA and YA recipients must choose at
least one Job Network provider, preferably more (FaCS, 2002), in order to continue
receiving payment. Further, YA and NSA recipients must negotiate an activity
agreement with their Job Network provider.

If they choose to transgress their negotiated agreement (FaCS, 2002), they will
be financially penalised (breached). As explained earlier, the Job Network Provider
must report any transgression of the activity test to Centrelink, who may then impose a
breach. Finally, if an ' enterprising individual' Centrelink client is unhappy with the
service of either Centrelink or a Job Network Provider, they are free to call the customer
complaints line (FaCS, 2002). Consequently, within the mentality and techniques of
neo-liberal governance, breaching is tied to the discourse of individual freedom, despite
being a governed punishment. Further, for an ' enterprising individual', the customer
complaints line is the most obvious avenue through which to practice their freedom to
complain, despite its inability to change decisions.

The formal administrative appeal structure for Centrelink clients was
conceptualised in a welfarist political rationality, with its championing of reciprocal
obligations, social solidarity and the ' responsible individual'. It was intended to be a
way of ensuring that responsible individuals were not harmed by a perceived possible
excess of state power (Administrative Review Council, 1 995).

According to the analytic of governmentality, the complaint line has not
replaced the appeals structure. Rather, they coexist. Indeed, people do still seek appeals.
However, customer complaints seem to translate more efficiently with the techniques of
self-discipline that govern unemployed people through Centrelink offices and the JNAs
in neo-liberal governance. According to Patricia Harris (1 999, p. 43), who writes about
the Australian welfare system, "clients become customers" in advanced liberal
governance. Centrelink clients see themselves as customers to the extent that they
complain to a customer complaint line that cannot overturn a Centrelink decision rather
25

Patricia Harris ( 1999, p. 41 -48) uses the phrase "advanced liberal governance".
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than to an administrative appeals system that can overturn Centrelink decisions. Further,
they cannot seek an appeal of a JNA decision in the formal appeal system (see Chapters
One and Five): as a customer who is an ' enterprising individual' they only have the
freedom to make a customer complaint about a JNA.

Mitchell Dean (1 995; 1 998; 1 999) has done much analysis of the techniques of
the self in Australian social welfare. His work provides a window for understanding
how Centrelink clients may be made into customers through disciplining power.
According to Mitchell Dean, Centrelink clients are subjected to intense surveillance in
an attempt to create their inner moral lives-in particular, to make them into active "job
ready" individuals (M. Dean, 1 998, p. 93). In other words surveillance,
individualisation, normalisation and distribution are used to create and recreate
Centrelink clients. One significant way these disciplines are applied is through the
activity test. Many Centrelink clients must pass this test each fortnight to receive
payment. According to Mitchell Dean (1 998, p. 94-95), the activity test facilitates
"intense supervision of the activities of the unemployed, by which the claimant must
demonstrate not only active job searching but also training and job preparation
activities". The activity test not only allows the surveillance of a Centrelink client, but
also the maintenance of an individual record about that client, and a technique to
normalise a client as an active jobseeker. To evidence this point, Dean points to the
focus on active job seeking manifest in the "various resume, application, interview and
job-search techniques recommended in the Job Search Kit provided by the CES" (M.
Dean, 1 995, p. 574). These are, "backed up by sanctions, such as the cancellation of the
allowance for varying periods for various groups of the unemployed" (M. Dean, 1 998,
p. 95). Although these observations relate to the CES, which has been replaced by the
JNAs, similar disciplinary techniques are still administered to Centrelink clients. They
are also backed up by sanctions such as breaches.

Further, Hartley Dean (1 992, p. 1 3 6-1 74) shows how individualisation can also
occur in the social security appeals system. He views seeking an appeal as an individual
examination. Hartley Dean uses this concept to understand the different hearings in the
Social Security Appeals Tribunal in the United Kingdom (H. Dean, 1 99 1 , p. 1 3 6-1 74).
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In his analysis of the pre-hearing process, Dean shows that while most social security
recipients in the United Kingdom usually do not meet the officials who administer their
case, "to appeal against the determinations of such officialdom is to invite further
scrutiny" (H. Dean, 1991, p. 145). He continues; "even if it is only a minority of
appellants who appear in the full light of a tribunal hearing, in the act of appealing every
appellant submits her/himself for examination" (H. Dean, 1991, p. 145). Similarly in
Australia, not only are Centrelink clients created into customers who are more likely to
choose a customer complaint line over a formal appeal, they may also be reluctant to
seek a formal appeal because it invites further individual examination. Both processes
would manifest as a relatively low number of appeals, even when breach numbers are
increasing rapidly.

Evaluation

This interpretation of breach and appeal figures stands up well in relation to the
case findings. This will be shown by locating evidence for how various governmental
technologies create individual Centrelink clients who can be governed through their
freedom to choose. Much evidence was found for the disciplining techniques of
surveillance, individualisation, normalisation and distribution. As we shall see, much of
the evidence adds flesh to this approach rather than challenges it.

However, the depth of an analysis of Centrelink breach and appeal figures
according to discipline and governmentality would stop around here. It would not seek
to ask who does the training, who suffers through this failure, or who benefits. Nor
would this approach ask if our current regime is particularly prone to failure. Rather, as
explained earlier, it views power as more diffuse than this-there is no agent who
orchestrates these disciplinary techniques. Further, failure is a characteristic of all
rationalities of government and their techniques-not any particular one. According to
this approach there is no hidden agenda or deeper meaning. This has led Gavin Kendall
and Gary Wickham to describe Foucault's analysis as "a rather 'flat' description"
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(Kendall & Wickham 1 999, p. 1 24). However, they do not mean this as a criticism. This
is because they believe it is a deliberate attempt by Foucault to distance himself from
established ideas, particularly Marxism. According to Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham:

A central feature of Foucault's proj ect lies in the distinctive form of his
engagement with the legacy of Marx ... What Foucault does is to ' use'
Marx to set up a negative pole against which to elaborate his alternative.
He did this as a strategic reaction to the significant influence of Marxism
in French intellectual life. (Hunt & Wickham 1 994, p. 33-34)

Foucault's deliberate distancing from Marx also means that he focuses principally on
power as positive and creative rather than negative and oppressive. Hunt and Wickham
explain that Foucault's:

critical step is the equation and conflation of negativity with repression;
the result is that in order to avoid a negative conception of power he first
down plays (but does not exclude) the repressive capacity of power and
then proceeds to elaborate an account of the modem forms of
disciplinary power which is founded on non-repressive forms of
domination. In order to secure this objective he sets out to purge all those
elements associated with negativity and repression. (Hunt & Wickham
1 994, p. 34)

In analysing the case study findings for this section, different (but
interconnected) disciplinary techniques were used as analytical categories. Research by
Wright and Gore was particularly useful here. They adopted techniques of power
derived from Discipline and punish as categories for analysing the disciplining of the
human body in a classroom (Gore, 1 998; Wright, 2000). Wright (2000) recorded and
transcribed a girls gym class lesson and analysed the text according to the following
categories:

surveillance,

normalisation,

exclusion,

classification,

distribution,

individualisation, totalisation, and regulation. The categories of surveillance,
individualisation, normalisation and distribution were useful in this research. This
section will outline operational definitions of these categories, and then detail evidence
for each category.
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Surveillance.

Gore's operational definition of surveillance is "supervising,

closely observing, watching, threatening to watch or expecting to be watched" (Gore,
1 998). Wright extends Gore's operational definition to include instructions for subjects
"to become involved in the monitoring of their own performance" (Wright, 2000, p.
1 56). This includes panoptic surveillance where, according to Foucault:

He who is subjected to a [continuous] field of visibility, and who knows
it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the
principle of his own subjection. (Foucault, 1 977, p. 202-203)

Evidence of surveillance from my study included the 'fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2
May 2000), The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c), and repeated warnings that
Centrelink may take any means necessary to investigate the accuracy of a client's
claims.

Individualisation. Surveillance works on the level of the individual. According

to Foucault (1 977, p. 1 93) in a disciplinary regime "individualisation is 'descending"'
(Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 93 ) rather than ascending. This is in contrast to, for example,
feudal society where "the more one possesses power or privilege, the more one is
marked as an individual, by rituals, written accounts or visual reproductions" (Foucault,
1 977, p. 1 92). He explains that:

As power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on
whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualised; it is
exercised by surveillance rather than ceremonies, by comparative
measures that have the 'norm' as reference rather than genealogies
giving ancestors as points of reference; by ' gaps' rather than by deeds.
(Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 93)
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Gore defined individualisation as "giving individual character to oneself or another"
(Gore, 1998, p. 242). Wright (2000, p. 157) elaborated it to be naming, using "you",
individual treatment, or using "I". I found much evidence of this in my research.
Phrases like "your job search", "your obligation", and "your interview" occurred
throughout the documents.

Individualisation can also incorporate Foucault's concept of "the examination"
(Foucault, 1977, p. 185, 192). Examples of individual examination include medical
examination and scholarly examination. The examination is like a personal interview
which implements "within a single mechanism, power relations that make it possible to
extract and constitute knowledge" about an individual (Foucault, 1977, p. 185, 192).
The examination is a mechanism that makes the subjected individual visible and
objectifies them (Foucault, 1977, p. 187), documents them (Foucault, 1977, p. 189), and
"makes each individual a 'case"' (Foucault, 1977, p. 191). In short, it "establishes over
individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them"
(Foucault, 1977, p. 184). As stated earlier, Hartley Dean uses this concept to understand
the Social Security Appeals Tribunal in the United Kingdom (H. Dean, 1991, p. 136174). In his analysis of the pre-hearing process, Dean shows that "in the act of appealing
every appellant submits her/himself for examination" (H. Dean, 1991, p. 145). Evidence
of such examination in Australia includes claimants' personal, private interviews with a
Centrelink officer when they apply for payment.

Normalisation.

Normalisation means, generally, the detailed and personal

categorisation of 'normal' as distinct from 'abnormal' behaviour, with the aim of
correcting abnormal behaviour or maintaining normal behaviour. Here "the non
conforming is punishable", and "disciplinary punishment" is "essentially corrective"
(Foucault, 1977, p. 179). Further, "punishment is only one element of a double system:
gratification-punishment" (Foucault, 1977, p. 180). According to Foucault, "the power
of normalisation [not only] imposes homogeneity; but it individualises by making it
possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties and to render the
differences useful by fitting them one to another" (Foucault, 1977, p. 178). Thus, in my
research evidence of normalisation was threefold.
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First was evidence of setting a criterion for normal behaviour-"invoking,
requiring, setting or conforming to a standard-defining the normal" (Gore, 1 998).
Evidence included defining "Centrelink approved activity" (Centrelink, 2 May 2000),
outlining "steps you can take to help open the doors to employment" (Centrelink,
2000c, p. 1 ), and "other things you need to do" such as "provide information requested
by Centrelink" (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 2).

Second was the training of "docile bodies" to maintain normal behaviour
through repeated, specific activity (Foucault, 1 977, p. 135-1 69). There was much
evidence of such repeated behavioural training. Examples of this training included
continual job searching and repetitiously signing a pledge to look for work.

Third, this training may involve a system of rewards and punishments for
normal or other than normal behaviour. Evidence included what Gore (1 998) and
Wright (2000, p. 1 58) consider "regulation" and define as rules, restrictions, sanction,
rewards and punishment, expressed in words like "must", "need to", "have to",
"should", and "required". An example of such regulation in my research was the
common threat to reduce a Centrelink client' s payment if a particular task was not
completed properly.

Distribution. According to Foucault, "discipline proceeds from the distribution
of individuals in space" (Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 4 1 ). This might include some of the
following specific technologies: ''partitioning" individuals into separate categories
where "each individual has his own place; and each place its individual" (Foucault,
1 977, p. 1 43); and ''functional sites . . . particular places were defined to correspond not
only to the need to supervise, to break dangerous communications, but also to create a
useful space" (Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 43-1 44). Also included is "rank: the place one
occupies in a classification" (Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 45). Gore and Wright defined
distribution simply as pertaining to space (Gore, 1 998; Wright, 2000). This thesis found
evidence of distribution where Centrelink warned clients to obtain permission to change
address, because if they move to an area with a lower employment rate their payment
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may be reduced or stopped. Other evidence included the architecture of the Centrelink
office: placement of desks, and location of interview rooms. Case study evidence for
each disciplining technique is detailed below.

Surveillance

As we will see, surveillance for a Centrelink client might occur at various levels,
often simultaneously. They might be simply watched continually through such
techniques as the ' fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). However, a Centrelink
client might also be threatened to be watched through continual reminders that they may
be observed at any time, perhaps even without their knowledge. It follows that clients
might also expect to be watched and alter their behaviour accordingly. Furthermore, a
client might actively watch themselves on behalf of Centrelink. These different levels of
surveillance will be detailed below with some of the practices that render them possible.

Centrelink clients are continually being watched. Centrelink recipients must
subject themselves to significant surveillance to receive, and continue to receive,
payment. The most obvious form of this surveillance is through the extensive and
repetitive filling out of forms that clients must complete to receive payment. Indeed,
recipients may be required to complete an application for payment form fortnightly, and
Thejobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c) every 1 2 weeks. These forms don't j ust require
a client to request payment; they require detailed personal information-including who
a client is living with and their relationship with this person, whether they went overseas
for a holiday, what job they applied for and how they contacted the potential employer.
For example, the ' fortnightly' form states in question 8 that "you must tell us if any of
the things below happened in the period" and lists thirty specific things such as "you
started living with a partner", "you separated from your partner", and "you and your
partner are intending to go overseas (even for a short period)" (Centrelink, 2 May 2000).
Similarly, both the ' fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2 000) and Thejobseeker diary
(Centrelink, 2000c) require details about an individual's behaviour. For example, the
diary requires the Centrelink client to write details of every contact with a potential
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employer-including name, contact details, person contacted, how they were contacted,
when, and the type of position.

Centrelink's gaze is not confined to the A4 oblong of a form, however.
Centrelink can also "make any inquiries necessary to help us [Centrelink] work out how
much we should pay you" (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). Further, anyone is encouraged to
watch Centrelink clients and, if in doubt of their legitimacy, report them on Centrelink's
web page (Centrelink, 2002). One person interviewed, whom I will call Jillian, even
experienced being watched by her ex-husband:

Jillian: Oh, I'm just trying to think what it was. It was, um, the parenting
allowance. Yeah, um, and they received information from somebody else
(background noise).
Lynda!: Somebody who wasn't you?
Jillian: Yeah.
Lynda!: About your case.
Jillian: Yes. Yep.
Lynda!: Oooh.
Jillian: Yeah. My ex-husband, so, but anyway, they fixed it.

Centrelink clients are not simply observed, but they are continually reminded
that they are being observed, maybe even without their knowledge. Below are four

examples of clients being reminded of the gaze of Centrelink.
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First, on forms and fliers, the client is frequently reminded that they are being
watched. On all documents analysed in this research26, clients were reminded that they
were being watched at least once on each page, usually more often. Phrases used
include "this Diary is an important document and must be kept in a safe place. You may
be asked to provide it to Centrelink at any time" (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 1), and "you
must tell Centrelink of any changes that may affect your payment" (Centrelink, 2000e,
p. 6). In The jobseeker guide (Centrelink, 2000d), clients are even reminded about their
appearance during an interview. Under the title "appearance" they are told that
"personal appearance is important", "plan your clothing in advance", "be careful with
your choice of clothing-but be comfortable with what you wear", and "appear well
groomed" (Centrelink, 2000d, p. 7).

Second, Centrelink clients are also reminded that they may be observed at any
time without their permission and without being aware of it. Indeed, every fortnight on
their 'fortnightly' form, after the declaration and signature, clients are reminded that
"we [Centrelink] can make any inquiries necessary to help us work out how much we
should pay you" (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). Similarly, in The jobseeker diary they are
reminded that "Centrelink may check with employers you list to make sure you
approached them for work" (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 3).

Third, Centrelink clients are even reminded that they are being watched as they
line up at their Centrelink office. Indeed, the researcher observed a large sign in the
Centrelink office which read:

26

•
•
•
•
•
•

As detailed in Chapter Two this includes:
Application for payment of Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2 May 2000) (also
known as the 'fortnightly' form),
The jobseeker guide (Centrelink, 2000d),
Thejobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c) (also known as the 'dole' diary),
What we can do to help each other: customer charter (Centrelink, September 2000),
Claim for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000b ), and
Notes for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000e ).
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WARNING
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
IN OPERATION
BY AUST GUARD

"WARNING" was in bold white type on a red background, while the other text was
bold black on a white background. There was also a large convex mirror near the entry.
This made it obvious to Centrelink clients that the staff could survey them easily from
behind their desks.

The fourth example of Centrelink clients being reminded that they are being
observed is the act of completing the forms themselves. As people disclose personal
information to Centrelink by writing it on a form, they are reminded that Centrelink is
watching them.

Centrelink clients are not only watched, reminded of being watched, but they

expect to be watched. Indeed, the Centrelink clients that were interviewed expected to
be watched. They made constant reference to filling out forms, needing to obtain correct
documentation, and being assessed by Centrelink officers. A vivid example of a
Centrelink client's awareness of being watched was expressed by a young man, Jack.
When asked to reflect on his rights when disagreeing with a Centrelink decision he
mused about how different institutions seemed to share information and said "Yeah. Big
brother is watching. Anyway".

In addition to Centrelink clients being watched, being reminded of being
watched, and actually expecting to be watched, they facilitated Centrelink's surveillance
of themselves. In short, not only did Centrelink watch them, but they also watched

themselves.
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This self-surveillance was encouraged by The jobseeker guide (Centrelink,
2000d). Here, Centrelink clients were advised that "You may wish to make notes about
your job search. These notes are for you to keep and may help you with your job search
in the future" (Centrelink, 2000d, p. 14). Four of the eighteen pages are provided for the
client's personal notes on themselves (Centrelink, 2000d, p. 13- 16).

Also, every time a Centrelink client discloses their personal details on a form
and submit it to Centrelink, they are effectively watching themselves for Centrelink.
Indeed, interviews with Centrelink clients provided many examples of people watching
themselves on behalf of Centrelink's gaze.

One interviewee, Jack, when asked if Centrelink had made any decisions he
disagreed with, succinctly stated "No. I follow the system and they don't really stuff
you around". This reveals self-surveillance in two ways. First, Jack says that since he,
"personally" follows the system, he does not find Centrelink difficult to deal with. And,
provided he ensures that he follows the system himself, this will continue. Second, Jack
implies that because he follows the system, including providing all information
(documentation) required, then Centrelink will not make trouble for him. Indeed, all
interviewees actively watched themselves by completing the forms required. When a
Centrelink client discloses their personal details in a Centrelink form, they are actively
participating in their own surveillance. They are helping Centrelink watch them.

In a further example, a common complaint among interviewees was Centrelink
claiming they had not received forms that clients had submitted. Although the complaint
was usually about the loss or delay of income, it demonstrates how actively clients
participate in their own surveillance. For example, Joe felt some Centrelink officer had
taken a personal dislike to him and kept 'losing' his form. In other words, he felt that
the officer was doing him an injustice by sabotaging his self-surveillance (and thus
denying him payment). Joe expressed his experience this way:
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Okay. They didn't like me. A personal dislike towards me. I mean if a
person doesn't really like the person on the other side of the counter or
that person has enemies that that person knows you're in shit. I might be
an exception to the rule but it's true 'cause like I could even go into the
forms like the Q 10 forms and what not which are rent assistance forms
they've s'posed to be lodged you do a free thing and I lodged the same
one three weeks running and they still reckon it didn't get put in.

So, Centrelink clients are subjected to intense surveillance. They are continually
watched, reminded of being watched and facilitate Centrelink's gaze by watching
themselves. They are thus created into individuals who can be governed. However,
surveillance affects the individual Centrelink client. Thus surveillance is linked to
processes of individualisation.

Individualisation

As Foucault states, while in the past only the powerful (such as monarchs, with
pomp and ceremony) were individualised, now "those on whom it [power] is so
exercised tend to be more strongly individualised" (Foucault, 1977, p. 193 ). The
techniques

of ascribing

individual

character

to

each

Centrelink

client

individualisation--can be demonstrated on many levels. Centrelink clients are
continuously spoken of as individuals, they are also assigned activities and obligations
that can be fulfilled only by themselves, individual personal records are kept, and they
are repeatedly examined through individual interviews with Centrelink officers.
Evidence for each level of the process of individualisation is detailed in this section.

As explained in Chapter Six, the documents studied gave individual character to
Centrelink clients. They did this by heavily using words like "you", "your", "you'll",
"you're" and "yourself'.
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The documents did not just give individual character to the client, but also
explicated individual actions and responsibilities that the client alone was required to
take. This is illustrated in page one of The jobseeker diary:

This Jobseeker Diary is for you to record your efforts to find work. It can
aid you in your search for work and will be used to show Centrelink that
you are meeting your obligations to actively seek work. (Italics not in
original Centrelink, 2000c, p. 1 )

Indeed, stating "your obligations", "your efforts to find work" and "your search for
work" reinforce that it is this individual activity that is a personal obligation to
Centrelink. This personal individual obligation is reinforced by stating the diary is for

"you to record your efforts" to show that "you are meeting your obligations". Further, it
is a Centrelink client's individual responsibility to avoid being breached. The above
quotation is followed by an "IMPORTANT!" reminder that payment "depends on you
meeting your obligations. If you don't we may have to reduce your payment or even
stop payment. Help us to avoid this" (Bold in original, italics not in original Centrelink,
2000c, p. 3). Not only are you reminded that you will be punished if you do not meet
your obligations but you are told that it is your responsibility to make sure this does not
happen. You must "help us to avoid this" because we may "have to reduce your
payment" even though we don't want to-it's up to you not Centrelink to ensure your
payment continues!

Not only are clients given individual character, given individual required
behaviour and responsibility, but they are also required to help Centrelink maintain their

individual records. Indeed, very personal and individual information about the recipient
is continually recorded. Through the 'fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000), this
occurs every two weeks. Clients are warned that "If you want this payment to continue"
then you must "answer all the questions". They are asked to disclose their fortnightly
earnings and information about their personal relationships. In question 8, which
engulfs a quarter of the space of the entire form, it states "you must tell us if any of the
things below happened in the period". The question encompasses "income",
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"relationships" such as "you started living with a partner", "children" such as "a child
under 1 6 left your or your partner's care", "rehabilitation", "prison", "studies",
"approved activity", "bank details", "rent"; and for "youth allowance only",
"parents/guardian/s" and "brothers and sisters". Further, Centrelink recently ran an
advertising campaign to remind clients that "when your circumstances change, don't
forget to tell Centrelink" because you must "support the system that supports you"
(Advertisement, 2002).

A Centrelink client is not only ascribed individual character, given individual
responsibility, and their personal details stored, but they are also often required to
undertake an individual examination with a Centrelink officer, where their individual
record is reassessed. Individual examination is compulsory for receiving NSA.
Generally a claimant must subjugate themselves to an examination, in the form of a
personal interview with a Centrelink officer, in order to qualify for payment. The Notes
for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000e, p. 2) illuminate some of the characteristics
of this interview. These notes include a list of "4 easy steps" to "claim" NSA. Step four
is titled "interview" and has the following instructions27 :

Contact Centrelink in 1 3 1 02 1 to make a time for your interview.
What you should bring to your interview:

• Your completed claim form;
• Your completed looking for work form; and
• All the additional forms and documents you were asked for in the
claim form (see the checklist at the back of the claim form). (Bold in
original Centrelink, 2000e, p. 2)

27

Please note that a client may claim for the Newstart Payment without filling out the
Claim for Newstart Allowance (Centrelink, 2000b) form. However, to do this they must
contact Centrelink to claim payment.
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Further instructions follow:

If you have been given an interview time, please arrive at the reception
on time. Otherwise a new interview time will need to be made. If you do
not attend your interview, you may not get your payment. [picture of
a telephone is here] If you are asked to come in for an interview but you
cannot attend, please phone 131021 for another interview time. (Bold in
original Centrelink, 2000e, p. 2)

Here, not only must the client individually attend this private interview, but also
individualisation is reinforced by being told it is "your interview" and you must bring
"your completed claim form" and "your completed looking for work form". It is also

the individual Centrelink client's responsibility to reschedule the interview if unable to
attend. Being subjected to the gaze here are both the individual and the personal details
on their forms. This gaze will become part of the permanent record of this client.

However, an individual examination is not a singular experience for a Centrelink
client. When a client personally lodges their ' fortnightly' form, they generally line up to
hand it personally to a Centrelink officer. The officer then checks their details again
before accepting the form. Individual Centrelink clients are examined and re-examined
often. Jane was so accustomed to individual examination through her permanent record
that when asked what rights she felt she had when she disagreed with a Centrelink
decision, she replied:

I don't know, like get as much back up into why you're right, you need
back up of course. Document, show that you're correct, and why they're
wrong, you know (unclear, background noise) you need, yeah, proof,
why, cause if you ain't got any proof, no matter what you say, they're
just not going to take notice of you, 'cause they've got documents to
show that why your wrong. And that's what you do.

Centrelink clients are so individualised that not only are Centrelink decisions
directed to them personally, but any disagreement or appeal may be added to their
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individual permanent record. Consequently they are disciplined to accept the decisions
made about and for them by Centrelink. Thus Centrelink client Jim referred to his
permanent record as his "slab"-as something solid, hard, and permanent. Jim explains
vividly how he feels incidents are recorded:

On, on my record, my slab, my record. I got it sticking on me. I should
have been in fucking gaol. Why not put me in gaol over this, and finger
print me and photograph me. It sticks on that too.

However, not only is appealing a Centrelink decision an individual experience
that may affect a client's personal record, but to appeal formally is to invite even further
individual examination. As Hartley Dean points out about the Social Security appeals
system in the United Kingdom, "to appeal against the determinations of such
officialdom is to invite further scrutiny" (H. Dean, 1 991, p. 1 45). John, who had never
sought a formal appeal, was aware of his right to appeal and described the process as
follows:

Um. Fill out a form I think ... make an appointment. I've never had to
do it but I mean if they start breaching me or cut me off I would.

Despite viewing the appeals process as inviting extra scrutiny though new
documentation and interviews, John was still willing to seek an appeal if he felt he
needed to. Another interviewee, Jonathon, who was awaiting an SSAT hearing when
interviewed, but felt he had few rights, described some of the extra scrutiny he had
experienced as follows:

I just filled out the thing and they go over the statement of what I said
happened, they went over it and sent me a letter saying no, if you want to
take it further you can go to appeals.
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Jonnah saw the extra examination more positively, although he still felt he had few
rights. When asked what rights he felt he had when he disagreed with a Centrelink
decision, he answered:

Um. Not a lot really ... um you know if you disagree with something,
normally you've got a specific person you can speak to, like the person
that, who's done all your forms when you go in, and stuff like that, and
so like the guy that I've got has said that if I ever have any problems,
speak to him personally and, he'll do his best to sort it out because, I
s'pose that's more interpersonal relationship that we've got going through
the ... interview, which was, which was good. So yeah.

Hence, Centrelink clients are made into individuals who can be governed
through individual treatment. However, Centrelink clients are individually watched
according to specific criteria of appropriate behaviour-according to "normalising
judgement" (Foucault, 1 977, p. 1 77-184).

Normalisation

Centrelink clients are surveyed continually according to particular criteria of
what is normal behaviour and what is not normal. The aim of this judgement is to
maintain normal behaviour among Centrelink clients, or correct abnormal behaviour so
clients behave appropriately. This process, which Foucault names "normalisation"
(Foucault, 1 977) might consist of three stages, although these stages do not necessarily
occur in this order, and could be simultaneous. The first stage is a normalising
judgement-the criteria of normalcy are applied to a Centrelink client. Next, a client is
trained to maintain appropriate behaviour. Finally, this training might involve a system
of reward and punishment that encourage correct behaviour and discourage
inappropriate behaviour. Each of these stages of the process of normalisation is detailed
in this section.
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So, by what criteria might a Centrelink client be judged as normal or other than
normal? An important criterion is revealed in the customer charter (Centrelink,
September 2000), ' fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000), The jobseeker guide
(Centrelink, 2000d) and The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c). Indeed, all these
papers explain that a Centrelink client must be judged to be a ' genuine jobseeker'.
Indeed, The jobseeker diary states that:

To make sure you keep getting your payment, Centrelink has to know
that you are actively looking for work. It ensures that money goes to
those who are genuine jobseekers. To demonstrate this you must satisfy
the activity test and meet other obligations. (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 2)

Centrelink clients must demonstrate that they are a ' genuine jobseeker'. To show
Centrelink you are a ' genuine jobseeker', you must demonstrate that you abide by the
activity test, do Centrelink approved activities and do other required activities. If you do
not do the above, you will be judged to be something other than a ' genuine jobseeker'.

The jobseeker diary continues to list things you "should" do and "other things

you need to do" (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 2). These include being willing to take any work
or training Centrelink deems suitable (including part time and casual work) and
administrative requirements such as "fill in this Diary", "provide information requested
by Centrelink" and "attend Centrelink appointments" (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 2). This
implies, among other things, that a person must abide by Centrelink administrative
requirements or be considered to be something other than a 'genuine jobseeker'.

So, what governing practices allow a Centrelink client to be judged normal or
otherwise? The ' fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000) and The jobseeker diary
(Centrelink, 2000c) provide the information for this judgement. For example, the
' fortnightly' form directly asks Centrelink clients to state whether they did a
"Centrelink approved activity in the [previous fortnightly] period", where an approved
activity includes "study, training, voluntary work, language courses and intensive
assistance" (Centrelink, 2 May 2000, p. 2). Similarly, Thejobseeker diary explains that:
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The details you write in this Diary will be used to ensure that:
•

you're applying for enough jobs;

•

you're looking for different types of jobs (that is, any work you are
able to);

•

you're looking for work beyond your immediate area (eg. up to 90
minutes travel from your home); and

•

you're not relying too heavily on only one or two methods of finding
work (eg. only phoning employers may not be enough). (Bold in
original Centrelink, 2000c, p. 3)

The normalising judgement that Centrelink clients are subjected to is not a
singular event. Rather, it is repeated to train clients to behave in the correct manner.
This is exemplified by the 'fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000), and The

jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c). The last question on the 'fortnightly' form requires
a personal declaration and signature from the client:

9. Declaration and signature
I declare that I was willing to work and that I was actively looking for
work, or doing a Centrelink approved activity (including full time or
concession study) or was exempted from seeking work or had an
incapacity for which I have provided a medical certificate. The
information I have given is correct. (Bold in original Centrelink, 2 May
2000, p. 2)

Generally, every two weeks a client is reminded of the correct behaviour and personally
signs their name against it. A Centrelink client is reminded of this every time they
complete this form and fulfil any of its requirements, including accurate completion of
this form. Similarly, The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c), if assigned to a client,
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must be completed continually and regularly. Clients are required to complete the
details of each job application in the diary, including the date they contacted each
potential employer. An explanatory box attached states "complete your diary on the day
you apply for the job" because "if you don't, you may forget some of the details"
(Centrelink, 2000c, p. 5). This implies that you need to include all details and be
organised enough to fill in the form on the same day as the activity. This correct
behaviour must be repeated until the client successfully finds work.

Centrelink clients are not simply judged to be normal or otherwise, and trained
to improve and maintain appropriate behaviour. They are also managed through a
system of gratification and punishment. The documents studied clearly imply that
engaging in the correct behaviour will lead to gratification while incorrect behaviour
will bring punishment.

Gratification for correct behaviour can take many forms. The most obvious is to
receive payment. Another common form of gratification is to increase one's
employment prospects. For example, Thejobseeker diary states that such gratification is
yours if you plan your job search:

There are steps that you can take to help open the doors to employment.
One of the most important is to plan your job search. With a plan you
increase your chances of finding work. Make use of the Jobseeker
Diary and Guide. (Bold in original Centrelink, 2000c, p. 1)

Further, actually completing your job search records properly, according to The

jobseeker diary, can lead to the gratification of increasing your employment prospects:

This Jobseeker Diary is for you to record your efforts to find work. It can
aid you in your search for work. (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 1)
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In addition, threats of punishment for incorrect behaviour pervade the
documents. For example, Thejobseeker diary states that:

You must complete your Diary and you must provide it when asked. If
you don't we may have to reduce your payment or even stop payment.
Help us to avoid this. (Centrelink, 2000c, p. 1)

Similarly, the customer charter warns that "you need to do these [following] things or
your payment may be affected":

You need to:
•

tell us as soon as you know that your circumstances are about to
change e.g. your address, income or relationship arrangements

•

reply to our requests on time

•

meet any mutual obligation requirements for the services or
payments you are receiving. (Bullet points in original Centrelink,
September 2000)

These threats were common in the documents studied. Indeed, the word "must"
is used four times on the 'fortnightly' form (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). It is also stated
five times that a client may be penalised for not completing a particular task properly.
The social security law is mentioned directly once. Further, in the Notes for Newstart

Allowance (Centrelink, 2000e), clients are threatened to complete an activity properly or
be penalised eight times over the seven pages of text. Of these eight times, the law is
mentioned four times, and social security law is mentioned a further three times.

Further, legal justification is continually given for these punishments. For
example, in the top right hand comer of the 'fortnightly' form (next to box for placing a
client's name and address) it states:
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If you want this payment to continue:
•

Fill in and return this form 02 MAY 2000

• Payment will stop if this form is returned late
Answer all the questions (use a pen) ...
This is an information notice given under the social security law. (Bullet
points in original Centrelink, 2 May 2000)

Here the client is told that they must complete this form by the date and do it properly
or their payment will not continue, and also that Centrelink is legally able to do this.

Further, at the end of the form, a client is reminded that "there are penalties for
providing false or misleading information" and that "we [Centrelink] can make any
inquiries necessary to help us work out how much we should pay you". Not only are
Centrelink clients reminded that they may be punished for not filling in the form
accurately, but they are told that Centrelink can do anything to catch them out
implying that this is also legally sanctioned.

So, Centrelink decisions are inextricably connected to a judgement of normalcy
and the process of normalisation. To be normal is to behave like a ' genuine jobseeker'
by passing the activity test, doing Centrelink approved activities, being willing to
undertake any work or training and complying with Centrelink's administrative
requirements. Indeed, complying with Centrelink is normal appropriate behaviour,
which Centrelink clients are trained to accomplish and maintain through repeated
behaviour and rewards (both promised and realised). Hence, through normalisation
Centrelink clients are made into individuals who can be governed.
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All the governmg practices shown so far in this thesis-surveillance,
individualisation and normalisation-are facilitated by the layout of the Centrelink
office. The effects of particular arrangements of Centrelink clients' bodies in space are
collectively the subject of the next section.

Distribution

This section details some practices of distribution that discipline Centrelink
clients and allow them to discipline themselves. Centrelink clients may be disciplined,
and self disciplined, through the distribution of their bodies in space in many ways.
Although Centrelink clients are not geographically trapped in a fishbowl cell, like the
prisoners in Bentham's Panopticon, they are spatially governed. For example, clients
are requested to obtain permission from Centrelink to shift to a new house. Every
fortnight recipients are asked if they changed their home address with the
"IMPORTANT" explanation that: "You may reduce your prospects of getting work if
you change your address. Your payments may also be cancelled. Check with Centrelink
before you move" (Capitalisation in original, Centrelink, 2 May 2000). Similarly,
overseas trips and rental leases are also scrutinised. Generally a client is asked every
two weeks whether they or their partners have gone overseas or intend to, and provide
details about this (Centrelink, 2 May 2000). Also, Centrelink requires details about your
lease, the people you live with and their relationship with you if applying for rent
allowance. However, most of this section will focus on the spatial governing practices
within a Centrelink office visited by the writer in early 2002. The layout of a Centrelink
office may include many different disciplining techniques. Spaces might be partitioned
for specific activities and people. Also, spaces might provide a specific function for
disciplining a Centrelink client. For example, a particular space might be used for
surveillance of clients, or to minimise political communication among clients. Space
might also be organised hierarchically, where people of different rank occupy different
spaces. Each of these practices of distribution will be detailed below.
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The space in the Centrelink office studied in this thesis was divided into three
general partitions (Foucault, 1977, p. 143). The first partition was the client area (see
Map 2). I call it the client area because it was the only area in the office that clients
could access without special permission. It was where clients lined up (behind the
yellow and red tape on the floor (see E on Map 1), sat to wait to be called for their
appointment, looked for jobs at the jobsearch computer screens, collected and
completed forms and used the resources provided to look for work. 28

The client area was also the vantage point from which I drew the map of the office.
The staff ignored my map drawing, despite being the last ' client' to leave for the day at
4:45 pm.

28
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Map 1. The layout of the Centrelink office in early 2002
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D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K

L
M
N

"Reception. Employment Services"
Yellow or red coloured wide tape on floor for people to queue
behind
Potted plants
Small circles indicate chairs
High desk
Job search computer screen
Photocopier
Approximately 50 cm wide blue supporting pillars
1
"WARNING.
VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE
IN
OPERATION BY AUSTGUARD"
"Welcome to Job Network Access. The equipment in this
2
area is for you to use, free of charge, to help you look for a
job as well as write resumes and applications."
Stand alone directory, bolted to floor facing entry
Notice board on wall
Large convex surveillance mirror above entry
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Map 2. The partitions of the Centrelink office in early 2002
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I call the second partition the 'invitation only zone' (see Map 2). Only invited
Centrelink clients could enter this zone. When I was drawing my map, a person sitting
beside me on the chairs near E (see Map 1) was called for their interview, and then
proceeded past the comments and suggestions box at B (see Map 1) and into the
invitation only zone (see Map 2). Also, I was given permission to exit through this area.
The front doors were already closed for the end of the day when I followed the last
client out the back door after gaining eye contact with a staff member and receiving a
nod as I passed her. This area consisted of open floor space and partitioned interview
desks. During a prearranged interview a client sits on a chair in the invitation only
section, while the interviewing staff remain inside the semi-circular desk.

The third partition will be called the 'staff only area'. It was the area inside the
semi-circular desks where the staff work (see Map 2). Although a staff member may
enter the other zones to greet and direct an interviewee, at all other times they spoke
with clients over the desk. This area was barricaded in two ways. First, the semi-circular
desks formed a barricade between the client and Centrelink staff. Each area was like an
island that appeared to have only one entry point, which seemed to be on the furthest
side from the clients' entry. Second, the desks seemed to be different heights, depending
on the level of 'barricading' required. The desks in the client area were chest hight,
providing a barrier that was nearly impossible for a client to jump over. Since this is
where any client (or member of the public like myself) could enter without invitation,
and the bulk of clients were served, perhaps extra protection for staff was desired. In
contrast, the desks in the invitation only area were waist hight. Both the client and
Centrelink officer could sit during an interview. It seems less protection for Centrelink
staff was desired here-fewer and only invited clients could enter, the risk of a violent
occurrence was thus reduced.

Within the client area of the office there was further partitioning according to
type of allowance and task. Indeed, at C (see Map 1) the following sign hung from the
ceiling, its orange and white type legible throughout the client area "Reception. Youth
& Student". At D (see Map 1), a similar sign read "Reception. Employment Services".

1 40
Finally, at A, a similar sign read "Forms lodgement". It seemed that NSA recipients
were separated from Austudy or YA recipients. These clients were further partitioned
from those lodging forms. There were even separate places to line up for each of these
categories-indicated by the coloured tape on the floor at E and potted plants at F (see
Map 1 ). It seems those clients who simply lodged their forms, without requiring special
attention, were partitioned from clients who were either applying for allowance or
required special assistance. Further, perhaps the clients who required special attention
(or are applying for the first time) were being shown that they were different and require
special supervision. Indeed, the surveillance warning sign was behind the "Youth and
Student" and "Employment Services" desks rather than the "Forms lodgement" desk.

Different sites inside the Centrelink office may also provide different
disciplining functions. Supervision seemed to be an important function of the client only
area. The staff at desks A, C, and D could view the entire ' client' area of the Centrelink
office (see Maps 1 and 2). All the service desks formed a physical barricade between the
client access areas and the staff only work areas. Also, a large sign which warned clients
that they were under video surveillance was clearly readable throughout the ' client' area
(see Map 2). The sign was positioned at K l so a client would see it most clearly from
the desk near C and D (see Map 1 ). The only passage for clients from the ' client' area
area, besides the exit to the street, was at B (see Map 1 ). Here there were two high semi
circular desks that formed a small passage through which clients may be invited.

"Break{ing] dangerous communications " (Italics not in original Foucault, 1 977,
p. 1 43-1 44) also seemed to be a disciplining effect of the layout of the Centrelink office
studied. Although clients frequented the Centrelink office, it seemed to be designed to
discourage communication among them. Indeed, there were few chairs in the client only
area-only six office chairs along the wall near E (see Map 1 ) and a few in the job
network access work area (K2 on Map 1 ). Clients were required to stand while using the
job search computer screens, fill out forms (at H, see Map 1 ) and stand in line to be
served at desks A, C or D (see Map 1 ). There were no meeting places, and clients were
constantly surveyed while inside. This office was not designed for lingering or meeting
people socially. There were metal benches outside the office, sheltered from the wind
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and rain. However, it was uncomfortable to sit on these for a long period of time (as I
discovered while conducting interviews) and, forming a single row along the wall, did
not facilitate group discussions.

The partitioned areas discussed above also suggest a "rank " (Italics in original
Foucault, 1977, p. 145) order-from potentially dangerous for staff (client area, see
Map 2), to moderately dangerous for staff (invitation only area, see Map 2) to safe for
staff (staff only area, see Map 2). The clients who posed the greatest perceived threat
were in the client area closest to the entry (see Map 2). Also, a rank order was implied
whenever a client was served at a desk. The client was outside in the higher danger area,
while the staff member was in the 'safe' area. Furthermore, clients at C and D (see Map
1) seemed to be ranked lower than those simply lodging a form, because, through a
large sign (Kl on Map 1), they must be warned of being surveyed.

So, a client's social behaviour and inner ethical life are not the only things
disciplined; also disciplined is each client's body in space. Where they live, with whom
they share a bedroom, and where and how long they travel is managed. Even within a
Centrelink office clients are disciplined. They are disciplined when they queue for
service, when they wait for partners, when they require an invitation to enter. They are
governed to stand for certain tasks (queuing and service in the client only area) and sit
for others (an interview in the invitation area). Centrelink clients are also physically
placed in a hierarchy. The location and posture of the clients' bodies are supervised
throughout their visit to the Centrelink office. What a Centrelink client does with their
body outside the office is also important. They must physically attend any job interview,
they must actively write job applications and phone or visit potential places of
employment. They must present and posture themselves in an employable manner (see
above). They must locate and move their bodies like an 'active jobseeker' (see above).

Most importantly, since Centrelink clients are a geographically dispersed group,
the Centrelink office is one of the few places where they might meet other clients with
similar experiences of Centrelink decisions. Since the office layout does not facilitate
communication among Centrelink clients, they are governed (and self-governed) to
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keep their experiences to themselves. It appears unlikely that clients will discuss
Centrelink decisions, or any experience of challenging a decision. Their bodies are
governed ( and self-governed) to minimise such communications. Even the layout of the
Centrelink office seemed to discipline Centrelink clients to become governable
individuals.

Mechanism failure

However no governing practice is perfect or complete (see Malpas & Wickham,
1995). Inherent in any mentality of governing is failure. Thus, the governing practices
of surveillance, normalisation, individualisation and distribution are inevitably limited.
Interviews with Centrelink clients revealed many failures of the practices that attempt to
govern them and train them to govern themselves.

Surveillance of Centrelink clients meant not only the supervision of their
behaviour, but also the threat to watch them at any time, so that clients expected to be
watched and watched their own behaviour and attitude. However, interviews with
Centrelink clients revealed one way in which this intense surveillance has failed. Some
clients were so aware of the potential of being watched that they expected their rights to
be violated. They distrusted Centrelink as an institution:

Jack: Oh, none at all. Um. No. You can argue all you like but no, you
don' t really have any rights at all. I don't believe you have. From what I
understand is that all your information goes to some private organisation
actually. Centrelink send them all their information (unclear). They say
that they don't disclose that information but I know for a fact that they
must of because for some reason the electoral roll found me.
Lyndal: Oh. Okay.
Jack: Yeah. I was over in Sydney and they found me over here. And it
wasn't until I actually enrolled in Centrelink.
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L:

(unclear)

R:

Yeah. Big brother is watching. Anyway.

Jay saw the surveillance administered by Centrelink as more ambivalent:

Oh. Not too bad. It's just a bit mechanical. It just, it's not really humane
if you know what I mean it's just here are the rules, which box do I tick
for you? They're not really out to hurt you but they're not really out to
help you either. It's just like OK fill out this form do you know what I
mean it's just like which form do you fit into. That's about as far as it
goes. Which is a bit of a pain because sometimes your situation isn't in
one particular category but you're like more like do you know what I
mean

Further, Jemma related the limited amount of rights she felt she had to the intense
bureaucratic surveillance by Centrelink. Jemma replied, when asked what rights she
thought she had when she disagreed with a Centrelink decision:

Umm, probably depending on (unclear) because they've got a lot of
paperwork that they have to go through and a lot of agreements that they
have to go through and so basically there's not much room to move/for
any, umm

Through normalisation, Centrelink clients are also judged, trained, and rewarded
or punished so that they adopt and maintain appropriate job seeking behaviour.
However, this can go wrong in many ways. For example, on both the 'fortnightly' form
(Centrelink, 2 May 2000) and The jobseeker diary (Centrelink, 2000c), clients are
required to record their job search. The names and contact details of employers
contacted, and the type of position applied for, are recorded. Effectively, this means a
Centrelink client is required to record details of their job rejections. A possible
unforseen consequence of this is that it is not really the job search that is repeated here,
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but the recording of each job rejection. The training may not just be to diligently record
the search for work, and appropriate job searching behaviour, but to get used to being
rejected.

Similarly Jackie described how the administrative requirements of Centrelink
often embarrassed her. Jackie was very "embarrassed" to complete her jobseeker diary
and "dole form". She found the direction to get a Centrelink form stamped by the
interviewer at a job interview so humiliating that she said "there is no way that I'm
going to go to a teaching interview and then say here's my dole form can you stamp it
please". Complying with Centrelink administrative requirements does not mean being
an ' active jobseeker' to Jackie, it means being humiliated. It seems such intense
surveillance can lead Centrelink clients to associate compliance with shame rather than
jobseeking.

Also, punishment for non-compliance was not simply a reduction or temporary
suspension of payment for some clients. For Jaques the punishment was homelessness.
He was evicted from his home when unable to pay rent due to a reduction in his
payment. His punishment was living on the street for 50 days.

Not only are punishments potentially harsh, but many Centrelink clients
perceive them as random. They do not associate being breached with any action of
theirs, but with a Kafka (1 925/1 999) like sinister random quality in Centrelink
administration. This was vivid in Jaques' statement about problems with Centrelink;
"Hopefully nothing else happens this year, any day I'm expecting" and "every day
(laugh) I wouldn't be surprised if something turned up".

Jonnah provided another example: "Um, mainly 'cause I've only just started
getting payments so I haven't been postponed as yet. Touch wood. (Laughs)". Despite
only being a Centrelink client for a short period of time, and being generally happy with
the experience, Jonnah still felt the need to "touch wood" that he would not have his
payments postponed. He also implied that his payment had not been postponed yet
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because he had only been receiving payments for a short time-Centrelink had had too
few opportunities yet.

In a slightly different example, Jacinta was aware of the policy which led to her
incurring a breach, but it seemed absurd to her. She explains how she incurred a breach
when Centrelink took too long to change her payment type, only to have them applied
much later when her allowance was changed again:

Jacinta: Oh, 'cause I was changed from pension to New Start and which I
got breached which I should never have got breached. You know.
Centrelink pension section was supposed to change me over to the
pension before I got breached in New Start and they didn't so they were
a bit late so I got two breaches on me from that
Lyndal: Yow.
Jacinta: and the when I went from pension back onto New Start that's
when they found two breaches against my name so I was cut money
because of that.
Lyndal: What did you do about it?
Jacinta: Um. Went and argued with them (laugh). (unclear) until they
fixed it up (unclear) without pay. But I had to argue with them.

If Centrelink clients do not connect punishment with their behaviour, they will not make
an effort to behave according to Centrelink's expressed criteria for appropriate
'jobseeker' behaviour.

Not only has connection between punishment and non-compliance been severed,
but also some Centrelink clients connect compliance with a lack of rights rather than
reward or gratification. For example, Jasmine replied, in an assured voice, when asked
what rights she thought she had when she disagreed with a Centrelink decision "Well, I
think that, um, you should have at least fifty per cent of the rights, as a human,
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birthright". Jenny replied even more negatively to the same question "Um, none really,
it's their decision and what they say goes I guess".

Surveillance and normalisation work on the individual Centrelink client through
ascribing individual character to clients, assigning individual responsibility to each
client, keeping each client's personal record and examining them repeatedly-that is,
through individualisation. However, this focus on the individual Centrelink client fails
to make individuals governable. Most importantly, governing practices are so intensely
focused on each individual Centrelink client that three related failures may occur. First,
individual treatment is so targeted to different clients with different needs, that some
clients feel Centrelink is unsystematic and potentially vindictive. For example, Josh
explained that:

I lose my temper in there because they just, I don't know, very slow and
don't seem to want to help or that much. Unless you sort of make friends
with someone in there then they tend to be a bit more helpful, you know,
and they start to tell you a few of the loopholes, and ways to get money,
and yeah, they're a strange lot.

Second, clients are treated so individually, and their allowances can change so
much due to individual circumstances, that they might not know what type of allowance
they are actually receiving or where to locate themselves in the system. Jackie, Jemima
and Jock were all unsure what payment they were receiving.

Third, individual practices are difficult to administer en masse-mistakes are
made. For example, Jemima said she and her partner were breached due to not receiving
mail that Centrelink officers claim they sent.

The spatial distribution of Centrelink clients' bodies in a Centrelink office
governs them through partitioning special zones for particular people, special functions
such as supervision and minimising communications among clients, and hierarchal
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zones. However, these practices also imperfectly govern (and self-govern) Centrelink
clients. For example, the queuing that clients endure to consult with a Centrelink officer
about a problem with their payment, discourages them from complaining. Indeed, Joe
tried to question a Centrelink decision but "the lines were so long and it takes so long to
get to see anyone that I had to go to work, I didn't have time to do it".

Also, while the layout of the Centrelink office did seem to prevent clients from
communicating with each other, its supervising function allowed them to observe each
other's behaviour. This means that other clients observe both compliant and non
compliant behaviour. Most importantly here, clients can see other clients "blowing off',
"losing it" or "getting aggro"-they see that other clients are frustrated and angry at
Centrelink decisions. This might not occur if the Centrelink office was not spatially
designed for surveillance. Jim provides a vivid example of watching other clients'
violent behaviour. He explains how, when most inquiries were taken in cubicles before
the current office design was implemented:

This is before they done all this up and that, they had the old cubicles,
and I, ah, had a bit to say. Mind you I've watched the guy next to me
beat the shit out of the cubicle next to me. I wasn't too bad I just abused
the shit, I just threaten to drag them over the counter. That wasn't too
bad, this guy wrecked the counter, ah, the cubicle . . . so mine wasn't too
bad. He was only gunna get dragged over the counter.

If this occurred in the current open plan office, Jim would have been able to observe the
other client's violent behaviour from further away than the next cubicle.

Hence, analysing Centrelink breaches and appeals according to discipline and
governmentality has much to offer. The case study data adds flesh to this framework,
rather than challenges it. A particular strength of this approach is its rich detail about the
micro-management of Centrelink clients. Such details are lacking in the other
approaches considered. Also, unlike the approaches considered previously, it does offer
a convincing account of the case study finding that Centrelink clients do not always
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seek an appeal for an unsatisfactory decision even if they are aware of the possibility. It
shows that this is both a success and failure of the disciplines. It is difficult to say
whether the breach and appeal figures in Chapter One indicate a success or failure of the
governmental technologies of surveillance, individualisation, normalisation, and
distribution. It is also difficult (and somewhat off the point) to say which governmental
rationality is most dominant. However, a conclusion that can be made is that the various
governmental technologies can have unpredictable outcomes in relation to Centrelink
breaches and appeals. This challenges the confidence of neo-liberalising based mutual
obligation reforms.

This forms the tentative conclusion of this thesis because, of all the different
approaches considered in this thesis, this approach provides the most convincing
account of the case study findings. Unlike the neo-liberal account, it does account for
the vulnerability of Centrelink clients. It also does not suffer the neo-liberal's false
assumption that clients who do not reapply after being cut have other sources of income,
otherwise they appeal.

Also, unlike the advocacy account, it does not deal with the vulnerability of
Centrelink clients in a paternalistic manner. Also, it does not incorrectly assume that the
relatively low formal appeal rate is due to Centrelink clients lacking the necessary
knowledge and skills to seek an appeal. Also, unlike the advocate's approach, it does
not limit its criticisms to the effectiveness of the current policy regime.

Ziguras, Dufty and Considine (2003) also argue, from an advocacy persepective,
that mutual obligation fails the most vulnerable Centrelink clients. They even found, in
their research on Centrelink clients' experiences of mutual obligation, that particular
activity test requirements, including the 'fortnightly' form and The jobseeker diary
failed to improve the most vulnerable clients' employment prosects. For example, they
found that:
Continuation forms ['fortnightly' forms] were clearly seen by job seekers
as a mechanism for demonstrating compliance with job search
requirements and of little help in themselves. It was clear that people
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sometimes wrote down jobs, even if they were not really interested in
them, simply to complete the requirements. (Ziguras et al., 2003, p. 35)
Similarly, they found:
Just over half of those who had been given a Jobseeker Diary felt it was
primarily a bureaucratic requirement rather than a source of assistance.
Jobseekers often found the diaries frustrating and annoying. (Ziguras et
al., 2003, p. 35)
Both findings are similar to the mechanism failure found in this thesis. However, there
are important differences between Ziguras, Dufty and Considine's research and the
conclusion of this thesis. These differences reflect the limitations of the general
advocacy position that were identified in Chapter Four. While they did find that mutual
obligation activity requirements failed to improve the employability of the most
vulnerable Centrelink clients, they also said that it may succeed if it is administered
better. They are not critical of the idea of mutual obligation as a basis for current social
welfare administration:
In effect, then, the system operates for many disadvantaged job seekers
not as 'welfare to work' but 'welfare as work'. This is a poor outcome
for all concerned: job seekers fail in meeting their goal to find work, and
governments bear the continued cost of providing social security
payments and an ineffective service system. (Ziguras et al., 2003, p. vi)
However, rather than criticise the mutual obligation basis of the current policy, they
offer advice about improving the current policy's effectiveness for making Centrelink
clients more active. They offer a list of reforms needed for a "more effective active
labour market policy" (Ziguras et al., 2003, p. vi). They merely say that the problem lies
with the current application of mutual obligation. In contrast, this thesis concludes that
neo-liberal govemmentality inherently fails, as do all political rationalities (Rose &
Miller, 1992).

Also, Foucault's account of discipline and govemmentality provide a basis for a
more appropriate account of the case study findings than the new-contractualism
accounts offered by Camey and Yeatman.

Unlike Camey's approach, it offers a

relatively convincing account for the case study finding that some clients did not seek
an appeal even if they disagreed with a Centrelink decision-because they were
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disciplined not to, and because attempts to make them governable individuals failed to
make them into active citizens. It also does not problematically assume that there was a
golden age of TH Marshall type citizenship in Australia where social security provided
a safety net for all, and that the appeals structure in Australia, as a final precious
remnant of this time, successfully protects the rights of social security recipients. Also,
unlike Yeatman' s approach, it does not neglect that advocacy groups are often
paternalistic themselves.
Also, unlike the approaches that focus on surveillance as oppression, the
approach in this chapter does not neglect to address individualisation in its analysis. It
thus offers an explanation for how oppressive surveillance works at the level of the
individual.

Conclusion

Chapter Seven elaborated the usefulness of the concepts of surveillance and
individualisation for explaining current breach and appeal numbers. The analysis that
ensued relied heavily on the work of Michel Foucault, particularly his work on
discipline and governmentality.

Governmentality, according to this approach is concerned with the how of
governing. Surveillance and individualisation are, according to this approach, imperfect
techniques of disciplinary power which, along with a number of other techniques such
as normalisation and distribution, imperfectly make Centrelink clients into governable
individuals. The case study data provided much evidence for surveillance,
individualisation, normalisation and distribution, and also their failure.

The current breach and appeal figures reflect both the intention of neo-liberal
political rationality to create governable individuals from Centrelink clients, and its
failure to do so. Most importantly, it shows, through an analysis of the case study data,
that governmental technologies have unpredictable outcomes. This challenges the
confidence of neo-liberal based mutual-obligation reforms.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

As established in Chapter Three, the current Australian social welfare system is
essentially neo-liberalising. This neo-liberalising conservatism argues that the values of
the market and competition should be upheld, , and it is individuals' lack of self
motivation that has led to their poverty. Hence, governmentality should train people to
be motivated and competitive enough to be able to compete successfully in a market
economy. The current Australian policies of mutual obligation where Centrelink clients
must not just seek work but take part in other activities that give back to society and
prepare them to ' actively participate', fall within this framework. So does the recent
(but not new) concern about welfare dependence in the McClure report (2000a; 2000b)
and parliamentary addresses in Australia (Hansard, 1 997; Hansard, 2000). The
argument for the need for some coercive measures to ensure compliance, such as
administering financial penalties known as breaches, also falls within this conservative
neo-liberal framework. All these measures aim to manage Centrelink clients so they
behave in a certain manner, and adopt certain values and self-perceptions. This thesis
has shown that this is a somewhat overconfident aim. It has shown that the results of
various social policies often have unforseen results that fail to create governable
Centrelink clients. This means that social welfare policies that aim for more control over
the lives, and, as Mitchell Dean (1 998) argues, ethical lives of social welfare
participants are inherently flawed. In a local political climate of very confident neo
liberalising conservatism, this conclusion challenges the very basis of many current
policy reforms. However, please note that this analysis also applies to other political
positions (see Leonard, 1 997). This conclusion was reached through an exploratory
analysis of current Centrelink breach and appeal figures using a case study of a
Centrelink office. This occurred in the following steps that comprised the chapters of
this thesis, which were organised into Parts A, B and C.
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Part A, comprising of Chapter One, Two and Three, provided the groundwork
for the thesis. Chapter One revealed a growing disparity of Centrelink breach and appeal
numbers between 1996-1997 and 2000-2001. This thesis then explored some possible
explanations for this disparity. However, as explained in Chapter Two, these numerical
figures alone provided insufficient evidence for any relationship between breach and
appeal numbers. Therefore, a case study of a Centrelink office was conducted to obtain
more information about the social context of Centrelink breaches and appeals.
Information was collected via interviews with Centrelink clients, documents obtained
:from the office, and direct observation. Some limitations inherent in the study were also
considered here.

Having established in Chapter Three that the current Australian

welfare regime can be understood as essentially neo-liberalising, Parts B and C
evaluated possible explanations for the disparity of breach and appeal numbers in the
light of the case study findings. Part B considered the contemporary pragmatic
approaches of the neo-liberals and the advocates in Chapter Four. New-contractualism
accounts were considered in Chapter Five. In Part C, some approaches that elaborated
ideas of surveillance and individualisation were evaluated in relation to the case study
findings. Chapter Six evaluated accounts the view surveillance as oppressive, while
Chapter Seven covered an account of surveillance and individualisation that drew :from
Foucault's analysis of discipline and govemmentality.

Chapter Four in Part B considered the neo-liberal and advocacy approaches. The
neo-liberals (Hansard, 1997; 2000; 2000a; McClure, 2000b) dominate Australian social
policy. They draw :from a belief in market forces and individual enterprise to criticise
the post World War Two welfare states for creating welfare dependence. They argue for
a more participatory system that, through measures such as breaching, punishes those
who do not participate. They perceive the current breach and appeal numbers as a
positive indicator that this approach is working. The advocacy view (ACOSS, 2000b;
ACOSS, 200 1a; ACOSS, 2001b; ACOSS & NWRN, 2000; The Salvation Army
Australia, 2001; WRAS, 1999; WRAS, 2000) provided many valuable insights into how
the current breach and appeal figures reflect the vulnerability of Centrelink clients to
administrative error or misuse of power in an unnecessarily harsh breaching regime.
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Both the neo-liberal and advocacy approaches represent contemporary pragmatic
responses to welfare in Australia and have significant strengths, but serious weaknesses,
for explaining the breach and appeal figures. The neo-liberal account of current breach
and appeal figures was shown to be limited because it did not account for the vulnerable
position of Centrelink clients with respect to the market. Their assumption that clients
who do not reapply after being breached have other sources of income-otherwise they
appeal-was also shown to be false.

On the other hand, the advocate's interpretation of the breach and appeal figures
was found to be limited because it dealt with the vulnerability of Centrelink clients in a
paternalistic manner. It thus did not account for the vulnerability of Centrelink clients to
the state, or advocacy agencies themselves.

Chapter Five in Part B considered the new-contractualism writers' applicability
to the case study findings. According to this scholarship there is a contemporary
contractualism in Australian social policy which uses the language of classical legal
contract, but reinterprets it. Camey and Yeatman represent different general approaches
in this literature that offer different understandings of this reinterpretation of the
contract.

Camey (1 998; 1 999; 2001 ) is critical of current new-contractualism which he
argues is neo-liberalism embodied. He is particularly concerned that contemporary neo
liberal based new-contractualism retracts TH Marshall type social citizenship to a
citizenship based on individual agreements, such as individual activity agreements
between a JNA officer and a Centrelink client. This is not a classical legal contract
because the parties are neither equal or free. According to Camey's new-contractualism,
the relationship between increasing breach numbers and low appeal numbers is
connected to new administrative arrangements. In particular, the increase in breaches
after 1 9 97-1 998 corresponds with the introduction of Centrelink and the JNAs and their
more individualised quasi-contract approach, while the decreasing scope for
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administrative appeal of welfare matters has prevented a corresponding increase in
formal appeals.

Camey's interpretation of current breach and appeal figures was shown to be
compelling. Indeed, it clearly linked the increased number of breaches and stagnation of
appeals with changing fundamentals of social policy. In particular both the increase of
breaches since 1 997-1 998 and the continuing low number of appeals, despite the rise in
breaches, was linked to new welfare architecture in Australia, especially the
introduction of the Job Network.

However, this new-contractualism approach had some serious limitations in
relation to the case study data. It failed to account for why some Centrelink clients did
not seek a formal appeal even if they disagreed with a Centrelink decision and were
aware of the possibility of appeal. It also incorrectly assumed that the appeals structure
is entirely benevolent.

Yeatman (2001 ; 1 997; 1 998; 1 999) offers a different interpretation of new
contractualism in Australian welfare. While she does locate the new-contractualism in
contemporary Australian social policy within neo-liberalism, she partners this with a
second influence-social movements on behalf of social welfare client groups.
Although Yeatman stops short of supporting neo-liberalism, she is less critical of new
contractualism than Camey because she views it as a less paternalistic development of
neo-liberalism.

An interpretation of current breach and appeal figures based on Yeatman's
explication of new contractualism was shown to be compelling in many instances. First,
it does not optimistically accept the benevolence of the appeals system like Camey.
Second, unlike Camey, Yeatman does account for why Centrelink clients do not seek a
formal appeal, despite disagreeing with a Centrelink decision and being somewhat
aware of the appeal structure-because they know it is not in their "deeper preference"
(Yeatman, 1 999, p. 267) to fight their activity agreement. Indeed, some research has
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shown that Centrelink clients ultimately agree with being breached because it means
they remain active. Further, some clients that were interviewed expressed similar
sentiments-while they often found Centrelink requirements inconvenient, they also
saw their necessity.

However, although this approach does offer an explanation for a client not
seeking an external appeal even when they know this is possible and disagree with a
Centrelink decision-it is a flawed explanation. If Centrelink clients must be coerced to
follow their own "deeper preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267) in one area-active job
seeking-how can we be sure they are acting in accordance to their own "deeper
preference" (Yeatman, 1999, p. 267) by not appealing when breached. To claim any
action to be a higher good is potentially arbitrary and, thus, risky.

Although some clients interviewed did agree with the need for enforcing
compliance through breaching, this agreement should not be considered in isolation
from their other comments. They also felt that they had few or no rights when dealing
with Centrelink.

However, perhaps the focus should not be on what type of contract we have, as
Camey and Yeatman assume, but why people have accepted this contract in the first
place. In particular, the surveillance and individualisation of Centrelink clients might
hold a key to explaining why some clients don't seek an appeal, despite being both
unhappy with a Centrelink decision and aware of the possibility of appeal. Surveillance
generally means continual monitoring, while individualisation means, generally, giving
individual character to someone or something. Two general accounts of surveillance and
individualisation were considered in Part C-accounts of surveillance as oppressive in
Chapter Six and an account that drew from Foucault's work in Chapter Seven.

According to accounts which view surveillance as oppressive (De Maria, 1992;
Fox Piven & Cloward, 1971; McMahon et al., 2000; Pateman, 1989/2000), the current
disparity of Centrelink breach and appeal figures relate to welfare's relationship with
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the powerful. In particular, the disparity might be due to the oppressive surveillance that
Centrelink clients are subjected to.

This approach's interpretation of current Centrelink breach and appeal figures
was compelling. This interpretation of oppressive surveillance might explain why some
Centrelink clients do not seek a formal appeal when they disagree with a Centrelink
decision, even if they are aware of the appeals process-because they are too oppressed.
This explanation does seem to fit with the powerlessness clients expressed in
interviews. For example, Jim felt so surveyed that he said "It's [being a Centrelink
client] like being in gaol".

Despite these strengths however, this approach does not explain why people let
themselves be so oppressed. Conley offers a partial explanation, that they have
internalised their labels (Conley, 1 982, p. 281 ). However, this explanation is insufficient
because it does not explain how this occurred. Although many oppressive surveillance
writers prefer to focus on collectivity to show the class (Fox Piven & Cloward, 1 97 1 )
(or gender (Pateman, 1 989/2000), race etc) based nature of individuals' experiences,
this does neglect questions about how these processes work on the level of the
individual. Hence, an approach which engages with both surveillance and
individualisation was shown to be required.

Much current work on surveillance and individualisation in social welfare draws
from the work of Michel Foucault (1 977; 1 980; 1 99 1 ). This approach was considered in
Chapter Seven. Surveillance and individualisation are, according to this approach,
imperfect techniques of disciplinary power which, along with other techniques such as
classification, normalisation and distribution, imperfectly make Centrelink clients into
governable individuals. The case study data provided evidence for each of these
disciplinary techniques, and also their failure.

Governmentality, according to this approach is concerned with the how of
governing. The current breach and appeal figures reflect both neo-liberal political
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rationality to create compliant job seeking customer citizens, and its failure. Breaches
and appeals reflect both the success of disciplinary techniques and their ability to create
cynical Centrelink clients who expect their rights to be violated and do not appeal a
decision even if they disagree with it and know of the possibility of appeal.

This approach was shown to offer the best interpretation of the case study
findings. Unlike the other approaches that were considered, it does offer a convincing
account of the finding that Centrelink clients may not seek an appeal, even if they both
disagree with a Centrelink decision and are ware of the possibility of an appeal. That
this is both a result of their training to become compliant jobseekers, and the failure of
disciplinary techniques to do so.

A compliant jobseeker accepts punishment as

deserved and thus would not seek an appeal. However these techniques may also create
Centrelink clients who expect their rights to be violated and do not appeal when
breached-even when they both disagree with a Centrelink decision and are aware of
the possibility of formal external appeal. Thus, the current disparity of breach and
appeal figures might also reflect the failure (or incomplete governance) of neo-liberal
political rationality. It might reflect cynical Centrelink clients who expect their rights to
be violated and disassociate breaches with their own non-compliance-not competent
customer citizens. Such clients are more likely to accept a Centrelink decision rather
than seek a formal appeal-even if they disagree with a decision Centrelink has made
about them and are aware of the possibility of external appeal.

Hence this thesis tentatively concludes that the current disparity of Centrelink
breach and appeal figures might reflect neo-liberal political rationality and its governing
techniques and, also, its incompleteness or failure. Or, in other words, when we pull
down breaches (or appeals) for further analysis, the neo-liberalising conservatism that
currently dominates Australian social policy reforms appears over confident about its
potency to control individual Centrelink clients' and their subjectivities.
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Appendix A: Interview schedule

Opening
"Hello, My name is Lyndal and I'm a postgraduate student with Edith
Cowan University doing a study on why people do or do not formally
question Centrelink decisions.
Could you spare me 1 0-20 minutes of your time to answer a few questions?
Your answers will be treated as confidential. I needed you to read this so
the university knows I am interviewing you with your informed consent."

Decisions Made by Centre/ink
"Thinking about your dealings with Centrelink, have there been any
decisions taken which you have disagreed with?"
O Yes

O No

0 Not Sure

If"Yes""What did you do when you disagreed with the Centrelink decision?
"What rights do you think you have when you disagree with a decision taken by
Centre link?"

"To what extent are you aware that you have a right to have decisions of
Centrelink subject to a review by an Authorised Review Officer?"

I-------I--------I-------I
Very aware Somewhat Aware Not Sure Not Aware
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"To what extent are you aware that you have a right to have decisions of
Centrelink subject to a review by an appeal to the Social Security Appeals
Tribunal?"
I--------I---------I--------I
Very aware Somewhat Aware Not Sure
Not Aware

"Have you ever taken a decision by Centrelink to a review by an
Authorised review officer or to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal?"
o ARO

o SSAT

o Neither

If "yes" to either ARO or SSAT

How did you find out about the ARO/SSAT?
About You
"To make sure that the people I interview are representative it would help if you would
answer some questions about yourself. Please keep in mind that your answers are
treated as confidential."
First can I ask you what kind of Centrelink payment you are receiving?
0 Disability Support Pension
0 Sickness Allowance
0 Newstart Allowance
0 Youth Allowance
0 Supporting Parent Payment
0 Aged Pension

0 Family Allowance/Family Payment

0 AUSTUDY/ABSTUDY
0 Special Benefit
0 Other (please specify) ________

Into which age category do you fall?
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0 15 - 21
0 2 1 - 24
0 25 - 34
0 35 - 44
0 45 - 54
0 55 - 59
O 60 - 64
0 65 +
Interviewer to complete:
O Male
0 Female

Do you have children living with you?
0 Yes

O No

If "Yes" how many and what ages are your children?
Child 1
Child 2
Child 3
Child 4

Age __ years
Age __ years
Age __ years
Age __ years

Were you born in Australia?
0 Yes
0 No

What Language do you speak at home?
0 English
0 Other, please specify ______

Are you a person with a disability?
0 Yes
0 No
If "Yes" what is the nature or type of disability(s)?
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Are you of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander decent?
0 Yes
0 No

What suburb or town do you live in ?
-------- Postcode: ---

Thank you very much.
If you have any difficulties in dealings with Centrelink or wish to questions
their decision you do have the right to do so. You can either talk to
someone at Centrelink and request a review by an Authorised Review
Officer, make a complain to the Commonwealth Ombudsman (Ph. 9220
754 1 ) or contact the Welfare Rights and Advocacy Service (08) 9328 1 75 1
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Appendix B: Statement of disclosure and informed consent

This study asks why unemployed people rarely challenge Centrelink
when it breaches them. To answer this question, I wish to ask
unemployed peoples themselves, by conducting unstructured interviews
with unemployed people who have been breached. This will only take
1 0-20 minutes of your time and will be tape recorded. This research
hopes to help make Centrelink accountable to how it treats its clients.
Participation in the interview is strictly confidential and voluntary. You
are free to decline to participate or withdraw from the interview at any
time.
Any questions concerning the project entitled: "Pulling up their 'breaches ': a
Foucaultian discourse analysis of the power processes that lead unemployed
people to accept 'breaches ' " can be directed to Lynda/ Sleep of the School of
Community Services and Social Sciences on (. .. . . . ... ... . ..)
Ifyou have any concerns about the project or would like to talk to an
independent person, you may contact the research ethics officer on (... ... ... ... .. .)
� .......................................................................................
CONSENT FORM
Project (working) Title: "Pulling up their 'breaches ': an exploratory analysis
of current Centrelink breach and appeal numbers from 1996-97 to 2000-01 ".

I (the participant and parent or guardian of the participant if under 1 8 years old)
.................................... have read the information above and any
questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.
I agree to participate in this activity and for the interview to be tape recorded,
realising I may withdraw at any time.
I agree that the research data gathered for this study may be published provided I
am not identifiable.
Participant or authorised representative Date:
Investigator Date:
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Appendix C: List of interviewee pseudonym and brief description
Table 3: Interviewee pseudonym and brief description

Pseudonym

Age group and gender

John

15-2 1 year old male YA recipient

Jock

21-24 year old male, thinks he's on YA,
but not sure

Jack

21-24 year old male NSA recipient

Joe

25-34 year old male NSA (intensive
assistance) recipient

Josh

25-35 year old male AUSTUDY
recipient

Jenny

15-2 1 year old female YA (student)
recipient

Jemma

21-24 year old female NSA recipient

Jed

25-34 year old male AUSTUDY
recipient

Joan

25-34 year old female has two children

Jebidiah

35-44 year old male NSA recipient

Jemima

21-24 year old female, thinks she's on
NSA, Supporting Parent and Family
Allowance, but not sure, one child

Jay

21-24 year old male NSA recipient

Jacinta

21-24 year old female NSA recipient
with two children

Jaques

25-34 year old male AUSTUDY
recipient, approached me and asked to
be interviewed while I was interviewing
another, period of homelessness

Jackie

25-35 year old female, thinks she's on
NSA, but not sure
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Jonathon

25-35 year old male NSA recipient,
currently seeking an appeal at the SSAT

Jasmine

25-35 year old female NSA recipient

Jeff

35-44 year old male NSA recipient

Jillian

35-44 year old female NSA recipient

Jim

45-54 year old male long term
unemployed

Jane

21-24 year old female YA recipient

Jonnah

1 5-21 year old male NSA recipient

